Co-production - between service delivery strategy and urban governance transformation approach

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This dissertation explores the role of co-production in transforming existing urban governance frameworks. Specifically, it interrogates how the co-production of housing between civil society or urban poor groups and the public sector influences urban governance processes.

While referring to the existing interpretations of co-production, this thesis focuses on the hitherto largely unexplored issue of extending the co-production approach from a project or neighbourhood scale to broader governance structures. In so doing, this dissertation builds on the classic understanding of co-production as primarily a service delivery strategy, through linking it to the debate on social-movements-initiated or bottom-up co-production. Herein, the intricacies of the co-production process are analysed in the context of low-income housing provision within an exclusionary governance setting (as is commonly found in rapidly urbanising areas). Through a review of the extant literature, this thesis discusses the differences in understandings of co-production in various intellectual traditions and develops a framework for the analysis of governance transformation processes in the aforementioned contexts.

The central empirical part of the thesis is based on field research in Metro Manila, and concerns activism among the urban poor and civil society that led to the establishment of the Oplan LIKAS programme for the relocation of and development of housing for circa. 120,000 Informal Settler Families. Based on the findings from this fieldwork, the overarching argument of the thesis is that while co-production is typically explored and analysed in settings at the project level, its distinct features undergo important transformations when attempting to scale-up projects. This process, termed here the ‘co-production of governance’, gains new features and experiences new challenges in comparison to project-level interventions. Namely, the process of scaling-up urban poor solutions requires the application of more diverse approaches than in classic co-productive projects. Its typical features such as networking, and showing by doing, are essential for the internal organisations of movements and groups attempting to reach the higher governance level; however, to leverage the impact of people and effect change on governance processes, a number of additional external strategies are
also required. These include, among others, a readiness to engage in more politicised arenas, where ad hoc coalitions and conflict-based action become essential. In this way, the thesis supports the view that co-production, rather than being seen as a pure ideal model approach, needs to coincide with a range of different strategies to be effective in higher governance settings.

Finally, this thesis reflects on the complexities of the governance creation phase in which people’s movements attempt to successfully position themselves as co-creators of policies or programmes at the metropolitan scale. Through this, some key assumptions frequently found in a variety of international studies are questioned. Firstly, the institutionalisation of pro-poor solutions, as much as they are empowering, may also have exclusionary effects. These occur when ‘formal’ sectors use informal mechanisms to shape institutionalised frameworks in such a way that their fixed regulatory logic counters the principles of flexibility inherent in people’s approaches. Secondly, a significant challenge relates to power imbalances within the urban poor sector, where the capacity to engage in complex co-productive activities is not shared uniformly by all urban poor actors, particularly in situations where ready-made housing products are on offer.

In conclusion, this thesis supports the view that co-production is one of the most effective approaches available to the urban poor for building relations with governance structures at the local level. However, this approach inevitably experiences new challenges when applied at higher levels of governance, and therefore needs to be supported by a variety of different strategies and undergo thorough restructuring to ensure long-lasting, pro-poor inclusionary outcomes. The theoretical concept of co-production of governance understands this process as an open-ended engagement that, rather than being a form of institutionalised deliberation, enables the urban poor to continuously influence, review and update policies within or outside of formally recognised bodies. At the same time, the approach should ensure that newly established approaches continue to mirror urban poor groups’ own protocols and safeguard principles of flexibility and collective action.


Das übergreifende Argument der Dissertation ist, dass Koproduktion typischerweise und hauptsächlich auf der reinen Projektebene erkundet und erforscht wird, jedoch dass ihre gut definierten Eigenschaften einen wichtigen Transformationsprozess durchlaufen, bei dem Versuch, den Ansatz hochzuskalieren. Der Prozess, der hier als Koproduktion von Governance definiert wird, gewinnt neue Eigenschaften und begegnet neuen Herausforderungen, die es auf Projektebene nicht gab. Die Hochskalierung von Koproduktion erfordert die Anwendung von stärker

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research context

Contemporary cities are one of the most powerful manifestations of human creativity and the ability to commonly develop complex but functional systems that, at least to some degree and in the long term, work to the overall benefit of their inhabitants. Historically, the city-building process was led by communities and individuals incrementally erecting settlements that best fitted their needs and represented their cultures. Over time, as planning history teaches us, a knowledge of the ways in which cities can be organised was systematised and translated into planning systems. Cities did not, however, become the sole handiwork of professionals and authorities. The influence and input of the people continued to be essential. As a result, cities were always co-produced or co-created by the different actors involved in the process, though this process took a variety of pathways, ranging from cooperation to rivalry and contestation. Somewhat paradoxically, and in the face of current systematised Euro-American planning thought, we are today seeing a return to a situation in which ordinary people take the lead in the creation of their cities.

This phenomenon has most recently been linked to the rapid urbanisation process unfolding mainly in Asia and Africa. Thirty-five of the thirty-six cities whose populations increased by around 6% between 2000 and 2018 were located on these two continents. This compares with an average annual growth of 2.4% in cities with a population over 500,000 (UN, 2018) and illustrates the magnitude of the changes those Asian and African cities are facing. This trend is expected to continue in the coming decades. While the world’s urban population is estimated to increase by two-thirds by 2050, around 90% of that growth will occur in Asian and African cities (UN DESA, 2015: 12). Owing to multileveled factors, including the rapidity of the growth, much of the housing for the increasing population will be created by the new urban dwellers themselves, inevitably leading to establishment of new approaches challenging the existing governance constellations (Herrle, Fokdal and Ley, 2013). On the one hand, this type of housing process illustrates people’s eagerness to live in cities as well as their
capacity to create functional settlements through a self-help approach (Turner, 1997). On the other hand, many new settlements created in this fashion tend to be developed in precarious contexts, with a large proportion of their inhabitants living without access to basic services and suffering from environmental and health hazards (Davis, 2005). Whether this type of self-built settlement succeeds in providing a safe living environment and helps people better their position, or fails to do so, depends on more than just autonomous entrepreneurialism and the activism of the inhabitants. The broader macro-structural context, as well as governance matters and solutions promoted by the public sector and planning practice, can also in various ways have an effect. Despite evidence that incorporating self-managed housing ‘in public and formal social housing delivery system is invaluable; ignoring or combating it is unwise’ (Smets, Bredenoord and von Lindert, 2014: 1), the latter approach has been the main modus operandi for the public sector in many contexts. This kind of ambiguous relationship between people’s activism and official policies has manifested itself even in some overall supportive policy environments. A curious example is the Millennium Development Goals, whose Goal 7 aimed to improve the lives of a minimum of 100 million slum-dwellers by 2020. This goal was supported at many different levels, from local implementation level to a number of global campaigns, including Cities Alliance’s ‘Cities Without Slums’. This campaign fostered the implementation of many innovative programmes, but also, unsurprisingly, given its title, opened the way for its misinterpretation in some contexts as an incentive for the radical eradication of slums, thereby perpetuating the vicious circle of demolitions and replacement (Huchzermeyer, 2011). In this way, an overall progressive agenda, envisioned as an effort to improve the living standards of people across the globe, may have to some degree had the opposite effect. When juxtaposed with such straightforwardly unfavourable circumstances as land accumulation by power holders, it remains no surprise that the number of people living in slum conditions is not declining significantly. Globalisation and the neo-liberal policies (Pieterse, 2008) which have to a large degree shaped urban development processes in many Southern contexts, rather than solving the issue, had contributed to growing precariousness and inequalities.

In spite of this rather pessimistic picture and the clearly conflicting rationalities of the different actors in the urban development process (Watson, 2003), it would be simplistic to discard the possibility of bridging the agendas of ordinary inhabitants of
contemporary cities and representatives of the state or professionals. Alongside autonomous activities of the people, planning systems that engage people through a variety of participatory approaches have long been discussed. As described by Arnstein (1969), such cooperation, although sometimes marked by elements of manipulation, can also lead to true partnerships and real citizen control over the development process in a project context. In the Southern contexts the idea of including the people in the development process gained momentum after the fall of the mass housing schemes of the 1960s and 1970s (Ley, 2010). Most significantly, the recognition of people’s capacity to build housing for themselves (Abrams, 1964; Turner and Fitcher, 1972; Turner, 1997) resulted in the development of such approaches as aided self-help, slum upgrading, incremental housing and so on (Galuszka, 2012). Supported by new governance constellations promoting concepts such as the New Public Management system, these housing solutions were able to emerge from the 1970s onwards as a real alternative to classical housing delivery systems. Their further promotion by international development agencies including the World Bank and the UN resulted in the establishment of several landmark programmes where the people took on the key role in the settlement upgrading process. Some of these programmes turned out successful. Close government-community partnerships were a fundamental part of the process. Among the most successful of these programmes were the Million Houses Programme in Sri Lanka and the Kampung Improvement Programme in Indonesia (Joshi and Khan, 2010; Silas 1992). In some other contexts, however, global agendas enforced the decentralised housing process according to a one-size-fits-all model, which responded poorly to local dynamics of urban development and reinforced the dichotomy between those who decide on housing frameworks and those who have to fit into them (Riley, Fiori and Ramirez, 2001; Balbo, 2014). Any shift towards an increased role for communities in the development process remained largely dependant on external conditions such as the openness of the state to this type of cooperation and the governance mode it represented (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). In many contexts, decentralisation and the inclusion of communities in the upgrading process were perceived as an attempt to depoliticise these communities (Burgess, 1978), enabling their engagement in housing delivery while pushing them away from broader governance and the policy arena. Many participatory approaches and inclusivity mechanisms, while seemingly adaptive, respectful to local cultural contexts and flexible
imposed value systems and subjected people to power structures they were unable to contest (Cornwall, 2004; Miraftab 2004; Cooke and Kothari, 2011). Not all authors took this view, however, with some pointing out that although participation could be a form of subjection results were context dependent and that for some groups participation might in fact provide an opening for political action rather than depoliticise them (Williams, 2004). Nevertheless, regardless of the impact these kinds of approaches might have on governance structures and the political process, another critique was made regarding the devolution of service delivery obligations away from the state. The process was reinforced by the neo-liberal turn which provided leeway for the orthodox implementation of ideas of a modern city (Pieterse, 2008) catering to the needs of the real estate and private sectors rather than being concerned with the needs of the urban poor. This often took the form of ‘speculative urbanism’ (Goodfellow, 2017), which radically pushed low income communities out of the city centres. In these contexts, even when people had a role in designing neighbourhoods and took part in the service delivery process, the overall logic of the urban development process clearly perpetuated their exclusion rather than integrating them as rightful citizens.

Since recently, these failures, gaps in implementation and contradictions were theorised within the context of the failure to grasp the logic of squatting or informal urbanisation by the dominant forces in planning practice (Roy 2005; Pieterse 2008; Veseduwan, 2015) - an issue that is evident across Asia and Africa. One problem is that many official planning systems still operate with colonially infused tools ill-adapted to local realities (Odendaal, 2012; Akaateba, 2018). In addition, these systems are very often influenced by imaginaries of modernity and globalness exported from foreign contexts or motivated by ‘nation building’ aspirations (Holston, 2009; Shatkin, 2005; Watson, 2014a) and manifested in the development of showy mega-projects with scant reflection on the impact of these initiatives on informal dwellers. A third problem is the inherent belief of the planning machinery that, rather than being a valid expression of urban development, informality is a manifestation of a lack of formality and an aberration rather than a norm (McFarlane, 2012; Banks, Lombardi and Mitlin, 2019).

In response to these negative influences there has been an increasing recognition that planning theory and practice in the South needs to devise its own approaches if local challenges are to be tackled effectively (Yiftachel, 2006; Watson, 2009; Roy 2009a;
Robinson, 2013). In particular, the practices of the people moving into the new settlements need to be recognised as constitutive to the nature of local cities (Roy and AlSaayad, 2004; Vasudevan, 2015) and their views and perspectives recognised as holding significant potential for conceptualising contemporary cities (Banks, Lombardi and Mitlin, 2019). Consequently, at ground level, rather than being simplistically incorporated or formalised within official planning systems, these practices need to be placed at the system’s core.

Depending on a context, the academic debate identified several formats of influence that ordinary urban dwellers can have on the ways in which planning and broader urban governance is framed.

The main discussion included:
- Decentralised activism of urban dwellers aimed at extending the rigid frameworks imposed by the state through persistent daily practices and the gradual appropriation of spaces (Bayat, 2000; Holston, 2009) and by operating in the interstices of hegemonic structures (Perera, 2015).
- More organised bottom-up social movements, operating in a networked (Castells, 1983), politicised and often contentious manner (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly and Wood, 2015). These activities are based on a capacity to engage in collective action and those involved frequently have specific political demands.
- Co-production of services between the state and citizens (Joshie and Moore, 2004; Mitlin 2008; Watson 2014b; Mitlin and Bartlett, 2018).

While each of the above, or some combination (Mitlin, 2018), can be seen as a useful solutions for restructuring existing governance relations, co-production has been increasingly discussed as an approach representing the Southern perspective in planning (Watson, 2014b) and as an enabler of far-reaching change for the benefit of the urban poor (Mitlin and Bartlett, 2018). This relatively recent understanding of co-production builds on its previous conceptualisations that emerged from the 1970s when the approach was identified alongside more established and described modes of citizen participation (Percy, 1984). Probably the most commonly quoted definition of the term comes from Elinor Ostrom, who described it as a process whereby individuals representing different organisations contribute to produce a service or good (Ostrom, 1996) (this definition was paraphrased by some researchers to apply to interactions between groups rather than individuals) (Parks, et al., 1981). As pointed out by
Albrechts (2012), these early works concentrated predominantly on co-production as a strategy to enable the state to reduce budgetary costs and increase service delivery. Much attention was given to co-production as a business, management and organisational practice (Ramirez, 1999). At the same time, the benefits to the citizens of the approach were discussed mainly in terms of adapting the state’s response to their needs and increasing forms of participation (Percy, 1984), which in some cases translated into an impact on the policy making arena (Whitaker, 1980). Other possible benefits to the people were also pointed out, such as empowerment and the creation of resilience within community structures (Cahn, 2000).

Building on those early conceptualisations, the co-production discussion has, in the last decade, assumed a prominent position in the contexts of North America, Australia and Europe (Pestoff and Brandsen, 2013; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013) as well as increasing relevance in Southern contexts (Joshie and Moore, 2004; Mitlin, 2008; Watson, 2014b).

This shift has included its recognition as an approach structuring the urban development process in the South (Watson, 2014b). In a broader sense co-production is considered to be effective in tackling the specifics of governance processes and the blurriness of on-the-ground realities. In contrast to ‘good governance’ principles, including democratic participation, empowerment and individual human rights, these realities include practices of clientelism, brokerage and ad hoc arrangements as characteristic of the relationships between the poor and state representatives (Benit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2011). Similarly, it most often operates in a context of rapid urbanisation, high inequalities, land pressure and informality. In other words, in an unsupportive environment in which power holders tend to structurally disempower urban poor groups and communities rather than work towards inclusiveness (Heller, 2001). The co-production approach enables communities to navigate these complex contexts and challenge existing power relations (Siame, 2018), to mainstream new knowledge production modalities (Jasanoff, 2004) and build relationships with official agencies (Appadurai, 2001). This is typically achieved through a variety of on-the-ground activities such as conducting surveys, enumeration, savings schemes and demonstration projects, all supported by networking activities which often spark collective action. In effect, this approach reinforces reaction from the public sector, which often is incentivised to cooperate with civil society organisations thanks to
decreased service delivery costs. In this way the knowledge, resources and sweat equity of communities translates into increased political recognition through an acknowledgement of people’s citizenship rights (Mitlin, 2008). This often leads to greater independence of bottom-up groups from the patronage of powerful figures and positions them as more powerful stakeholders in the development process. Consequently, groups engaging in co-production are often seen as apolitical (Appadurai, 2001) or at least distrustful of old grassroots organisations and political parties (Bovaird, 2007).

In other words, co-production in the South is seen as an approach which counteracts issues associated with externally installed participatory approaches and the decontextualized application of some housing solutions promoted by major development agencies. Overall, when described as social-movement-initiated co-production (Watson, 2014b) or bottom-up co-production (Mitlin, 2008), the approach is considered to have the potential to transform broader governance structures and make them more equitable and inclusive.

The dissertation presented here concerns itself with this part of the co-production discussion and with the possible restructuring impact of the approach on governance matters in the context of the broadly-understood South.

1.2 Knowledge gap and research problem

The interest in co-productive arrangements, both in terms of practical arrangements and as a subject of research, has been growing since the 1980s (Alford, 2009) and has further intensified in recent years (Verschuere, Brandsen and Pestoff, 2012; Brandsen and Honigh, 2016). Currently the concept is used in a variety of contexts ranging from traditional service delivery orientation to a research and knowledge creation approach (Jasanoff, 2004; Moser 2016), as well as a policy and governance framing tool (Ackerman, 2004). Nevertheless the term, with its multiple uses, is still characterised by conceptual ambiguity and mixed definitions (Joshie and Moore, 2004; Evert and Evers, 2014). Moreover, the distinctive features of the approach depend on the cultural perspective and intellectual traditions in which they are settled (Verschuere, Brandsen and Pestoff, 2012). Consequently, it has been suggested that, rather than being treated
as a single phenomenon, co-production needs to be understood as having multiple manifestations and characteristics (Brandsen and Honigh, 2016). The research presented here intends to fill a gap in one particular strand of the co-production discussion presented in the preceding section; namely that of social-movement or grassroots-initiated co-production in the context of the global South. The knowledge gap has two dimensions. First and more broadly, in spite of their potential relevance for global theory making, the majority of empirical studies over the last few decades have been conducted in European, Northern American and Australian contexts (Cepiku and Giordano, 2014). Secondly, an examination of studies concentrating on the Southern context reveals that a majority of them underline the relevance of co-production in challenging existing power relations and influencing policy making and broader governance structures to the benefit of the civil society and urban poor movements. However, in spite of the clear ambition of urban poor groups and networks to scale up their approaches to a city-wide scale (ACCA, 2014) and to achieve far-reaching change (Mitlin and Bartlett, 2018), the research into and documentation of this process rarely go beyond a single project or neighbourhood scale (Galuszka, 2019). In such cases, the discussion on governance change is limited to the specific administrative units and structures in which the process is settled. As a result, it is easy to assume that governance change is driven by such well-researched features of project-level co-production as ‘showing by doing’, networking, the building of own financial and knowledge bases and, typically, by operating independently from established political movements (Watson, 2014b; Mitlin, 2008). These features are then extrapolated to larger scales of governance, overlooking the fact that something that worked on a small or mezzo scale may not necessarily succeed in a different context. In fact, project-related assumptions regarding the role of co-production and the way it affects planning systems may lose their validity when the co-productive approach is truly aiming to scale up to a broader governance level. At those levels the power structures may work differently, larger political and economic interests may come into play and the realities of the transformation process may differ from the familiar perspective of small urban communities, on-the-ground projects or neighbourhood contexts. Empirical investigation into what is included in this broader process, currently largely missing, is essential for an understanding of the prospects and transformations of the co-productive process on an urban or metropolitan scale.
Similarly, most case studies look at the factors which influence the functioning of co-productive arrangements but not at their outcomes (Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 2015). Consequently, the impacts of co-production on governance, although considered to be high (Miller and Wyborn, 2018), remain largely unknown or undocumented in a broader metropolitan or countrywide scale. At the same time, a lack of relevant local underpinnings means that in the discussion around urbanisation in the South (Cepiku and Girdiano, 2014) the models applied for measuring the impacts of co-production and its interrelation with policy and governance domains operate mainly within analytical frameworks rooted in the Euro-American context. A large portfolio of practices and their impacts is therefore at risk of being omitted from the academic debate.

The dissertation presented here intends to fill these research gaps through a discussion of the broader governance impacts of co-production, documentation of a case study with relevance for wider governance structures and the development of new analytical frameworks for grasping the subtleties of the process in a complex governance system. The intention is to understand how the classical project-level process is transformed when it enters a wider scale, what it retains from its original frameworks and how it interacts with approaches labelled as distinctive from ‘pure’ co-productive process. Thus, it will reflect on a whole new level of engagement discussed as co-production of governance and help define how it differs from more established (or more described) formats such as participatory governance and similar.

1.3 Research questions, approach and methods

In response to the identified research gaps the dissertation concentrates on two main research questions.

1. How does the process of co-production of housing between civil society/urban poor groups and the public sector affect urban governance?

2. What promotes and limits the outreach of co-productive approaches?
The research takes an inductive approach with the intention of generating new perspectives in the inquiry on civil society/urban poor and public sector cooperation in the context of the South. While grounded in the current discussion on co-production, it intends to shed new light on the conceptual relevance of the approach as a way of creating new governance constellations and synthesising new theoretical perspectives for the analysis of a governance transformation process.

Considering the growing blurriness of sharply distinguished research paradigms in postmodernist thought (Geertz, 1993) and in line with the view that ‘by definition research in "the urban" traverses disciplines, scales and philosophical and methodological paradigms’ (Parnell and Pieterse, 2016: 242) the present dissertation draws from multiple perspectives. The adopted perspective stems from constructivist and participatory/cooperative paradigms, which in line with Lincoln and Guba’s view are non-exclusive and characterised by complementarity. The constructivist paradigm translates, in particular, to the recognition that the criteria for judging reality and knowledge creation derive from ‘the community consensus regarding what is “real”, what is useful and what has meaning’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2011: 167). At the same time, in line with the participatory/cooperative paradigm, the research attempts to follow the logic of doing the research ‘with people rather than on people’ (Heron and Reason, 2006: 144). This translates into the incorporation of ‘subjects’ into research decision making (Heron and Reason, 1997: 285), including the broader focus of the study and the practical issues to be addressed, as well as the selection of case studies and consultation on initial results for rephrased conclusions. It is also intended that the research will generate feedback with potential applied value to specific issues of interest to the community participating in the research.

This approach translated into the use of qualitative methods whose range was based on the specific focus of the articles included in the dissertation. Overall primary data gathering was based on such methods as: semi-structured interviews, participatory observation, transect walks in specific settlements and project areas, visual registration and expert workshops. Secondary research included a content analysis of relevant policy documentation. In response to criticism regarding participatory paradigm subjectivity, triangulation of data was applied as an approach for ‘cross-checking of information either by varying the methods, varying the sources of
information or varying the investigators’ (Miltin and Thompson, 1995: 239). While the research falls into a qualitative framework and did not generate its own quantitative data, the quantitative and spatial information sourced from local organisations was analysed and utilised for the aforementioned purpose. Similarly, in order to generate a broader understanding of the processes under discussion, the interviews were conducted with representatives of different sectors, all involved in the processes being analysed but holding a variety of stances in terms of their interpretation.

Depending on the focus of the articles presented, different methods were utilised, as described in the following chapters of the dissertation. The first article was mainly based on secondary research and informed by ten interviews with experts working in the Philippines and South Africa in the housing and monitoring and evaluation sectors. The next two articles utilise a case study research approach as each has a strong potential for planning theory advancement (Flyvbjerg, 2006) and stands as an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundary between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 1994: 13). To a large extent the discussion is based on data gathered during fieldwork conducted between November 2017 and March 2018 and a total of 37 semi-structured interviews in Metro Manila (see Appendix 1). This metropolis was particularly interesting for the study because of its socio-economic, political and governance context. More precisely, it is one of the biggest and fastest growing cities in South-East Asia, with a big proportion of informal settlements, high competition for land and a growing real-estate market. At the same time, the policy environment promoted decentralisation and an active civil society. This included several housing and finance programmes, which were internationally considered as progressive and supporting urban communities in settlements’ upgrading interventions, including those which incorporated principles of co-production in service delivery. The selection of interviewees was based on snowball sampling technique, while incorporating a balanced representation of the different sectors and interests groups involved in the development and implementation of the Oplan LIKAS programme. On the one hand, this included representatives of the two main urban poor blocs engaged in the programme and operating within Metro Manila: the Urban Poor Alliance (UP-ALL) and Kilos Maralita. Within UP-ALL this further involved organisations
representing different fractions of the bloc such as the Homeless People’s Federation, DAMPA, TRICOR alliance members and associated NGOs such as Urban Poor Associates, Community Mobilisers Multiversity and the TAO Pilippinas, as well as former representatives of the CMP congress. On the other hand, public sector representatives were also interviewed. These included both people who were associated with civil society during the Oplan LIKAS implementation period as well as representatives of agencies unaffiliated with the civil society bloc. Among them were high-ranking officials (or former officials) from the main shelter and the national government agencies responsible for programme development and implementation, such as: the National Housing Authority, the Social Housing Finance Corporation, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor. Additional interviews were conducted in Quezon City, Manila, San Juan, Pasig and San Jose Del Monte City with city administration representatives, NGOs and People’s Organisations mainly involved in the work of the Local Housing Boards.

Seven site visits and transect walks were carried out during the fieldwork phase. These included visits to newly-realised or almost-finalised resettlement housing projects conducted within Oplan LIKAS, a visit to two informal settlements prior to relocation and a visit to a community-based enumeration office. The primary data analysis was complemented with an analysis of relevant policies and quantitative and spatial data sourced from local shelter agencies and civil society organisations in Metro Manila, Philippines.

The dissertation also indirectly benefited from workshops and conferences orbiting around the theme of planning pedagogies and co-production and insights gained from the experts taking part in them. These events included the Habitat III conference in Quito in October 2016, the World Urban Forum IX in Kuala Lumpur in February 2018 and the brownbag session at the Philippines Institute for Development Studies in February 2018, which involved some of the interviewed experts and enabled discussion on the results of the study.
1.4 Dissertation outline

The dissertation is comprised of three single, authored, peer-reviewed articles in impact-factor journals of which two have been published and one was accepted for publication. The articles are organised so that they lead from more conceptual to practical debates on co-production. The first article concentrates on the broader foundations of the concept and the relevance of the approach for the governance process in the South. It discusses multiple interpretations of co-production through reference to its practical and theoretical applications in various cross-dimensional contexts. It lays out an analytical approach for studying the co-productive arrangements oriented on governance change in the context of an exclusionary governance setting. The second article focuses on a specific context of governance change on a metropolitan scale. This process is steered mainly through a co-productive approach by the urban poor sector with the intention of leveraging co-productive modality as a main housing delivery mode. More precisely, it is concerned with urban-poor-driven transformation of governance in relation to the Oplan LIKAS programme in Metro Manila in the Philippines. This text utilises the analytical framework laid out in the first article for an investigation of the processes discussed. The third article focuses even more closely at ground level and reflects on one of the modalities of the Oplan LIKAS programme, concentrating on co-production in multi-storey housing between urban poor groups and the public sector. Two projects of this type are discussed in great detail that includes the governance constellations they created as well as their implementation processes and tangible outcomes. In line with the publishers’ specifications, the articles included here are the Author’s Accepted Manuscripts.

Chapter 2

Following a number of prominent concepts in urban planning, like participatory planning or self-help housing, co-production has started to gain momentum in the global South context. While it has been long discussed as a means of service provision, the term is more and more often used in the broader sense of urban governance and policy planning. This understanding goes beyond the aspect of scaling-up successful co-productive infrastructure focused projects; rather, it indicates a different format of
engagement for prompting urban stakeholders into planning citywide urban solutions. This article discusses the distinction between the different levels of co-production and their inter-linkages, and it investigates the relevance of positioning co-production as a factor framing urban governance. This includes a discussion on three main contradictions that can be identified within the current discussion on co-production. Finally, it identifies a set of arguments for elaborating the role of co-production in a policy and urban governance setting.

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Statement of contribution: Jakub Galuszka is the single author.

Chapter 3

Social movement-initiated co-production has been increasingly described as an approach that enables urban poor communities in the South to gain wider access to urban governance. However, with a predominant focus on project-level interventions, the case studies in which movements truly affect governance matters in a metro scale are rare. One of the examples involving such an achievement is the activism of civil society organisations and urban poor groups in Metro Manila, Philippines, which have succeeded to have a major impact on the housing and resettlement programme; the Oplan LIKAS. This article analyses how the civil society was able to gain such a position and the way it utilised it. The documentation of the challenges experienced by the civil society reflects the nature of co-productive engagement in the South and shows that it may easily reach its limits in an exclusionary governance setting.

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Chapter 4

Faced with an ever-increasing demand for land in Metro Manila, as well as with the domination of standardised low-income housing models, the local civil society and the urban poor sector embarked on the development of an alternative shelter approach: in-city multi-storey housing delivered through the People’s Plans. The article documents the emergence of the approach, interrogates its main assumptions and takes a closer look at the implementation process through two case studies, in Pasig and San Jose Del Monte. The article analyses the modality as an attempt to create a hybrid approach between formal and informal delivery systems within the built form conventionally associated with the imaginaries of the ‘formal’ city. The findings underscore the role of co-production in enabling the urban poor sector to leverage their approach, while documenting the need to move beyond a formal-informal dichotomy in both theory and urban development practice.

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What makes urban governance co-productive? Contradictions in the current debate on co-production.

Jakub Galuszka

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What makes Urban Governance Co-productive? Contradictions in the Current Debate on Co-production.

Abstract

Following a number of prominent concepts in urban planning, like participatory planning or self-help housing, co-production has started to gain momentum in the global South context. While it has been long discussed as a means of service provision, the term is more and more often used in the broader sense of urban governance and policy planning. This understanding goes beyond the aspect of scaling-up successful co-productive infrastructure focused projects; rather, it indicates a different format of engagement for prompting urban stakeholders into planning citywide urban solutions. This article discusses the distinction between the different levels of co-production and their inter-linkages, and it investigates the relevance of positioning co-production as a factor framing urban governance. This includes a discussion on three main contradictions that can be identified within the current discussion on co-production. Finally, it identifies a set of arguments for elaborating the role of co-production in a policy and urban governance setting.

Keywords
civil society, co-production, institutionalisation, the urban poor, urban governance, urban planning

Introduction

The flow of urban discourses, originating in the power centres, has for decades impacted planning practices in the global South. Probably one of the most influential shifts in the way planning was done in the twentieth century in the South came with Turner’s notion of self-help housing, which celebrated the role of the urban poor as autonomous stakeholders with the capacity to steer the development of urban settlements (Turner and Fitcher, 1972; Turner, 1977). This salient framework supported the establishment of approaches that resulted in greater involvement of communities in the planning, construction and evaluation of urban development
projects. Over the following decades, major international agencies promoted a series of landmark approaches, including state-aided self-help housing, participatory slum upgrading or community driven development. At a project level, the effects of this participatory turn in planning in the South were considered to have generally been beneficial and to have helped to empower particular groups. Nevertheless, in retrospect it is doubtful whether this impulse resulted in real and meaningful advances, in particular in terms of power-relations – a factor identified as an important motor of urban spatial change (Watson, 2009). The classic model in which external stakeholders consult the local population has proven to be susceptible to misuse by a wide array of urban actors, starting with public administrations and ending with the community members themselves (Cooke and Khotari, 2001). Rather than bettering the position of the urban poor, the de-politicization of the housing question (Burgess, 1978) and the creation of sanctioned spaces of participation have been often used to extend the state’s control over society (Miraftab, 2009). Consequently, in spite of the participatory turn in planning, true citizen participation in the core functions of government remains extremely rare (Ackerman, 2004).

Moreover, regardless of the solutions applied by formal agencies, the huge population segment of unprivileged urban dwellers continues to grow and their informal and precarious settlements still constitute a dominant feature of many cities in the South. As a result, this sustained prevalence has more recently led to a reformulation of the focal question, namely is it the urban poor who need to participate in formal planning processes, or is it not the planning systems themselves that need to understand and take account of the dominant characteristics of Southern cities? Consequently, many scholars have come to recognise the inadequacy of analysing squatting and informality using investigative models developed by conventional planning agencies, which have proven to be contextually divorced from urban realities, and instead now emphasise the need to analyse how squatting practices constitute cities per se (Pieterse, 2008; Vasudevan, 2015).

One of the prominent concepts currently discussed within planning theory to address these challenges, and that is seen as ‘structuring planning and urban development processes in certain global South contexts’ (Watson, 2014: 63), is that of co-production. It is considered to be inclusive of developmental logic and a knowledge
of these urban actors, which do not typically fit into state-led and ‘professional’ planning schemes, and as such represents the dominant nature of the urban realm in the South (Watson, 2009).

However, similar to other popular buzzwords like ‘self-help’ in the 1970s or ‘community development’ in the 1980s (Sihlongonyane, 2009), the concept can acquire different meanings that are not necessarily mutually compatible. The term co-production is used interchangeably with other concepts, for instance co-creation (Voorberg, et al., 2015), and some of its definitions ‘are vague and unhelpful’ (Joshi and Moore, 2004: 39). Furthermore, along with the classic distinction of co-production as a service-delivery strategy (Albrechts, 2012), the concept is more and more often discussed as a form of engagement by different stakeholders at a policy and planning level, in particular as embedded via various bodies established within the sphere of formal governance. Similarly, co-production and co-design are increasingly identified as a distinct approach to knowledge building and research (Moser, 2016).

In 2017 alone the term of co-production was discussed in variety of different contexts, demonstrating both the popularity of the concept as well as its growing ambiguity. This is illustrated by a number of conferences and panels, the start of a PhD programme and planning of a special issue by a major journal, all revolving around the theme of co-production.

Based on a review of the literature to date and the author’s own research experiences, this article deals with a specific grey area in which co-production is increasingly discussed as an instrument of urban governance and policy framing. It examines how the concept of co-production overlaps with that of participatory planning, thus debating the relevance of positioning it within institutionalised forms of urban governance in the global South. In essence, the article argues that the concept requires sharper theoretical frames if it is intended to be reflective of the basic strategies of the urban poor, to represent the view from the South, or to be influential in the sphere of planning (Bovaird, 2007; Watson, 2014). The ultimate aim is to assist in distinguishing between governance-oriented formats that enable the development of new urban solutions and those that do not. On the one hand, this is motivated by a belief in the need to delink the debate from the notion of participatory urban governance, rooted in development discourses and practices in ‘Northern’ cities and mainstreamed through global development agencies such as the UN or the Cities Alliance (Pieterse,
As such, the article is intended as a contribution to the formulation of new theoretical perspectives on the major urban processes occurring in the South, but which have to date largely been perceived as ‘alternative’ or ‘innovative’ vis-à-vis approaches originating from the power centres. On the other hand, the goal is to further the distinction between those formats that truly represent approaches by informal urban actors from those that subject them to an external developmental logic.

The discussion below takes its cue from the conceptualisation of co-production as a deliberate engagement between the grassroots and the state, and characterised by a dynamic that encourages it to move beyond a local orientation towards more sustainable change (Mitlin, 2008: 353). It looks at both a range of new institutional possibilities that can affect urban governance in real terms (Watson, 2014, 74) and – as has already been widely described in the case of the Asian Coalition of Housing Rights (ACHR) – the specific movements able to capitalise on their own knowledge and a finance base in order to develop formats of engagement with urban politics. As such, the discussion links back to the argument that cities in the South are predominantly built by the urban dwellers themselves, and that a proper recognition of this sphere of activities at a governance level can result in the production of better urban solutions. The argument is based on a review of three main visible contradictions in the discussion on co-production: institutionalisation versus flexibility, conflict versus cooperation, and process versus outputs.

Co-production in policy settings and the participatory governance spectrum

The co-production debate commenced in 1970, and although initially a marginal concept it gradually became prominent in public management and economic studies. One of the research pioneers in the field, Elinor Ostrom (1996: 1073), defined it as ‘the process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the same organisation.’ Almost from the point it was first analysed, co-production was identified as extending the meaning of classic participatory models and as a case of citizens exercising a potential effect on policy formulation (Whitaker, 1980). Typically though, these earlier conceptualisations concerned micro-level co-productive interventions (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006), with numerous case
studies illustrating how small-scale projects impacted on particular power relations in specific contexts. Usually this was not identified as a critical movement towards larger changes in urban-governance structures, although further studies did link co-production to different types of activities, including the involvement of citizens in the co-planning, co-design, co-prioritising, co-management, co-financing and co-assessment of interventions (Bovaird and Löffer, 2013). This focus on the planning and design aspect of co-production is reflected in the literature, Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers (2015) having established that of 107 articles and books published between 1987 and 2013 in public management literature, 30 of them identified citizens as the co-designers of initiatives and 10 as their initiators.

A number of these conceptualisations, largely based on case studies from the North, differentiate between various state/citizen cooperative formats, including co-production, co-management and co-governance. The latter is defined as an arrangement in which the third sector participates in the planning and delivery of public services’ (Bransend and Pestoff, 2006: 497). In this sense, co-governance is distinguished from co-production and co-management to the extent that it focuses on policy formulation as opposed to implementation. A similar distinction is proposed by Ackerman (2004), for whom ‘co-governance for accountability’ assumes a direct participation of societal actors in the core functions of government. A separation between the different actors assuming specific roles in the delivery and planning of urban interventions is also present in Bovaird’s categorisation (2007), whereby he makes a distinction between the various types of professional/user relationships in the separate stages of a project. The community may, for instance, be only involved in service delivery, in co-planning, or indeed in both, but importantly, co-productive categorisation also includes arrangements through which communities deal exclusively with policy planning and have no role in actual service delivery. As such, there is no explicit continuity between project-level activities and broader policy-planning activities. Consequently, co-production is not identified as mezzo-level political engagement and a broader struggle for choice (Mitlin, 208: 347), although it is seen as a potential strategy for the negotiation of norms and regulations (Boviard, 2007).

Overall, although these conceptualisations vary on a case-to-case basis, their shared premise is that citizens can have a significant impact on policy making. They also
have common denominators, including the idea that the institutionalisation and consensual character of participatory space is key to its success. With these characteristics, the scheme resembles the communicative or collaborative processes that are an important idea in the formulation of planning frameworks in the North, although they nevertheless may not be entirely reflective of the transformations in urban contexts in the South (Watson, 2009). Further, the understanding of co-production or co-governance as a participatory scheme that places the state or the public sector as its main facilitator poses similar risks. Rather than providing remedies for local problems, endeavours positioned as state-initiated participatory urban-governance processes may become a vehicle for the institutionalisation of inequalities (Lemansky, 2017) and ‘may appear as innovations, but are often fashioned out of existing forms through a process of institutional bricolage, using whatever is at hand and re-inscribing existing relationships, hierarchies and rules of the game’ (Cornwall, 2004: 2). These issues are, for instance, common in stakeholder forums – a growing form of agency designed to deal with strategic planning issues. While formally inclusive, involving urban stakeholders from across the public and private sectors and civil society, they also entail the risk of depoliticising the agendas of urban movements, instead catering for well-resourced groups in urban governance. Therefore, rather than being inscribed in their set-up, the progressive potential of such forums is best extraneously anchored via the activism and autonomy of the civil society movements involved (Pieterse, 2008: 94). When linked to the concept of co-production, this translates to movements that are well-networked and actively involved in large-scale bottom-up work, rather than in minor on-the-ground programmes and participation in deliberative spaces set up by the public sector. While either group may be characterised as progressive, their ability to deliver their aims within the spectrum of formal governance is undoubtedly linked to the degree of mobilisation they command and the power they represent. In line with this perspective, co-governance, as described in the previous paragraph, may not differ significantly from a number of public-sector-led participatory governance schemes, as long as it is not strongly rooted in an urban movement.

What is here subsequently discussed is the distinction between the different levels of co-production and their inter-linkages, investigating the relevance of positioning co-production as a factor in framing urban governance. The ambiguity in the
understanding of the concept is captured through a consideration of the three main paradoxes resonating in the current discussion on co-production.

Contradiction one: institutionalisation vs. flexibility

Joshi and Moore (2004: 40) define institutionalised co-production as the provision of public services ‘through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions’, with the two main types of co-production identified as being logistical and governance driven. The latter includes situations in which organised groups of citizens become involved in governance in response to an institutional capacity deficit at either a local or national public level. In this sense, the institutionalisation of participation is viewed as one of the best steps to assure the sustainability of participatory schemes (Ackerman, 2004). In the context of settlement development, this has been shown to be true at a project level in cases where a variety of incremental solutions were supported by government measures, either through subsidies or technical assistance, and then successfully implemented (Greene and Rojas, 2008). Moreover, the examples of co-governance discussed by Ackerman suggest that the ‘absence of a clear legal framework left participation up to the whims of individual bureaucrats, leading to the eventual overturning of participatory schemes once there was a change of heart on the part of the government’ (2004: 459). Similarly, a lack of full engagement by the government bears the risk of reinforcing intra-community power relations and clientelistic networks (ibid.). This concurs with the opinion that in risk-adverse administrative cultures, public officials require organisational tools for active citizen involvement. According to this line of thought, if a sustainable relationship between the organisations representing the public sector and citizens is absent, this relationship needs to be structured in order to build a long-lasting platform of cooperation (Voorberg, et al., 2015). In their analysis of public-management publications, Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers (2015) identify the fact that actions facilitating a relationship can originate from both sides of the equation – either an organisation initiated by the public sector, or for that matter by the citizens. However, as pointed out by authors, all such initiatives are referred to in the publications they reviewed as something that the public sector (organisations) should
undertake (Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 2015). Seen from this perspective, the majority of co-productive projects fit the definition of invited spaces of participation rather than invented ones (Cornwall, 2004).

In its ideal sense, the goal of co-production is to strengthen the position of citizens, and their institutionalisation via formal governance structures may indeed reflect the achievement of this goal. However, it is by no means simple to transfer this fairly obvious assumption about co-production to conditions and processes in the South.

Firstly, the strength of co-production in the South is that it operates outside of existing norms and regulations (Mitlin, 2008; Watson, 2014). In the reality of informal and precarious settlements, imposed building codes or institutional arrangements are simply counter-productive. Indeed, here the urge to sustain everyday living needs or to improve personal habitat involves not adhering to but creatively overcoming external regulations. If systematised through collective action, these approaches have a chance to become a form of development practice, counterbalancing official development paradigms. As underscored by Pieterse (2008: 99), ‘state bureaucracies tend to be rigid, hierarchical and conformist institutions’ – in other words are unlikely to adopt innovative solutions unless confronted by external pressures resulting in new alternatives. Whilst these situations are reported to be very rare, co-production in its true sense remains a channel that can best leverage the aspirations of the urban poor. When it does occur, however, it is typically achieved outside of fixed regulatory situations in long-term relationships between local government and local communities, entailing continuous programme support, the funding of experimental activities and responding flexibly to emerging opportunities (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2004: 295). In essence, project-level innovations happen in spite of regulations not because of them, and co-production is realised because ‘formal channels of engagement do not exist or are not satisfactory’ (Watson, 2014: 71).

Secondly, the fact that the urban poor in the South operate in an informal sphere also defines their realm of expertise, thus constituting their resources. While a lack of institutionalisation exposes them to political vulnerabilities, becoming meshed in the domain of rules and regulations equally potentially poses the risk of submission to an alien language of conventional planning procedures and institutions. The danger, therefore, is two-fold. On the one hand, engaging with authority can entail cooperation
with more powerful actors who merely ‘purport to be concerned with poverty and with citizenship’ (Appadurai, 2001: 42). These counterparts may try to instrumentalize the urban poor through the formation of a dependency based on a lack of preparedness to navigate the rigid environment of hierarchical public bureaucracy. On the other hand, this also relates to the positioning and identity of the urban poor as actors in a development process to the extent that participation in governance impacts on the participants’ sense of themselves (Healey, 2003).

In these types of contexts, for some groups the threats embodied in institutionalisation may outweigh the beneficial protective factor. Since the processes ‘that underpin “real” governance often reflect informal bargaining power much more than formal institutionalised frameworks’ (Siame, 2016: 6), it is precisely in this sphere that the urban poor need to exercise their power and safeguard their independence. Consequently, for many civil society groups the ideal starting point is to engage in governance through informal channels rather than via an external actor who ‘gives’ them access to governance. Vice versa, when initiated by the public sector the process of formalisation brings with it a high risk of regulatory frameworks being imposed, which in turn undermines community-based approaches. Although involving the citizens in participatory schemes at the earliest possible stage (Ackerman, 2004) can be one way of facilitating engagement by the public sector, responding to pre-existing arrangements outside formal planning processes, or indeed deliberately leaving a scope open for the development of such, may be more interesting solutions.

Thirdly, much of the success of project-level activities by the urban poor lies in collective organisation rather than individual endeavours (Banana, et al., 2015). In the Southern context there are convincing reasons to believe that the key to the creation of a significant role of the poor in urban governance is the formation of some sort of collective power. There is, however, a caveat to this. Thus while classic representative democracy has been found to be ineffective in this respect, for instance in failing to facilitate popular political involvement or guarantee redistributive mechanisms (Fung and Wright, 2003: 3), some of the more elaborate participatory schemes can also suffer from similar drawbacks, resulting in a fragmentation of the civil society agenda. This risk is visible even in the widely praised case of participatory budgeting in Puerto Allegre in Brazil. In its initial stages, politicians tried to impose an individualised voting mechanism, as opposed to an arrangement where neighbourhood associations had
decision-making power – a proposal that was actively opposed by civil society actors. (Mitlin, 2008: 355). Currently, as replicated in other countries, this participatory budgeting ‘best practice’ lacks its crucial component, namely it suffers from the lack of large deliberative spaces for local committees to debate before the voting process begins (Sześciło, 2015). Therefore, the transplanting of an ‘innovation’ such as participatory budgeting to situations characterised by weak civil society structures can potentially act as an enticement for the public sector to choose less ‘messy’ frameworks that lack spaces of deliberation. For example, one argument is that co-production can be facilitated by lowering the threshold for citizen participation, for instance by offering plebiscitary choices rather than providing opportunities to debate complicated policy issues (Voorberg, et al., 2015). As much as this can be helpful in the context of project-level interventions and from the perspective of public sector implementers, its effects are not ultimately beneficial to the urban-poor counterparties involved in the process. Instead, on the whole such mechanisms may in fact undermine the building of a collective group agenda, in turn weakening their relative negotiating position. A further key factor is that these practices do not translate into changes in governance if the whole process involved is one of deciding about pre-defined solutions.

What these examples generally show is that even when postulated as a proper solution to the problems of the poor, positioning institutionalised co-production in the global South remains difficult and fraught with ambiguities. Whereas the instrument of institutionalised co-production undoubtedly has the potential to increase service delivery at a project level, nevertheless the framework may also be counter-productive if co-production is understood as a continuum of actions by the urban poor with the objective of affecting urban governance and policies. Having said this, there is arguably a necessity to safeguard the role of the urban poor in urban governance and decision making through institutionalisation in situations of a weak and unorganised civil society. Because many regulatory frameworks are opportunistically exploited by those who hold political or economic power, rather than simply following the prescribed routes of contributing to the execution of existing policies, stronger, well-established movements may opt for flexible arrangements with governments so as to allow them to shape actual policies and laws (Watson, 2009).
Consequently, the term co-production of governance may better reflect urban transition in the South than the concept of co-governance discussed above. Since direct societal participation in governmental functions is extremely rare, fragile ‘co-governance’ arrangements should not be treated as a given fact but as a process that is steered via social-movement-initiated co-production (Mitlin, 2008) and safeguarded by active movements operating outside of the formal governmental sphere. Rather than only being a form of institutionalised deliberation, the co-production of governance can be defined as an open-ended process that enables the urban poor to continuously affect, review and update policies within or outside of formally recognised bodies. Ideally, their impact should mirror their own protocols and safeguard principles of flexibility and collective action.

Contradiction two: cooperation vs. conflict

The issue of institutionalisation closely relates to the role of conflict in co-productive planning arrangements. Overall, co-production requires cooperation between different groups of stakeholders and assumes long-term relationships, substantial resource contributions, as well as a sharing in the range of decision-making power. A variety of case studies discussed in the literature underscore the equality between civil society and public sector, although it is often considered to result from the ‘good will’ of the latter (Voorberg, et al., 2015: 1344) and not as something that is achieved by the actions of the former. As such, equality is confined only to the deliberative space and as a factor safeguarded by more powerful actors, which in itself positions them in a more privileged negotiation position. The principle of excluding local power holders from specific governance arrangements, as described by Joshi and Moore (2004) in the case of the Citizen Police Liaison Committee in Karachi, may be a more promising way to ensure equality within decision-making. However, unless self-regulated by civil society, it simultaneously places the public sector in a privileged position. This similarly applies to the principle of the consensual character of the arrangement, which can potentially fail to reflect urban transition in the South. This includes the example of participatory budgeting in Puerto Allegre, which thanks to its set-up included an in-built pro-poor bias as a form of counterbalancing powerful interests (Ackerman, 2004). Nevertheless,
the participatory budgeting in this case was shaped with significant input from civil society and faced resistance from power holders. Rather than being an exception, this type of situation should be treated as the norm, representing the approach of development agencies and governments who do not want the urban poor to attain a status equal to theirs (Papeleras, et al., 2012). This in turns links to Watson’s argument concerning the difficulty of sustaining consensus-based planning-process practices, which involves different sets of values and beliefs (Watson, 2006), as well as concerning the role of power and conflict in planning in the South (Watson, 2014). This is crucial for two reasons.

Firstly, in the planning sphere in the South it can be expected that conflict will occur within the planning process in situations that involve both the mutual realities of the inhabitants of precarious settlements as well as the planning authorities. The former need to build their living with scarce resources, land invasions, etcetera. The latter are engaged in heavily politicised activities, and are subjected to lobbying by various interest groups and the pressures of political cycles. In rapidly urbanising areas, conflicts occur on a daily basis. They may range from soft, discursive struggles, which can be managed via consensus-oriented means, to violent confrontations in which different authorities try to achieve their goals. One example of such rapid eruptions of violence – which will undoubtedly increase in coming years due to climate change and expanding urbanisation – are the land-related clashes in Juba, South Sudan. This is a case of the complex reality in everyday struggles, where urban stakeholders assume new roles, including public officials, traditional authorities and military actors simultaneously engage in grabbing land and in perpetuating a spiral of ethnic violence and inequality (McMichael, 2014). In these types of contexts, the practice of urban development exceeds the control of professional planners (Odendal, 2012). In these cases, the traditional and consensual planning instruments that are largely effective in the European context become ineffectual, the urban policies involved being more strongly determined by an entire set of factors that differ from the familiar procedures informed by systematic and evidence-based data (Galuszka, 2017). To this extent, planners in the South are faced with new challenges that oblige them to act in a more politically conscious manner, prompting them to sometimes enter into politics themselves in order to achieve better working results (Karki, 2017).
Analogously, the ability of the urban poor to engage in confrontational and politicised spaces may be a clear manifestation of their ability to contribute to the planning process, as opposed to participating in stakeholder structures that lack this dynamic. In his notion of radical strategic planning as driven by the co-production approach, Albrechts (2012: 57) notes that ‘as it aims to secure political influence it is certainly confrontational and directed at a change by means of specific outputs (plans, policies, projects).’ For this reason, in the South the co-production of governance is rarely an outcome of public-sector-driven activities in those cases where a group is nominated as the representative of the urban poor without being recognised as a stakeholder with the capacity to operate in the conflict spaces. Instead, such recognition needs to derive from independent mobilisation in civil society, involving a real encroachment into the governance spectrum. In the majority of cases, this includes not only formal or informal negotiations with the public sector, but also the ability to navigate those spheres which influence policy making: media, global opinion makers, donors or the academic sector. The key factor here is the framing of an input with which the urban poor can contribute to the co-productive process and which translates into power. This includes knowledge produced through community enumeration, money generated within saving schemes, or networking, all of which enable the urban poor to counterbalance different planning paradigms using their own approaches (Boonyabancha and Kerr, 2015). Indirectly, these activities also translate into the building-up of social capital, which is one of the key pre-conditions for the success of co-production (Voorberg, et al., 2015). The ability of the urban poor to directly enhance their own financial and networking bases challenges the power relations between the public sector, donors and communities and is making politicians take notice of them as an important voting force. These tangible and intangible resources allow them to engage in complicated negotiations with powerful actors who operate within a different developmental logic and with their own agendas. At the same time, these resources reverse the dominant rationale whereby urban dwellers learn from professionals, the former instead taking on the role of educators themselves (Lipietz and Newton, 2015: 233).

The effective conclusion is that the ability of groups of urban poor to engage in conflict situations may be more productive than their operating within a planning arena
that involves rigid regulatory decision-making mechanisms, even if these mechanisms to some extent support the principle of protecting weaker stakeholders.

Secondly, these groups require the capacity to generate a critical numerical mass that can then engage in more radical forms of conflict in order to push their agenda forwards. This ability becomes especially relevant when the issue of distribution of space is at stake – a question that cannot be tackled without the factors of conflict and struggle (Castells, 1983). These types of activities are encapsulated within one of the five interconnected domains of urban politics described by Pieterse (2008: 95), namely that of direct action, in that the ‘street conflicts, clashes and destabilisation that spark off direct action are prerequisites for political agreements to address urban inequalities.’ Although most successful national and international federations of groups of urban poor, for instance the Slum Dwellers International or the ACHR, achieved their status largely thanks to their consensus orientation (Herrle, et al., 2015), their strategies in fact range from cooperation to contestation (Bradlow, 2013). Conflict-oriented measures such as protests can forge an equilibrium between the urban poor on the one side and the power of public stakeholders and the private sector on the other, as illustrated in the example of the anti-eviction campaign in South Africa’s Cape Town (see Miraftab, 2009).

Overall, while the protests and knowledge or resources generated by the urban poor represent the ‘stick and carrot’, both factors are interlinked and tend, in the context of the global South, to be more reflective of planning practices than the principles and benefits of collaboration as understood in the participatory-planning literature set in the context of the global North (Siame, 2016).

Contradiction three: process vs. output

To date there is a noticeable lack of empirical data showing the tangible effects of co-production (Voorberg, et al., 2015), especially when discussed in the context of policy and urban governance. What has been documented is that co-production at a project level can result in changes of governance, ranging from small-scale institutional change (Shand, 2015) and the empowerment of specific groups (Banana, et al., 2015) to a more substantial recognition of the urban poor (Mitlin, 2008). However, it is less clear how
the groups of urban poor that have attained sufficient power to frame urban governance have exercised this power. Likewise, transformations in urban politics happen as a result of multiply factors, rather than only a bottom up activism. These processes typically occur as a result of socio-political mobilisations that advance the idea of inclusive citizenship, as in the case of the Brazilian City Statute from 2001 (Fernandes, 2007). Nevertheless, the ways in which social movements manage to leverage their approaches also depends largely on the nature of the state in which they operate (Mitlin, 2006).

Indeed, much of the work of the urban-poor movements in the South concentrates on two interlinked objectives: the recognition of basic rights (such as the right to live in a specific location or to build one’s own house) and a redistribution of wealth. Project-level co-production clearly addresses the first of the aspirations through the construction of adequate shelter, the provision of infrastructure or the securing of land for development, and through helping achieve the recognition of the urban poor as an active counterpart in planning and service delivery. In this context, by definition co-production is intended to address the shortcomings of the classic Weberian model of service delivery (Mitlin, 2008).

On the other hand, institutionalised participatory spaces are seen by some scholars as a mechanism that increasingly puts the onus for service provision on the private sector, citizens and civil society, correspondingly negating it as a state duty. Rather than being isolated cases, this can be perceived as part of a general trend originating in the 1980s and 1990s when in some countries, as Pieterse comments (2008: 64), ‘neoliberalism flourished under the drive for state withdrawal from services delivery to counteract the perceived inefficiency and corruption of these machineries.’

Simultaneously, thanks to the role of co-production, civil society is able to affect governance and, arguably, contribute to the realisation of the second objective, namely the calls for a redistribution of wealth (Mitlin, 2006). Althought this can potentially involve any number of different solutions, including value-capture mechanisms in land ownership or securing a basic income for unprivileged segments of society, in the urban realm in the South it is very often linked to a reintroduction of the state as a service provider. Paradoxically, this entails a risk of reversing project-level co-production and losing the already volatile control over some aspects of the development process.
In the recent years there has been a visible trend of diminishing self-help approaches in favour of reverting to large-scale state-controlled or private-sector housing initiatives and subsidies programmes, such as Housing for All by 2020 in India, Minha Casa Minha Vida in Brazil or the Reconstruction and Development Programme in South Africa, many of which are characterised by peripheral locations, and which in effect fail to substantially benefit the urban poor (Huchzermeyer and Misselwitz, 2016). Although these types of projects are not always a result of civil society pressures, the pitfall of deliberative processes becoming manipulated appears to be extremely high when promises of a redistribution of wealth to the advantage of the urban poor is at stake.

The case of the South African housing sector over the last 25 years illustrates the third contradiction discussed in this article. In what was a unique development in Africa in the 1990s, following the fall of the apartheid regime a huge Reconstruction and Development housing programme provided one million ‘free’ housing opportunities during the first six years of operations. It was preceded by a supposedly deliberative process in the form of a participatory space – the National Housing Forum – that brought together representatives of civil society, the state and developers. In spite of the initial civil society interest in co-productive housing approaches, pressures from developers resulted in the authorisation of the delivery of uniform neighbourhoods by the state and the private sector (Huchzermeyer, 2003). Even though the programme perpetuated the urban socio-spatial divisions of the apartheid era, its product (single storey houses with a small ‘garden’) outlasted the programme and continued to be viewed as an ideal housing model (Galuszka, 2017) and a citizen’s right. Consequently, the process of shifting the housing approach in South Africa to more co-productive and incremental formats remained contested for years, confronting the advocates of change with numerous obstacles. Although many non-governmental organisations and citizens groups have advocated a more co-productive approach, service-delivery protests agitating for the receipt of conventional housing or other services are still very common (Pithouse, 2010). In this case, therefore, co-productive approaches are positioned – at least perceptually – in opposition to the principle of wealth redistribution.

This contradiction is likewise potentially visible in contexts where co-production is more firmly embedded in the local urban-development paradigm than in the case of South Africa. One intriguing achievement illustrating the process by which civil society
has succeeded in securing funding for the housing strategy of their choice, and to a large degree one that is driven by the co-production of governance, comes from the Philippines. It involves the Urban Poor Alliance (UP-ALL), who involved themselves with long-term groundwork by local organisations, building up a relationship with the government both outside of institutionalised bodies, as well as within existing programmes. As a result of this lengthy effort, elements of the ‘People’s Plans’ were incorporated by President Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino’s administration into the Oplan LIKAS programme which commenced in 2011 (Karaos and Porio, 2015). One of the modalities of the programme responds to the agenda of the urban poor by supporting in-city development and high-density, medium-rise housing, simultaneously enabling communities to retain a reasonable degree of control over the processes involved. Its key component, the High Density Housing Programme, was supported by the administration with circa 10 billion Philippine Pesos. However, the new multi-storey housing format has required a sub-contracting of construction companies, which has increased the project costs (Ballesteros, et al., 2015) and to some degree negates community control over the construction process. Although the community organisations remain the supervisors of the process, they are no longer the main constructors. As such, the example shows that although the urban poor in the Philippines have used co-production to engage in service delivery, in terms of governance involvement they have also opted for different housing types and upgrading solutions in order to obtain a balance between the variety of priorities present in informal settlements. The sustainability of this approach and the impact of the programme still require evaluation, including the progress of the housing process. Nevertheless, the ability of the urban poor in this case to secure additional funding for their preferred housing strategy illustrates their ability to successfully engage with governance at the programme’s formulation stage. This is particularly relevant because of the reported impossibility of achieving a similar goal over the preceding decades (Hutchison, 2007).

It can be argued that co-productive governance provides a flexibility to change, adapt and update proposed solutions. In contrast to classic participatory spaces, this can mean that civil society actors are not merely consulted regarding specific decisions, but are active implementers of them too. In line with the arguments discussed above regarding the first contradiction (institutionalisation vs. flexibility), this implies an
ability to act outside of existing regulations, as well as a continuous involvement in governing the delivery of specific strategies and playing a monitoring role. In this respect, one strong indicator of the success of this model would be that institutionalised and non-institutionalised governance relations outlive the span of a specific political leadership and its clientelistic aspects, which is often the motor behind these types of relations in the context of the South (Anciano, 2017). In other words, successful and ideal models of co-produced urban governance should attain a balance between the two goals of the urban poor in the South – the securing of greater control over the development process and the securing of access to resources – regardless of the changes in the political leadership in a country.

**Evaluating co-productive governance bodies – focus area and methodological considerations**

In line with the contradictions discussed above, the concept of the co-production of urban governance calls for a set of refined methodological considerations that can assist in understanding the characteristics of co-productive bodies operating on a policy level in the South. This requires moving beyond the analytical categories used for the evaluation of participatory governance schemes. While these undoubtedly provide a set of valuable insights into the participation formats or the levels of authority of different stakeholders (Fung, 2006; Cornwall, 2008), the innovative aspect of the co-production of governance, as laid out previously, lies beyond the set-up of an institution, its governing rules and its immediate outcomes. Instead, the argument is that urban movements need to secure their political influence outside of the existing institutional formats. Consequently, any evaluation of co-productive governance arrangements requires an additional analysis of the process of its formation and the external strategies that affect its functioning. While this broadly fits both the dimension of governance cultures and the focus on interaction relations discussed within the collaborative planning approach (Healey, 1997), its differences from the co-productive processes located beyond the Western context (Watson, 2014; Healey, 2003) call for an augmentation of the analytical framework to include considerations relevant in the South.
Following from the first contradiction (institutionalisation vs. flexibility), these potential areas of interest concern how issues of flexibility are treated. This includes inquiring if and how the counterparts amongst the urban poor in a process engage in setting up specific governance arrangements. Likewise, it requires reflection on how flexible the frameworks of co-productive processes are, and to what degree they enable the integration of those approaches formulated by the urban poor that are positioned extraneously to the legal machinery in a specific context. Lastly, it is relevant in what way collective action is treated, and whether the dominant factors favour either a tendency for the individualisation of decision-making through voting mechanisms and the offering of plebiscitary choices on the one hand, or for that matter the possibility of deep negotiations on the other.

The discussion of the second contradiction (cooperation vs. conflict) suggests that research should also focus on what kind of tangible and intangible resources are added by the counterparts to the process, and how these resources affect power relations and decisions within a specific context. This should also include an examination of how the counterparts to the process use conflict-oriented means located outside of a specific governance arrangement or institution, and how these actions affect the work of these counterparts. These means may range from protests by the urban poor and the use of public-sector law enforcement to private-sector pressure mechanisms, often manifested in relation to large-scale projects driven by real-estate interests.

Lastly, when evaluating the impacts of co-production at a policy level, it is important to analyse the ways in which it contributes to the realisation of the objectives of the urban poor, in other words control over the development process and the redistribution of resources. Based on the examples discussed, these two objectives often become mutually exclusive and the latter can become an instrument of political patronage and the co-optation of independent movements. In true co-productive arrangements the urban poor should arguably be able to navigate between these objectives, and if they opt for one over the other should have the ability to monitor, review and update their decisions in negotiation with their public-sector partners.
Conclusions

Based on the increased use of the term co-production in multiple contexts, as well as the review of three contradictions visible in the current discussion on the phenomenon, the argument is that the concept of co-production in the South requires sharper theoretical frames, particularly by delinking it from some of the assumptions based on case studies originating from the North.

This in turn links to the outlined overlap between the notion of co-governance and classic participatory governance schemes conceived as invited spaces of participation and facilitated by global institutions positioned in the power centres. What emerges is that the term co-production of governance, which encompasses activities by civil-society actors both inside and outside of formalised institutions, may be more relevant in the context of the South than that of co-governance. The inclusion of activities beyond the purview of formal bodies is crucial, due to the fact that the assumption is that institutional change is highly unlikely to take place without an active civil-society sector that is able to build up its own knowledge and resource bases, which includes a capacity to operate in conflict spaces. As such, maintaining a degree of independence from a specific legal frameworks or institutional settings is considered to be advantageous to civil-society actors and plays a supportive role in steering collective actions, as reinforced through networking activities. The latter is associated with a need for the urban poor to participate in the creation of urban governance bodies and institutions, rather than in formats set up exclusively by the state. The capacity to operate in the informal sphere is also considered to be another key component in the co-production of governance, rooted in the flexibility and innovations generated on the interface between different planning systems. Additionally, in keeping with contradiction three (process vs. output), a true engagement of the urban poor in the co-production of governance would mean that retaining reasonable control over project-level co-production does not become mutually exclusive with the other objective of the urban poor, namely a redistribution of resources.

Lastly, the specifics of the co-production of governance in the South elaborated above require the development of analytical frameworks that enable an exploration of the nature of the phenomena from a local perspective, which in turn relates to a broad
set of activities by the urban poor that shape the process outside of the established regulatory frameworks.

References


ii Wits-TUB Urban Lab PhD project initiated by the University of Witwatersrand and the Technical University of Berlin.

iii An issue of the Environment and Urbanization planned for 2018.

iv Non-public sector counterparts of the process are named differently in literature: civil society, end-user, citizens etc. Based on the focus of the paper on the governance, the term the urban poor and civil society will be used in this paper, unless directly referring to the works of an author using a different name. When the term civil society is used it is acknowledged that its nature in the South is not the same as in the wealthiest democratic countries located in the North.

v Later rephrased by Bovaird (2007) as ‘feasibility driven’.

vi As suggested by Ackerman (2004: 459) this may involve three levels of actions: reflecting participatory mechanism in strategic documents of government, setting up new agencies which assure societal participation and inscribing participatory mechanism into law.

vii It is worth pointing out that these community-level activities may also serve as a tool for reinforcing the power of specific groups, implying that local leadership is also largely formulated through conflict, as opposed to more innocuous means (Rigon, 2017).

viii The other categories are: representative politics, neo-corporatist-stakeholder forums, grass-root development action and symbolic politics.

ix This types of activism is, of course, not free from vulnerabilities, mainly the potential to be hijacked by populist forces that then potentially transform protest-oriented actions to their own purposes.

x To a certain extent this can be a differing factor when compared to Western examples of co-production where the projects concerned are often not necessarily a mechanism for changes in governance or the redistribution of wealth. In welfare-state contexts, these aims are sometimes more vigorously expressed via the platform of representative democracy (cf. the recent rise of populism in various European states) or direct contestation (cf. the Occupy Movement).

xi This applies in particular in situations where communities are threatened with relocation.
Chapter 3

Co-Production as a Driver of Urban Governance Transformation?
The Case of the Oplan LIKAS Programme in Metro Manila, Philippines

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Co-Production as a Driver of Urban Governance Transformation?
The Case of the Oplan LIKAS Programme in Metro Manila, Philippines

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Introduction

Civil society activism has been considered one of the key shaping factors of contemporary cities (Castells, 1983), particularly in a context in which urbanisation pressures and exclusionary urban development practice have resulted in the emergence of massive poverty-ridden informal settlements. Although the span of these activities is vast and difficult to describe in a linear manner, one of the strains of the current debate captures these processes through the concept of social movement-initiated co-production (Watson, 2014). The concept expands the traditional definitions that consider co-production mainly as a way to share resources and efforts by the representatives of different sectors engaged in a common project (Ostrom, 1996). These early conceptualisations identify co-production as a way to facilitate service delivery and as a mechanism to reorder the relationship between the public sector and the citizens. The current debate goes a step further by positioning co-production as a key factor that leads to a broader change in urban governance structures. Rather than only focusing on project-based matters, co-productive interventions are identified as having the potential for institutional restructuring and as a way to integrate various voices in the development process. This line of thought is amplified in the literature on urban transformation in the South (Watson, 2014), where co-production is considered an approach towards which urban poor groups consciously steer with the expectation of gaining wider control over the development process, accessing support from
governments and bettering their position in the urban governance spectrum (Mitlin, 2008). In other words, these actors try to scale up the co-productive approach with the intention of achieving “far-reaching change” (Mitlin & Bartlett, 2018, p. 363). Within a variety of often contradictory definitions (Brandsen & Honingh, 2016) and a highly contextualised application of co-production (Environment & Urbanization, 2018), this ambition of urban movements is described as one of the key features of the approach (Watson 2014; Mitlin & Bartlett 2018). However, with the predominant focus on the description of influential factors of co-production rather than on their outcomes (Voorberg, Bekkers & Tummers, 2015), as well as a focus on small-scale project-based case studies, reflection on the broader governance change process and outcomes, which co-production is supposed to instigate, is largely missing in the literature.

The aim of this article is to reflect on such a context and to analyse the process of governance change originated and steered by the urban poor sector as well as the outcomes of this process in terms of policy environment and practice. This is done through an analysis of the two-phased engagement of the Urban Poor Alliance (UP-ALL) with the urban governance of Metro Manila, and their role as co-producers of a major resettlement programme Oplan LIKAS (2011-2016) aiming at relocation and housing development for approximately 120,000 informal settler families (ISFs) living in flood-prone areas. The first phase involves efforts to widen access to governance and is identified here as the ‘scaling up’ phase. The second, ‘governance/implementation’, phase involves the execution of the new position. Phase one includes the non-linear engagement of various organisations, which gradually advanced their position through decades of bottom-up work based, to a major degree, on principles of co-production. Building on these activities and the networking efforts of different groups, a major coalition of urban poor - the Urban Poor Alliance (UP-ALL) - was established in 2005 and progressively achieved a greater impact on policy making matters (Karaos & Porio, 2005). The second phase analysed in this article commenced in 2010, when the UP-ALL signed a 10-point covenant with then presidential candidate Benigno Aquino III, who recognised the main housing policy demands of the alliance, including the landmark co-productive approach of the People’s Plans, and its embedding in the Oplan LIKAS programme.

The article reviews the strategies of one of the major urban poor movements in Metro Manila which led them to this position, as well as the outcomes of attempts to
scale up the co-productive approach of the People’s Plans and in-city relocation as the policy of choice in low-income housing programmes in Metro Manila. As such, in theoretical terms, the article critically contributes to the current debate on co-production of governance and reflects on the characteristics, prospects and limits of the approach beyond a project scale. By doing so it reflects on the broader premise of forming alternative modalities of engagement between the state and society. In other words, it asks to what extent the engagement, broadly defined as co-production, enables the formulation and embedding of inclusion mechanisms within the governance structures dominated by public sector and oriented towards the private sector's interests. In this sense, the article contributes to the debate on urban governance transformation through sharpening a theoretical understanding of co-production and identifying the conditions that such an approach would structure “planning and urban development processes in certain Global South contexts” (Watson, 2014, p. 63). Lastly, it tests the analytical approach (Galuszka, 2019) towards tracing the hidden dynamic underlying civil society–state engagement within the context of an exclusionary governance setting.

Co-production – Primary Concepts

The first studies of co-production were carried out in North America and the UK in the 1970s and were undertaken within the Economics and Public Management disciplines. Initially their main focus was on the reduction of service delivery costs and the increased efficiency that resulted from the sharing of responsibilities and resources by the public sector and citizens involved in the implementation of a common project. The aspect involving the creation of new types of relationships between the involved parties resonated more strongly in the following decades with the recognition that co-production can serve as a relevant tool to reorder the relationship between urban dwellers and power holders. While some authors positioned this effect as an instrument enabling negotiations of regulations and norms by citizens (Bovaird, 2007), others identified it as an approach which provides an opening for more substantial change through the sharing of power and inputs in the service delivery process (Mitlin, 2008; Watson 2014) and policy-making (Whitaker, 1980). This line of thought resonated mainly in the literature on the urban transformation of the South, where informal
urbanisation remained a dominant (and often the only available) housing mechanism for the urban poor. On the one hand, their engagement with service delivery was beneficial in that it helped communities to internally build strong and independent grassroots organisations (Mitlin, 2008) through fostering the need to federate and engage in collective action (Appadurai, 2001). On the other hand, activities like mapping (Watson, 2014), enumeration (Patel, Baptist & d’Cruz, 2012), saving schemes (Mitlin, 2008; Archer, 2012) and microfinance (McFarlane, 2012a), translated to creation of own financial base and knowledge base which helps challenging existing power relations (Jasanoff, 2004) and, in effect, recalibrating the strategies of the authorities (Roy, 2009a). As a consequence, an enhancement of the negotiating potential of the communities and a strengthening of their position, vis-à-vis the state, was identified, including the opportunity to challenge the conventional modes of service delivery. Thanks to these features, the approach was applied as a deliberate strategy by the urban poor, with the aim of shifting the power structures and attaining wider responsibility for the planning and delivery of developmental goods (Boonyabancha & Kerr, 2018). From the public sector point of view, this approach remained attractive because it allowed for increased service delivery, access to information and the design of better urban solutions. This is particularly relevant in the context of informal areas where some well-established developmental models might not work (Brown-Luthango & Reyes, 2018). For instance, in the face of declining traditional registration mechanisms, community-led enumeration helped the public sector to understand the actual number of people living in informal settlements and to plan better interventions. At the same time, the clear benefits of the co-productive approach are not accepted by all public sector actors. Conflicting rationalities (Watson, 2003) and the general unwillingness of authorities to share power equally (Papeleras, Bagotlo & Boonyabancha, 2012) mean that co-production can typically flourish in a context where the public sector is eager to experiment, where formal solutions have failed and where the long-term relationship and a track record of successful interventions incentivises them to work with the communities (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2004). This worked in the favour of those communities who were able to establish long-term leadership, with the capacity to generate critical-mass support or to navigate intra-community dynamics towards the expected outcome (Patel, 2013; Galuszka, 2014) while not always being responsive to the needs of all community members (Rigon, 2014) and pre-determined
by the existence of social capital (Voorberg et al., 2015). In more weakly organised communities this meant that a key role was played by NGOs acting as intermediaries between the authorities and the communities. Hence, in such contexts, the service delivery arrangement and cooperation format was also dependent on the wider positioning of an NGO within the local political and development aid structures and so on (Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2015) Although, subjected to those complex community and political dynamics (Pieterse, 2008), as pointed out by Watson (2014), co-production made it possible to counteract some of the main disadvantages of more established forms of participatory development, including the risk of co-option of independent movements and issues related to the creation of artificial representative structures (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Cornwall, 2004; Swyngedouw 2005; Miraftab, 2009; Lemansky, 2017). Apart from the scaling up approach and the ‘showing by doing’ strategy, this was achieved by enabling the mainstreaming of approaches of civil societies which did not fit into existing regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, it allowed control of the development process to move beyond mere consultation of ready-made solutions and enabled participation in a diversity of activities such as co-financing, co-management, co-implementation etc. (Watson, 2014; Bovaird, 2007). This was often forged through a more conflict-ridden process as opposed to a classical participatory governance setting (Albrechts, 2013; Galuszka, 2019).

**Co-production of Governance**

Given its transformative potential, co-production has been increasingly discussed as a tool for stimulating transitions in the way cities are governed. The creation of multi-stakeholder spaces through a co-productive approach is seen as a means to foster a new policy formulation environment (Frantzeskaki & Rok, 2018), bringing a change in the way decisions are made (Wyborn, 2015). In spite of its deeply decentralised character, particularly in the context of precarious settlements, the approach resonated beyond small-scale neighbourhood or district level scenarios. Wide international recognition of the power and influence of networks such as Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI) and the Asian Coalition of Housing Rights (ACHR) (Herrle, Ley & Fokdal, 2015; Watson 2014; Bradlow, 2015a), which grew from the bottom-up work of regional affiliates, reinforced the ambition to scale up and mainstream co-
productive solutions on a wider city scale (Mitlin & Bartlett, 2018). An increasing interest in the literature dealing with the ways in which the informal sector affects urban governance (Sermiento & Tilly, 2018) translated into an analysis of the impacts on governance of co-production in the South. In the early 2000s, Joshi and Moore (2004) identified logistical as well as governance drivers of the approach, with the latter being primarily directed at addressing governance capacities of the state. A range of authors (Ackerman, 2004; Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Bovaird, 2007) reinforced the distinction between different levels of co-production, while underscoring the potential impact of citizens on policy making and governance, for instance through co-management or co-governance. However, most of these interpretations, mainly originating from the Northern context, supported the view that the process needs to be driven by a public sector proponent and should include regulatory mechanisms such as institutionalisation and fixed frameworks ensuring sustainability of the arrangement.

The applicability of these assumptions was questioned in the case of the governance transformation, particularly in the context of the South. In particular, the positioning of the co-productive process as external to community groups or as an invited space of participation (Cornwall, 2004) was identified as bearing a similar risk as the aforementioned participatory schemes (Richardson et al., 2018) or as a mechanism having limited impact on the policy change process (Galuszka, 2019). As previously mentioned, the creation of openings for communities to be included in governance choices rather than only in co-implementation remains crucial here if the people are not to be relegated to a role in mere service delivery (Mitlin & Bartlett, 2018). This risk remains real as governments may find it both attractive and practical to “offload service delivery to NGOs and community groups or convince local residents to donate volunteer labor or materials” (Ackerman, 2012, p. 102). Access to governance, except with regard to the scaling up of the solutions of urban groups and movements (Mitlin & Bartlett 2018), has the benefit of increasing the accountability of the public sector (Ackerman, 2004) and enabling the self-positioning of citizens vis-à-vis the state. Yet, the way in which this access is achieved appears to be equally crucial in the context of urban change in the South. For instance, some initial reports suggest that co-production can have equally empowering and disempowering effects (Moretto et al., 2018) and can be contested by authorities when attempting to scale up (see Chitekwe-Biti, 2018). This risk resonates at higher governance levels. In fact, even when co-production is
embedded in governance systems, but not steered by grassroots, as in the case of the land delivery system in Ghana, the arrangement may have exclusionary impacts on the general population (Akaateba, Huang & Adumpo, 2018). For these reasons the understanding of co-production adapted in this article builds on the central assumption that the organised communities, rather than the public sector, need to drive the process (Boonyabancha & Kerr, 2018) and that their involvement extends beyond one single phase of a project. That involvement should impact on the design, management and execution of the process. Consequently, the analysed approach of this article is defined as co-production of governance which is an “open-ended process that enables the urban poor to continuously affect, review and update policies within or outside of formally recognised bodies” (Galuszka, 2019, p. 150), while bearing in mind, that the impact of organised groups of citizens on governance should “mirror their own protocols and safeguard principles of flexibility and collective action” (Galuszka, 2019, p. 150). The methodological considerations for inquiring into the nature of such a process are described in the following section.

Analytical Framework and Methods

The first major aim of this article is to trace the process of governance transformation instigated by the grassroots through a co-productive approach with the intention of scaling it up as the main solution for housing the poor in Metro Manila. Two phases of the engagement are identified and analysed: the first is the scaling up phase, the second is the governance/implementation phase. The first phase is described in terms of the variety of approaches that led to governance change. Its outcomes are evaluated based on the capacity to attain the goals set out by the UP-ALL and the achievement of new positioning within the housing governance structures in Metro Manila. The analysis of the second phase and its outcomes, as previously stated, is conducted beyond a project-level context. Consequently, rather than looking at specific projects realised within Oplan LIKAS (which have taken very different trajectories based on specific location, involved intermediaries, etc.), the article is concerned with the overall effects on governance and the actual integration of the co-productive approach of the People’s Plans and the governance factors which shaped the implementation of the programme.
The second major aim of the article is to deepen the understanding of the process of co-production in the context of the South. I argue that a discussion of the local specifics of the governance process is necessary to grasp the reasons for the achievements of the UP-ALL in the scaling up phase and the failures of the arrangement in the governance/implementation phase. That is, this study goes beyond the assumptions underpinning the successes of co-production and its governance effects in the European and North American contexts and seeks to understand relations, factors of change and outcomes of governance process transformation in a complex governance system that is decentralised but dependent on political leaders, and that incentivises bottom-up work but also undermines and co-opts it (Shatkin, 2007; Hutchison, 2007).

In particular, it reflects on three key issues that are considered to distinguish the co-productive process in different settings and intellectual traditions and are proposed as a guideline for analysing the governance change process in the South (Galuszka, 2019). These are:

- Positioning of the institutionalisation of a participatory space as a precondition for its sustainability (Ackerman, 2004; Joshi & Moore, 2004) versus the importance of maintaining a degree of independence from this space by civil society (Galuszka, 2019). Specifically, this issue focuses on understanding to what degree the civil society can preserve its approaches and get them inscribed into law, although these approaches are usually based on a completely different developmental or implementation logic, and exist because legal or regulatory frameworks fail (Watson, 2014).

- How cooperation and conflict are treated and what resources are used to reorder power relations between citizens and the state. This includes the consideration that a combination of the two is typical in the South and is usually required for civil society to advance with its agenda (Watson, 2014; Bradlow, 2015b; Miltin 2018), particularly in the scaling up phase. Simultaneously, this issue poses the question as to whether the declared depoliticised nature of some sectorial-oriented civil society movements (Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017) and their declared non-conflict orientation, suffice to affect urban governance on a broader metro scale.

- Two intertwined, but often exclusionary, objectives of civil society activism: control over the development process and redistribution of resources (Galuszka, 2019). That is, this issue reflects on the notion of co-production as a manifestation of the neo-liberal tendency to push service delivery responsibility away from the public sector (Miraftab,
and on the assumption that the redistribution of resources may be linked to an increase in the state’s control over the development process (Huchzermeyer, 2003). I ask whether the civil society can merge these two objectives and whether co-produced governance can help the civil society to achieve it.

The proposed analytical device can reflect on the hidden dynamic underlying the civil society – state partnership in the context of an exclusionary governance setting. While many co-productive approaches across the global South are documented through the prism of lower project costs or wider service delivery, these measures may, in fact, not be the dominant factors for the inclusion or exclusion of specific solutions or groups from a particular governance setting. The review of the contradictory nature of the co-productive process reaches to those ‘non-technocratic’ motivators of urban governance change, and aims at deepening the understanding of the governance processes in the South.

This article draws on data collected during fieldwork conducted in Metro Manila between November 2017 and March 2018, including interviews, site visits and the analysis of quantitative and spatial data sourced from the local shelter agencies and civil society organisations. Overall, 37 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted (including 7 in a group setting). The selection criteria for the interviews included engagement in the formulation and/or implementation of the Oplan LIKAS. Additionally, it involved screening for representatives of different sectors and organisations. These included leaders of the UP-ALL involved in the establishment and implementation of the Oplan LIKAS as well as partner community organisations and NGOs. Additionally, interviews were undertaken with a parallel urban poor bloc organised around the Institute for Popular Democracy/Kilos Maralita which benefited from a big proportion of the funding delivered for in-city resettlement.

As such, the research included interviews with the two main urban poor blocs in Metro Manila which engaged in co-productive action: the UP-ALL - largely composed of apolitical or broadly pro-democratic (liberal) groups and Kilos Maralita - linked to the left political block. The remaining major network – Kadamay – in principle rejects the co-productive approach and orientates itself towards more radical measures including

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1 Such as: TRICOR members: Community Organisers Multiversity, Urban Poor Associates; KOSMA (Coalition of People’s Organizations in Manila); CMP Congress members (former representatives of the Foundation for the Development of the Urban Poor), Homeless People’s Federation Philippines, DAMPA (Damayan ng Maralitang Pilipinong Api), TAO Pilipinas, Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies.
housing occupation and land invasions. Interviews were also conducted with former and current representatives of the public sector holding managerial and senior bureaucratic positions in the main implementing agencies: the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Social Finance Housing Corporation (SHFC), the National Housing Authority (NHA), the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, as well as representatives of the Local Government Units, mainly at the level of Local Housing Boards. Interviews were also conducted with community members on the 'implementing/receiving' end in three communities where resettlement projects were either finalised or near completion, as well as in two communities in the pre-relocation stage.

**Inclusive Foundations and Exclusive Practices in Housing Governance in Metro Manila**

The urban poor movement has been intensively organised in Metro Manila since the 1970s. It was originally composed of very diverse communities that were brought together by a unifying anti-eviction agenda and opposition to the repressive Marcos regime. During this period the groups had relatively few possibilities for engaging in governance matters through official channels and tried to exercise their influence through politicised and confrontational means (Shatkin, 2002). The change in political rule in the Philippines in 1986 and the adoption of in-depth decentralisation reforms significantly altered the nature of the movement and the scope of its activities (Karaos, 2006). Its function at that time was to benefit from enabling laws, particularly the Local Government Code of 1991 and the Urban and Development Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992, which devolved many of the centralised powers to the local government units. The essence of these new laws was to involve the representatives of people's organisations, community groups and NGOs in the development process by changing their position from beneficiaries to key stakeholders in the settlement upgrading process. These aims were manifested in the National Shelter Programme, which was linked to the decentralisation of housing production and legitimised the state position as an enabler of housing rather than its provider (Ballesteros, 2002). Under these

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2 This article employs the term ‘urban poor movement/bloc’ to refer to the two major fractions which support engagement in co-productive action and refrain from radical contestation measures.
conditions, numerous urban poor coalitions flourished and engaged actively in local urban development matters.

However, these progressive foundations were not smoothly translated into inclusive development practice, with many of the local elites from both the government and the private sector acting as a stumbling block in the implementation of pro-poor policies (Shatkin, 2007). The roots of this dichotomy, which is also linked to practical reasons such as competition for land and profit, can be attributed to the “ideological currents operating through local real-estate markets” (Garrido, 2013, p. 167). The preference of elite consumers for exclusive spaces and the related routine of planning practice remained in contrast to such policies as securing in-city land for low-income populations and the development of social housing. In practice, this kind of “off-the-scene” resistance of power holders was reinforced by the merging of political and economic elites (Kleibert, 2018) and manifested itself in a variety of ways, ranging from negligent implementation of progressive policies to the difficulty of transforming public institutions (Constantino-David, 2004). Likewise, even though innovative participatory mechanisms had been established, the outputs of these spaces still largely depended on the willingness of top decision makers. In her analysis of networked governance practices in two cities in Metro Manila, Porio (2012) documents that decentralisation may have transformed the traditional bureaucratic structures but at the same time was used by mayors to reinforce their control over the development process. The range of strategies involved not only the creation of alliances and networks supportive of their agenda, but also actions that are conventionally considered to support co-production (Joshie & Moore, 2004), namely the institutionalisation of regulatory frameworks and practices. This finding is confirmed from the point of view of community-based organisations. When building relationships with a multitude of ‘formal’ actors, including donors and government officials, these actors tend to attempt to maintain control of the development process rather than share it equally (Papeleras et al., 2012).

The issue also relates to the aspect of financing. The openings offered by the political transformation did not result in increased access to state resources and “protection as a justifiable right” but rather in the creation of spaces for bargaining for access to services and resources (Hutchison, 2007; Shatkin, 2002). As much as decentralisation has resulted in the emergence of an active civil society to date, the budget for housing has remained marginal for decades. In the years 2000–2007, the
Philippines invested the least money on average on low-income housing compared with other South-East Asian countries (Habito, 2009). Unsurprisingly, the issue of substandard housing conditions is nowhere near being resolved. Out of the approximately 13 million people living in Metro Manila, between 1.3 and 3 million are estimated to live in informal settlements (World Bank, 2016).

This paradoxical positioning of the urban poor and inclusive policies has been reflected in the local, public sector-led housing and tenure-focused programmes. A study of the overall number of assisted informal settler families from Metro Manila in the last decade reveals that the progressive solutions based on co-production principles benefited only a small number of people in comparison with top-down resettlement schemes delivered by developers. For example, the Community Mortgage Program, which positions communities in the centre of the land formalisation process, benefited 26,480 households between 2005 and 2011. From 2005 to 2010, the resettlement programme delivered 107,079 housing units (Galuszka, 2014). Consequently, the overwhelming majority of the low-income housing produced in Metro Manila and surrounding area is linked to the most contested format of development, namely, off-city relocation, which means people receive “little boxes on tiny resettlement plots in a vast grid development designed by NHA engineers and built expensively by contractor” (Papeleras, et al., 2012, p. 474).

The Scaling Up Phase: the UP-ALL and the 10-Point Covenant

Given the limited reach of innovative solutions and the perpetual housing shortage, efforts to find solutions towards a wider inclusion of the urban poor in the housing sector continued. In response to the forced relocations happening around Metro Manila (Mabilin, 2014), many of these activities were in the past steered by anti-eviction groups. Even before 1986, there were strong movements that utilised networking mechanisms with the intent to challenge official policies. One of the largest networks of this time, the Zone One Tondo Organisation (and its umbrella organisation - Ungayan), emerged as a relatively strong grouping utilising politicised and confrontational tactics and organised around an anti-eviction agenda. The group

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3 NHA: The National Housing Authority is the main housing agency mandated to provide housing for relocated families in the Philippines.
succeeded in negotiating with the authorities and took part in the World Bank-supported upgrading project in the Tondo district of Manila, the first major project promoting self-help and community engagement in informal settlement upgrading. The outreach of these early organisational efforts was short-lived; in the early 1980s CBOs and NGOs started falling out with each other over political stances (Shatkin, 2002). While decentralisation reform, which continued beyond 1986, supported the growth of various community-based organisations, it also resulted in the demobilisation of the urban poor movement (Shatkin, 2002). During the following decades, even the groups who were most successful in negotiating with the government did not emerge as a wider movement advocating land reform. This consequence was linked to the specifics of the governance structures, which enabled the urban poor to bargain for access to services while subjecting themselves to the patronage of powerful figures and to the political process (Hutchison, 2007). One example of this is the arbitrary instrument of the presidential proclamation, which gives a president the right to allocate land to a specific group by virtue of an executive order. Although it supported the development of many informal settlements and helped to stop forced evictions, it was also used to dismantle a wider coalition focused on comprehensive urban land reform. It shifted the focus of grassroots organisations to the immediate needs of the people in a territorially circumscribed manner (Karaos, 2006).

Aside from these groupings that primarily centred on advocacy, court action or community work in a specific location, numerous community-based organisations focused on co-production within or outside of the official governmental schemes. A number of governmental programmes, such as the Community Mortgage Program or the incremental modality of the Resettlement Program, incentivised this approach and mobilised a large number of communities across Metro Manila to engage in co-production. The approach was also steered outside of the established regulatory frameworks of the key shelter agencies. On a small scale, this engagement involved, for example, making local plans and facilitating the incremental construction of housing by people with materials and the technical guidance of local government units (see BASECO case where multiple organisations engaged in co-productive schemes towards settlement upgrading) (Galuszka, 2014). On a large scale, federations engaged in independent initiatives which included various power-building activities through the generation of their own resources, knowledge and planning routine. One example of a
people’s organisation is the Homeless People’s Federation Philippines (HPFPH), which was formed in 1998. In its early phase, this federation developed savings schemes and networked the urban poor in Metro Manila (Yu & Karaos, 2004), and later moved on to mapping activities. The success of this approach was documented in 2015 in Muntinlupa City where the informal settlement mapping was carried out. This case was supported by the authorities and became a source of information for the development of local upgrading and resettlement strategies. Simultaneously, engagement in regional activities through large international networks (Karaos & Porio, 2015) enabled the group to strengthen its position as a reliable partner of both development aid agencies and academics and therefore able to access funding opportunities.

It can be argued that the combination of movements utilising different strategies was what provided the opportunity for a significant reordering of the existing civil society–public sector relationship. The major stepping stone was the establishment in 2005 of the nationwide umbrella organisation UP-ALL. Its launch brought together 120 people’s organisation leaders, representing about 600 organisations from around the country (Karaos & Porio, 2015). The UP-ALL also involved NGO representatives, including the ‘Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies’ network, which had actively supported the community-based organisations in Metro Manila, since 1988. Many of these organisations specialised in different issues, such as networking and co-production, and some included in their portfolio protest means and court action. Building on their different capacities, the founding members agreed on a 14-point agenda that steered the advocacy efforts of the alliance. Overall, although part of the group incorporated activities rarely considered to be part of a co-productive approach, such as court action, in principal the groups agreed to a non-violent orientation and practised building synergies with government through engaging in co-productive solutions on the ground. Similarly, most of the advocacy work, or court action, was directed towards the increased responsibility of the people for service delivery and programme design, thereby strengthening their position as co-producers of housing.

As reported by Karaos and Porio (2015), in the years following its establishment, the UP-ALL achieved significant successes mainly in terms of reinforcing the Social

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4 For example, the aforementioned HPFPH follows the logic of the SDI and refrains from engaging in rallies and manifestations. Another strong bloc in the UP-ALL, the groups under TRICOR remains active in this field, while in parallel it is engaged in various on-the-ground co-productive projects with the public sector.
Finance Housing Corporation (the agency responsible for delivering the Community Mortgage Program) and defining the rules and regulations surrounding the titling and upgrading of informal settlements on government-owned lands.

However, the landmark opportunity to further the agenda of the alliance arrived in the run-up to the presidential elections in 2010, when the civil society explored the openness of the candidates to their agenda. During this time, “the urban poor movement made a deal with then-candidate Aquino, so the liberal party (…) wrote an agreement with the Urban Poor Alliance that there shall be shift of the strategy from off-city to in-city relocation” (civil society, 27.12.2018)\(^5\). The massive alliance could not be ignored by the politicians because it represented a significant voting base, which could make itself visible through rallies and ‘street-level’ support for a specific candidate. Consequently, during the final run-up to the elections, Aquino entered into an agreement with the UP-ALL, namely a 10-point covenant on the demands of the urban poor sector.

**Establishment of the Oplan LIKAS**

Although the signing of the 10-point covenant was the essential driver for the establishment of the Oplan LIKAS programme, the urban poor were effectively able to steer their activities through several external factors. Most importantly, the engagement was also motivated by a Supreme Court mandamus from the year 2008 that ordered the clean-up of Manila Bay and waterways in urban areas within a three-metre zone. The order indicated the relocation of a large number of informal settlers living along waterways. Around the same time, in 2009, the Philippines was struck by a number of devastating typhoons, including Typhoon Ondoy. Along with the advocacy bestowed by the 10-point covenant, the civil society “groups realized that as a strategy we can use what happened during Ondoy to better convince the government. So then we constructed the lobbying statement: government you spent now, before the disaster happens” (civil society/public sector, 24-11-2017) and “for government that was logical move, logical thinking to transfer these people away from this waterways” (civil society,\(^5\))

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\(^5\) The interviewees are referred to based on the sectors they were involved in: either public sector in general (including government or key shelter agency) or civil society (including People’s Organisations) as well as civil society/public sector for those who were engaged in both sectors at various stages of the Oplan LIKAS programme.
The civil society effectively gained more leverage to push for its own approach, and the mandamus, which could have posed a major threat of uncontrolled evictions, became an opportunity for better housing. Consequently, at the beginning of President Aquino’s term, the Oplan LIKAS programme began to be formulated. The process involved a series of convergence meetings and the formulation of the Informal Settler Families National Technical Working Group, which consisted of representatives of CSOs, local authorities and 13 public sector agencies involved in the programme in various capacities. The work also benefited from the technical assistance of the World Bank.

Although the realisation of the 10-point covenant was difficult from the start (Gerald, 2011), its process and the resources devoted to the programme suggests that it went beyond a classical clientelist relationship and, as Hutchison (2007) puts it, the disallowed political participation of the urban poor. Therefore, it enabled true co-production of policy solutions and access to governance, which contrasts with some participatory spaces established by power holders in Metro Manila only to reinforce their political influence (Porio, 2012). Similarly, in contrast to the logic of the populist appeal and the performance of sincerity (Garrido, 2017), the deal between Aquino and the UP-ALL created a channel for the realisation of some of the key demands of the civil society. This achievement can be captured within the three dimensions of the Oplan LIKAS programme:

**Financial Base**

In accordance with points 4 (housing budget) and 8 (post-Ondoy rehabilitation programme) of the covenant, the programme responded to the unrelenting advocacy of the urban poor for an increase in the budget for low-income housing. In November 2011, P50 billion (approximately US$ 1.15 billion) was allocated for the period 2011–2016 to house 104,000 ISFs (later increased to around 120,000 families) (World Bank, 2016). The reserved budget was the most significant financial input into the social housing sector in the last decade (HUDCC, 2017) to be utilised by settlers living in Metro Manila regardless of their affiliation with a specific political bloc.
Integration of the Urban Poor's Advocacy Points into the Planning of the Programme (in-city relocation and People's Plans)

From the start, the civil society was involved in the formulation of the programme through the work of the ISF-National Technical Working Group. The initial debates and documents shaped by the Working Group supported two key agenda points of the civil society: the in-city relocation and the adaptation of the People’s Plans. The former represented the continuous struggle of urban poor communities to avoid relocation to distant off-city locations, which typically resulted in unemployment and related issues. The latter legitimised the co-production of multi-storey housing between the state and the urban poor. Specifically, it assumed the alternative shelter planning approach that involves ISF community members in the process of creating, drafting and generating their plan for housing and community development. From forming their community associations, building their capacities, designing their housing and community, as well as negotiating with landowners and developers, to managing and maintaining their own housing and community (Patiño, 2016, p. 29).

Overall the approach was reflected in relevant documentation such as the Memorandum Circular resulting from the works of ISF - National Technical Working Group as well as in a number of new programmes established at a later stage, including: High Density Housing of the SHFC and the Micro-Medium-Rise Building modality of the DILG. This approach is directly related to point 10 (participation and stakeholdership) and indirectly to point 2 (provide support for area upgrading and in-city resettlement) of the covenant.

Embedding the Civil Society into Key Shelter Agencies

The civil society sector influenced the selection of the staff responsible for the implementation of the programme and its institutional setup. Consequently, the programme was settled within the DILG. As noted by one of the civil society leaders: “Most of our networks were there, they were hired because we really pushed” and “during that time we had a very good Secretary of Local Government, Jessie Robredo” (civil society, 08.12.2017b) who previously served as the mayor of Naga City and was known for applying participatory governance measures. Similarly, in accordance with the preferences of the CSOs, the programme was embedded in the Social Housing
Finance Corporation, which was chaired by the representative of the non-governmental sector, Ana Oliveros. Consequently, two out of the three main agencies (Figure 1), which were about to receive money for the implementation of the programme, were truly influenced by the CSOs. Only the NHA, traditionally responsible for the resettlement programme, was beyond this influence. This indicated the partial delivery of point 9 of the covenant (the appointments).

![Figure 1. Simplified time frame of the Oplan LIKAS programme.](image)

**Governance/Implementation Phase: Top-Bureaucratic and Community-Level Competition Over the Programme’s Approach**

With a number of tangible and unprecedented achievements at hand, Oplan LIKAS was “a golden opportunity, was supposed to be a golden opportunity to push for people’s driven shelter because we had the funds” (civil society/public sector, 01.12.2017). However, unlike in the empowerment phase in which CSOs acted as an extraneous power, the programme implementation period posed a set of completely new challenges that signalled the volatility of its previous achievements. Two clear blocs
started to emerge in the initial stage of the programme. The first one, supportive of the approaches of the urban poor, centred on two main implementing agencies: the DILG and the SHFC. The second one, in favour of classical top-down housing measures, was centred on the NHA. The final figures of the programme (Table 1) showed that only around 25% of the fund went to the progressive bloc. Although the scale of this shift became obvious only at the end of the programme, its initial years already suggested that the civil society agenda was becoming undermined, specifically when the involved stakeholders realised that the first P10 billion would be allocated exclusively to the NHA because “the release of 10 million to NHA is very, very inconsistent with the spirit or intention of (...) the Joint Memorandum Circular because the NHA is an agency that builds relocation sites mostly off-city, on distant relocation sites” (civil society, 27-12-2017). This poses the question: How was such an obvious diversion from the essence of the initial agreements possible so early in the process?

Table 1. Breakdown of the 50 billion fund, source: DILG (2017, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>TARGET UNITS/UTILISATION OF THE FUND</th>
<th>NUMBER OF HOUSING UNITS DELIVERED</th>
<th>BREAKDOWN OF FUNDING (in PhP)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Housing Authority</td>
<td>Target: 101,210</td>
<td>Completed: 85,053</td>
<td>32,21 billion</td>
<td>64,42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Occupied: 63,022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Off-city: 75,215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In-city: 9,838</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Housing Finance Corporation</td>
<td>Target: 19,658&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Completed: 3729</td>
<td>9,484 billion</td>
<td>18,97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Occupied: 730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Off-city: 6 projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Near city: 9 project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In-city: 12 projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>6</sup> The number of target units has changed during the Oplan LIKAS process. The numbers indicated here are based on the data of the DILG (2017 and 2018). The overall target of the NHA and SHFC is set here at 120868 units.
| Department of Interior and Local Government | -Fund allocation of P1,05 billion to LGUs for development of 2248 housing units within People’s Plans driven projects. Part of the funding to be utilised by the SHFC for the delivery of 718 housing units. -Provision of interim shelter fund P 180,000 for 52734 ISFs. | Target: 2248 Accomplished units: 434 Off-city: 1 project In-city: 7 projects | 2,489 billion | 4.98% |
| Department of Social Welfare and Development | One project: Provision of housing to ISFs of Estero de San Miguel | In city: 1 project | 531 million | 1.06% |
| Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor | Social preparation activities | - | 40 million | 0.08% |
| Unallocated | - | - | 5,243 billion | 10.49% |

The first major issue lay within the implementation and institutional logic of the programme that countered its progressive spirit. On one hand, the civil society agenda, including in-city resettlement and the People’s Plans, was positioned as a set of guiding principles for the implementation of the programme. On the other hand, Oplan LIKAS was a resettlement programme, and the legal framework, existing mandates of the key shelter agencies and professional routine positioned the NHA as their ‘natural’ proponent. The duality of the approaches translated into an intense competition among the implementing agencies, and epitomises Lefebvre’s (1974) argument that space is the stake of politics. This competition resonated along different levels of governance. At the level of top decision makers, it involved formal and informal lobbying in favour of their preferred approaches and, unsurprisingly, was motivated by political and economic interests. The issue was manifested in the works of the National Technical Working Group on the ISFs, the outputs of which were contested by some public agencies. The draft documentation reinforcing the in-city resettlement and People’s
Plans was approved by the majority of housing agencies and the civil society in 2013. Nevertheless, the last signature on the document was signed towards the end of the programme. “The HUDCC (Housing and Urban Development Council) was the last one to sign this and as a condition to sign they put provision here that the money given to them7 prior to signing of Circular will not be covered by the circular” (government, 19-02-2018). That is, a large portion of the money used for large, distant, off-city relocation sites in the first years of the programme by the NHA could not be questioned as a misuse of the fund. One of the motivating factors for the HUDCC to challenge the signing of the programme’s documentation was the political positioning of the agency. At the time, it was chaired by the leader of the political opposition, vice president Jejomar Binay, who was the running mate of an unsuccessful candidate in the 2010 presidential elections, and one of the civil society representatives expressed the following view: “I think that the HUDCC as chaired by Binay, vice-president (...) to the National Technical Working Group is an unnecessary aberration from the president, for they could have implemented the whole thing on their own” (civil society, 27-12-2017). In fact, although in 2010 vice-president Binay publicly urged for a change to the existing resettlement modalities, saying, “There have been numerous complaints on the manner by which government is handling the resettlement of informal settlers. It has proportionately increased the concern of stakeholders over the capacity of NHA and other housing agencies to effectively implement plans and programs of resettlement” (HUDCC, 2010), the refusal to sign the Joint Memorandum Circular in 2013 was a clear statement against the transformation of the resettlement approach.

The second issue is that the support given to off-city resettlement was related to the practical need of the NHA to fulfil pre-existing contracts with their partner developers, even though the format and location of the housing sharply contradicted the principles of the in-city relocation and People’s Plans. The financial mechanism, which, conveniently for the NHA, assumed the disbursement of money in yearly 10 million instalments, further supported the agency in promoting its solutions. Predicting how challenging cooperation with the NHA would be, the CSOs were already pushing to embed the programme into the DILG prior to 2011. However, this move was insufficient, and the resistance of the NHA and the HUDCC counterbalanced the

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7 National Housing Authority
influence of CSOs on the other implementing agencies. This suggests that direct access to governance space, in which civil society could, formally or informally, try to affect the planning process, did not automatically mean that the civil society had the capacity to navigate the new bureaucratic struggles (Galuszka, 2019) guided by a completely different set of developmental logic (Watson, 2003).

Simultaneously, the competition between the progressive and the conventional approaches trickled down to ground level, where local groups began to be approached by external mobilizers who tried to obtain their support for one of the modalities of the programme. Knowing that a majority of the funding would be initially consumed by the NHA, some urban poor groups tried to approach the agency and negotiate for an in-city option, an effort that turned out to be unsuccessful at that stage. Consequently, the civil society continued its advocacy to position the SHFC as the recipient of a portion of the P50 billion fund. This goal was achieved only in 2013 when the High Density Housing programme was established (Figure 1). This experience revealed a broad trend of communities being dragged between People’s Plans and off-city relocations. The civil society attributed the large number of communities convinced to move to off-city sites as an effect of the conscious campaigning of the NHA and some of the local governments against the People’s Plans. These plans were presented as being long and uncertain, which narrowed down to a message that “if you don’t take NHA housing now you will be demolished and evicted anyway and you might find yourself without a housing unit assigned to yourself” (civil society, 27-12-2017). Ironically, in the public domain, the rushed relocation to off-city sites was also backed up by the disaster risk reduction logic, which made local governments liable for cleaning a three-metre area along the waterways. Thus, the local authorities mobilised to remove the settlers as fast as possible, and the NHA provided this opportunity. In this way, the original lobbying statements of the civil society, which helped it to secure the P50 billion fund, were positioned against the People’s Plans approach.

Admittedly, these plans were not present and the model of development was uncertain in the early stage of the programme, since: “there is a lot of money, you have DILG, NHA, SHFC so you do not know who really is the main agency who coordinate who assist, who evaluates, how this fund was being used and utilised” (People’s Organisation, 07-12-2017). Most of the informal communities lacked strong organisation and agency to engage with it, which meant “they are left at the mercy of
default option, which is off-city resettlement” (public sector/civil society 02.03.2018). Consequently, there were reports of communities mobilised to engage in the People’s Planning process shifting position and opting for the cheaper and more rapid off-city solution proposed by the NHA. However, although the approach had the true advantage of being fast and inexpensive for the beneficiaries, the aforementioned socio-political factors can be considered as equal, if not more important, to the way the P50 billion fund was utilised. These factors emerge as central points of debate when considering the quality of the delivered sites and the socio-economic effects of off-city resettlement (as illustrated by an evaluation of the long-term benefits of in-city relocation compared to the off-city standardised approach) (Ballesteros and Egana, 2012). As expected, the off-city resettlement sites built within Oplan LIKAS experienced the same issues as the resettlements constructed in previous decades. Some of the relocation sites lacked adequate water and electricity services, and the livelihood restoration support in these sites was limited (World Bank, 2017). Owing to these issues, the government committed to providing additional investment and upgrading interventions. In 2017, about P1.8 billion, taken from the newly reserved P5.5 billion, was released for improvements works in these neighbourhoods (Bonaqua, 2017).

Control Over Resources and Development, Institutionalisation and the Land Access Issue

Having established the socio-political context of off-city relocation, I discuss here the resistance of the political and bureaucratic machinery within the conservative strain of the key shelter agencies as the opposition to two key objectives of the civil society: gaining wider access to resources and greater control over the development process, as laid out in section 3 of this article.

The difficulty of attaining a balanced influence on governance is clearly exhibited in the land access issue. This central determinant for the success of any resettlement programme was problematic in the Metro Manila context during the decades preceding the programme. In the early post-colonial period, private sector actors belonging to several powerful families, such as the Ayalas, Aranetas, Ortigases and Tuazons, dominated the local real estate market (Garrido, 2013). In the following decades, the urban enclaves, ranging from gated communities to condominium districts, which were
developed by financially capable private investors, occupied more and more land with exclusive designation for local elites, expats and overseas Filipino workers (Kleibert, 2018). This stark competition for land positioned informal settlers as the key, yet easily removable, ‘obstacle’ for the reinvention of commercially valuable areas in Metro Manila (Choi, 2016). According to the law, the local government units (LGUs) are mandated to delimit land for social housing within their boundaries. However, by the end of the Oplan LIKAS process, only 5 out of the 16 cites and one municipality in Metro Manila updated the Comprehensive Land Use Plans in place (World Bank, 2017), which meant insufficient or no land reserved for social housing. The situation was not challenged even with the support of international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank, which unsuccessfully promoted land sharing and subsidiary models for in-city social housing in the years preceding the Oplan LIKAS (Hutchison, Hout, Hughes & Robison 2014). These issues, including “problems on determining vacant land for in-city relocation” (key shelter agency, 01.02.2018) provided the NHA with a justification for their focus on off-city relocation when faced with the lack of lands reserved for social housing by the LGUs.

However, the civil society designed a mechanism to address the problem. Facing difficulties in obtaining land, the leaders of the main urban poor groups agreed on a multi-storey housing approach (World Bank, 2016), which in previous decades had been contested in the low-income communities (Karaos, 2006). The principles of the People’s Plans were embedded in the High Density Housing programme of the SHFC (Figure 1). The communities were entitled to find their own land, select developers for the construction, manage the process and establish facility management structures. Thus, the institutionalisation of the land research component was supposed to counterbalance the inability (or unwillingness) of the local governments to fulfil their statutory function and to support in-city relocation. As such, the communities were to retain greater control over the development process through land identification while being entitled to source resources from the P50 billion fund to develop their multi-storey housing. This type of compromise had mixed results. Given the small number of projects completed with the People’s Plans (Table 1) by the end of 2017, the process turned out to be vulnerable to various challenges. In addition to the issue of community mobilisation, the land access issue was again what the civil society leaders identified as critical. As noted by one of the civil society leaders: “It should have been in-city because
we don’t believe in off-site so they allocated 50 billion but this is not enough because money alone (...) and People’s Plans will be not a guarantee if you have no land” (civil society, 08-12-2017b). For instance, the CSO representatives reported that the land identified by the communities, after a tedious and lengthy process, was in some cases immediately purchased by a LGU once the community ‘revealed’ its information. Similar difficulties were reported in the search for public land by some communities, with the public sector characterised by a tendency to resist or delay the process, while “there is too much trouble we encounter in raising the fund, explaining the technicalities and about the conflict of legalities, conflict of mandate” (People’s Organisation, 10-03-2018).

In effect, these challenges relate to the question of whether the co-productive engagement of the civil society can indeed ensure a tighter degree of control over the development process while simultaneously helping the process of the redistribution of resources. The main stumbling block for using the fund for in-city relocation was the lack of land access. Civil society operations did unblock some of the idle lands in the metropolis for mid-rise buildings. However, these small successes did not translate into a general shift towards land accessibility. Thus, the institutionalisation of land research by communities could be positioned as an ersatz solution to a bigger problem, which lies in the blockage of public and private land for different priorities. This issue may be linked to simple economic gain or the aforementioned orientation of formal planning towards the needs of elite consumers (Garrido, 2013). In the absence of a fixed legal basis on a countrywide scale making in-city relocation (or the near-city option) mandatory and requiring that resettlement be generally driven by People’s Plans, programme-level institutionalisation was easily condemned by its critics as a slow and expensive solution. This response questions the extent to which institutionalised co-production (Joshie & Moore, 2004) can affect broader governance trends. The case study suggests that in an exclusionary governance setting, two out of the three levels of institutionalisation discussed by Ackerman (2004), namely, inscribing a participatory mechanism into the strategic plans of the government and setting up new agencies ensuring participation, may be easily contested. The third level, inscribing the participatory solution into law, was acknowledged by some of the civil society groups as a missing element in the Oplan LIKAS process. Currently, based on the efforts of CSOs and urban poor groups, the bill on “on-site, in-city or near-city” resettlement in support of People’s Plans is pending in the Philippine Senate. However, when tracing the
implementation of UDHA legislation from 1992, including the previously discussed failure to identify the land for social housing purposes, the effects of the third level of institutionalisation remain unknown.

Co-production in Perspective

The process of the formation of the UP-ALL, the 10-point covenant and the establishment of the P50 billion fund for the ISFs is an example of the civil society and urban poor sector achieving movement from small and mezzo-scale co-productive projects to the metro-scale engagement of co-production of urban space and governance in Metro Manila. However, the implementation of the programme also illustrates how volatile this achievement was. The analysis suggests that the strategies leading to the success of CSOs in the scaling-up phase were less successful in the governance/implementation phase.

The success achieved in the first phase lies in three key points. Firstly, the initial phase included the internal ability to build up a network large enough to engage in collective action. Secondly, it involved external boosting of the credibility of the alliance through multiple engagements at different levels of governance, starting at community level and ending in cooperation with international agencies (Herrle et al., 2015). Social-movement initiated co-production, understood as a deliberate mobilisation and engagement in the service delivery process, was instrumental in these two points. However, the third crucial point, the importance of the contestation and advocacy strategies utilised by a part of the UP-ALL network, questions the understanding of co-production as a consensual engagement and points out how it differs from the collaborative planning process (Watson, 2014). In fact, collaboration, contention and subversion are identified as complementary strategies of the grassroots (Mitlin, 2018). The research supports the view that the interaction of co-production and non-violent protest activities, including court action, are so strongly intertwined and built upon each other that they form a part of one approach. The network did, in principle, aim at non-violent forms of contention whenever the power ‘generated,’ though co-productive engagements did not enable them to secure their interests. For instance, in the context of Montinlupa City, where competition for land was relatively limited and the local government was open to cooperation with communities, the mapping activities of the
HPFP could be scaled up without the need to resort to more confrontational measures. In Manila, where local government is much less open to cooperation and where competition for land is extreme, rallies in support of co-production and against relocation emerge as an essential part of the strategy. Similarly, at project level, resisting relocation was in some cases a starting point for utilising elements of co-production and the People’s Plans.

This approach may resonate also in the activities of the international networks, commonly labelled as utilising co-production, including the SDI, which, in spite of its declared separation from contention strategies, has regional affiliates who integrate it into their actions (Huchzermayer, in press). In other words, the research confirms that the ideal model of conflict-free co-production, either at community level or on the community–politics interface, is highly unlikely, particularly when we talk about co-production of governance. Finally, even if these activities of the co-production-oriented urban poor bloc were not characterised by clearly confrontational dynamics typical of political movements aiming at universal transformation (Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017), the pre-electoral street-level activities of the UP-ALL were a form of political act. In fact, simply building up a network through the co-productive process is, in itself, political. Forming a massive grouping capable of affecting political processes makes these groups and their leaders a relevant force in election-based systems. As such, the ability to form ad hoc alliances (starting from the bottom-up level within small administrative units) should be brought into the debate as an important element framing the co-productive arrangements.

Using these three key approaches, the civil society achieved the following in the first phase:
- secured a redistribution of resources for social housing,
- positioned its main agenda points at the centre of planning discussions and
- had their representatives taken on by some of the most important shelter agencies in Metro Manila.

These achievements left several tangible legacies, such as proving that in-city resettlement and multi-storey social housing is an option, building a direct engagement between urban poor groups and the private sector and designating the People’s Plans as an approach for planned resettlement projects in the country (mentioned in the documentation concerning the North-South Rail project). However, the implementation
of the programme remains in sharp contrast to the hopes that were awakened by the P50 billion fund. It was already clear during the implementation phase of the Oplan LIKAS that the three aforementioned achievements were being challenged. The reasons for this contestation lay beyond the practicalities of the approach, such as cost of an intervention or its applicability to the needs of the concerned communities.

The bureaucratic and political machinery severely contested the civil society approaches, and was effective in doing so because of off-stage lobbying and the shaping of the programme in accordance with conventional budgetary and implementation measures. On the one hand, the urban poor groups, which were effective in navigating informality in their own context, had fewer tools to engage with the informality unfolding in the bureaucratic environment of the key shelter agencies. On the other hand, attempts to integrate the approaches of the civil society were also contested by the ‘formal’ and operational logic of bureaucracy in Metro Manila and the institutional setup it promoted. In this context, the NHA planning routine was put forward as a justification for continuing to deliver services in the same way as it had always done, failing to recognise that off-city resettlement planning, with its territorial and procedural dimensions, was a form of control and oppression (Yiftachel, 1998). Similarly, as in the international context, this happened despite the supposed openness of the power holders and policy logic, which operated with the language of inclusiveness (Appadurai, 2001; Watson, 2011) but pushed for the P50 billion fund to be allocated to conventional housing modality. While the People’s Plans were supposed to be guaranteed through a set of important documents, such as the Joint Memorandum Circular, the flexibility of the approach contradicted the rigid process of the yearly disbursement of money and the legal mandate of the LGUs to vacate in a timely manner, the risk-prone areas around waterways. Thus, the involvement of civil society actors in the process exposed them to the political and intra-bureaucratic dynamics they encountered on a smaller scale when acting as an extraneous power attempting to be involved in governance. The contestation strategies, which were relevant during the scaling up phase, were arguably less effective because the civil society representatives managed the implementation process and were somehow subjected to the logic of ‘accomplishing the project’. Additionally, the programme was hampered by the land access issue. The institutionalisation of the People’s Plans revealed itself as a double-edged sword: the discourse on the speed of the classical off-city resettlement was
positioned against the ‘slowness’ of the people’s solutions. When local governments and governmental agencies compete for the same resource as the civil society, co-production is at risk of being contested. In this context, the institutionalisation of land research by the communities, within the High Density Housing programme, may not be enough to overcome the passivity of the LGUs in the execution of their legal function, namely securing in-city land for social housing. This point confirms that the institutionalisation of co-production in the context of the South is not uniformly a guarantee that the urban poor will succeed in mainstreaming their approaches, particularly when the implementation logic of a programme counters the spirit of those approaches, or when it is used as an ersatz justification for the negligent execution of pro-poor law.

What the above-mentioned experiences mean for the understanding of the co-production governance change process, is that innovations achieved at project- or mezzo-level will typically be challenged when scaling up. The main challenges are linked to the aspiration of mirroring own protocols and ensuring flexibility within co-produced governance when organisations have to operate within existing legal systems which run counter to those principles. While co-production is conventionally a way of overcoming the shortcomings of official regulations (Watson, 2014) and tends to work when there is a strong relationship between the local authorities and the communities, the aspiration to scale up exposes these innovations to a conventional bureaucratic machinery typically more interested in quantitative success than qualitative improvements (Galuszka, 2017). In such cases, the conventional wisdom that co-management and co-governance are enabled by institutionalisation and the public sector should be questioned in the context of exclusionary governance settings. The failure of civil society to fully benefit from the context created by the Oplan LIKAS suggests that co-production of governance is an open-ended process which will experience highs and lows while interacting with the bureaucratic machinery of the state. Maintaining a mobilised network of people engaged in collective action and, even unintentionally, representing some sort of unaffiliated political power able to negotiate ad hoc coalitions, might be a stronger guarantee of sustainability of People’s approaches than the creation of programme-level frameworks (which may or may not be helpful depending on the wider governance context). This points to the centrality of the
internal function of co-production, namely its role in creating large networks linked through collective action.

However this ‘security buffer’ for co-production of governance - the active, interlinked and numerous community-organisations - may paradoxically be threatened when the changes instigated by social movements take the form of resources. The mobilisation of the communities on the ground within the Oplan LIKAS was not as smooth as expected, and this resulted in a large number of people opting for resettlement in off-city neighbourhoods. As much as this can be attributed to the active lobbying of conservative actors, it also suggests that co-productive modality, such as High Density Housing, may not be uniformly attractive to informal dwellers when its initial costs outweigh long-term benefits (Ballesteros, Ramos & Magtibay, 2017). This points to the issue of representation within the co-productive process and poses the following question: Are people willing to engage in co-production when given direct access to resources, even if these resources are in faraway relocation sites? Similar to the experiences of the Capital Subsidy Scheme in South Africa, the ease of pushing people to these off-city sites without serious contestation (World Bank, 2017) suggests that the resources may function as an instrument of socio-economic control, in which “popular awareness of this individual entitlement leads directly to a demand for standardized delivery, leaving no space for collective reflection on the appropriateness of the individualized product” (Huchzermeyer, 2003, p. 600). Although in the Philippine context ‘entitlement’ is only partial since the housing must be paid for, a similar role is likely played by the lower cost of an off-city location which comes with a clear ownership title, compared to the usufruct agreement that applies in most in-city locations. Consequently, the sustainability of the P50 billion fund was hampered by the civil society’s lack of control over the distribution of the money, suggesting that neither of their goals – redistribution of resources and control over the process – was totally achieved.

Conclusions

This article documents the engagement of the civil society in urban governance in Metro Manila beyond the process of small and mezzo-scale cooperation projects with the public sector. The scaling up phase was linked to the considerable success of the UP-
ALL, manifested by the establishment of the P50 billion fund, the orientating policy discussion on the issues of co-productive modality of People’s Plans and in-city resettlement, and the employment of civil society actors in the main implementing agencies of the Oplan LIKAS programme. As such, the engagement achieved much more than past participatory approaches, which provided some new communication channels between the society and the state but failed to impact directly on policy making (Karaos, 2006) or help to disentangle communities from the patronage of powerful figures (Hutchison, 2007; Porio, 2012). However, the governance/implementation phase revealed that these achievements left a few tangible legacies, among them proof that a people-driven development of in-city, mid-rise social housing is possible. The fund was mainly utilised for conventional off-city resettlement, People’s Plans were rarely developed, and a majority of the civil society activists lost their jobs in the key shelter agencies after the change of political leadership in the country.

An analysis of the process offers several valuable lessons for understanding and advancing a governance-oriented co-productive process in an exclusionary governance setting.

Firstly, the centrality of conflict in the process remains crucial. The cooperative dimensions of co-production are essential in the scaling up phase – and have both an internal function (to build up a network) and an external function (to build relationships with government). As a result of these two functions the co-production movement reaches further than participatory schemes, which may dismantle collective agenda-building and promote existing solutions rather than devising new ones. However, moving into co-production of governance is unlikely to happen unless the movement, or a part of it, is able to engage in protests, manifest dissatisfaction, resist relocation, establish interactions with high-level politicians and, in so doing, be perceived as possessing political power. Therefore, the conventional understanding of entirely non-political, consensual movements focusing on co-production is put into question when groups try to scale up and genuinely affect urban governance, especially in an exclusionary setting. I argue here that at this stage co-production of governance requires the integration of protest-based strategies, and that consensus- and contention-based approaches are barely separable. Purely consensual co-production that mainly employs a showing-by-doing approach may be effective in an inclusive
setting, but this is unlikely to be the case in contexts where land prices are sky-rocketing.

Secondly, the research questions the assumption that institutionalised co-production (Joshi and Moore, 2004) is a guarantee of the sustainability of the approach. If the co-productive approach is institutionalised at project and programme level without broader support at governance level, then the process itself may limit the reach of the approach and exhibit the same vulnerabilities as participatory planning schemes. Such a mechanism may actually result in the positioning of co-productive solutions as ‘innovations’ or as ‘alternative’ service delivery mechanisms, with the majority of public contracts being consumed by big developers offering standardised mass housing in peripheral locations of cities. This relates to the notion of conflicting rationalities (Watson, 2003) and powerful imaginaries of a dichotomy between formal and informal sectors (McFarlane, 2012b) as strong drivers motivating replication of ‘formal’ urban practice.

Thirdly, even if communities engage in collective action and are the proponents of governance change, their outputs, such as redistribution of resources, may, in fact, hamper mainstreaming of co-production. In other words, the assumption that communities will always be eager to lead the process of change may be valid when they do not have any other solutions to hand. Yet, when offered faster, ready-made alternatives while being pressured to relocate, many people will choose these over a complex co-productive process, especially when community leadership is weak or fragmented. This also means that reflection on intra-community relations as a precondition for the leveraging of co-production should be repositioned at the centre of the academic inquiry.

Overall, co-production remains a highly paradoxical process. It does instigate change of governance but at the same time its intrinsic vulnerabilities may affect the sustainability of the change. Addressing this paradox is central for academicians and for the civil society actors themselves in order to make progress in scaling up the approach and developing more equitable urban settlements and governance systems. While co-production may be one of the most powerful mechanisms for citizens to meaningfully engage with the public sector, when the engagement reaches the highest level of governance it will experience strong resistance of conservative actors. What it reveals about governance structures in an exclusionary context is that rigid regulatory
mechanisms can be used to support a wholly informal set of dependencies and pressure mechanisms reinforcing the interests of power holders. The sustainability of people’s solutions may truly depend on the ability to navigate those spaces. Consequently, the way forward in understanding the governance change process in an exclusionary governance setting requires the adaptation of renewed analytical frameworks. Such frameworks should question the theoretical underpinnings of this process, based on assumptions largely deriving from ‘developed’ contexts (Yiftachel, 2006; Roy, 2009b). The juxtaposition of institutionalisation vs. flexibility, conflict vs. cooperation, and control over the development process vs. redistribution of resources, may offer a useful analytical device for the analysis of such a process and for reaching a deeper understanding of the complexities of the governance transformation in the South.

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Chapter 4

Adapting to informality: multi-storey housing driven by a co-productive process and the People’s Plans in Metro Manila, Philippines

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Adapting to informality: multi-storey housing driven by a co-productive process and the People’s Plans in Metro Manila, Philippines

Abstract Faced with an ever-increasing demand for land in Metro Manila, as well as with the domination of standardised low-income housing models, the local civil society and the urban poor sector embarked on the development of an alternative shelter approach: in-city multi-storey housing delivered through the People’s Plans. The article documents the emergence of the approach, interrogates its main assumptions and takes a closer look at the implementation process through two case studies, in Pasig and San Jose Del Monte. The article analyses the modality as an attempt to create a hybrid approach between formal and informal delivery systems within the built form conventionally associated with the imaginaries of the ‘formal’ city. The findings underscore the role of co-production in enabling the urban poor sector to leverage their approach, while documenting the need to move beyond a formal-informal dichotomy in both theory and urban development practice.

Keywords Co-production, formal-informal binary, multi-storey housing, People’s Plans, Metro Manila, resettlement, public sector, civil society, climate change

Introduction

With the growing pressure on land and housing in rapidly urbanising Asian cities, multi-storey housing has become one of the key alternatives for accommodating the increasing low-income urban population. Considering the costs as well as complicated construction and management issues, most developments of this type have been facilitated in a top-down manner by public sector agencies. As in similar mass housing schemes across the globe, this has typically led to limited input from the beneficiaries during the planning process and has resulted in issues such as peripheral locations or inappropriate design (Lin, 2018) as well as the dismantling of tight social networks and the spatial formations of informal settlements that enabled a mix of living and working spaces (Hasan et al., 2010). Consequently, although the availability of decent shelter is a key determinant of people’s welfare, these types of mass housing projects have reportedly had limited positive socio-economic impacts on their beneficiaries (Buckley et al, 2015; Huchzeremayer & Misselwitz, 2016). In the South-East
Asia context, which is the focus of this article, co-productive or self-help approaches have been reserved mainly for slum upgrading or site and service interventions, which were heavily promoted by international development agencies from the 1970s onwards (Giles, 2003). Currently, in contexts where civil society is active and land prices are sky-rocketing, multi-storey housing driven by people’s organisations emerges as an important, yet underexplored, alternative for the housing delivery system. Apart from its obvious relevance in addressing low-income housing backlog, this approach emerges as an embodiment of the reciprocal relationship between the formal and informal nature of contemporary cities (Dovey, 2012) within a spatial form conventionally labelled a ‘formal’ type of housing. This article concentrates on the creative process of this approach, which represents an alternative to the conventional logic of informal spatial structures being consolidated and ‘incorporated’ into the city. It illustrates a solution in which the development of a spatial structure conventionally associated with the imaginaries of a formal city is driven by people rather than exclusively by the public sector. The approach rejects the assumption that the creation of this type of built form requires that the formal process be rigidly followed and that constructive input of communities into housing development can happen solely in the context of incremental upgrading of low-rise settlements. In other words, through the application of People’s Plans based on a co-production principle housing development becomes infused with solutions originating from the urban poor sector.

The People’s Plan is defined as ‘a resettlement option and community development plan formulated by People’s Organisations, with or without the support of NGOs, Local Government Units and National Government Agencies’ (National Technical Working Group, 2014). The process assumes that urban poor communities can take on a key role in all aspects of multi-storey housing development including: community organisation and profiling; land acquisition; creation of developmental, architectural, engineering, site development, financing plans; co-management of construction works and input into those works as well as creation of community development plan including livelihood and estate management components (Asia Foundation, unknown). The analysis presented in the article documents this process and reviews the ways in which people's solutions attempt to reverse the conventional logic of multi-storey housing development. In theoretical terms the article contributes to the pivotal debate on the positioning of informality in contemporary cities (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004) and the need to transcend ‘the othering of informality for the benefit of a more inclusive urban theory contribution’ (Acuto et al., 2019). It does so by reflecting on the three spheres conventionally identified in the academic debate as forming the dichotomy
between formal and informal: spatial categorisation, organisational form and governmental form (McFarlane and Waibel, 2012). The research points out the importance of framing of informality and formality as a practices rather than spatial category (McFarlane, 2012a:105) and illustrates that the formulation of spatial form conventionally seen as formal may be driven by highly hybrid forms of organisation and governance. Simultaneously it reflects on the positioning of co-production as one of the approaches that may be structuring planning practice in the South (Watson, 2014) and providing an opening which allows for the leveraging of solutions developed within the spectrum of informal urbanisation (Galuszka, 2019a).

The article is structured as follows: firstly, approaches incorporating an informal housing process within the formal context are presented and juxtaposed with the top-down multi-storey housing delivery system seen in the South-East Asian context. This is followed by a debate on co-production as an approach which enables the integration of different planning perspectives in the housing development process. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the specifics of housing in Metro Manila and a recent governance shift while briefly discussing the openings it has provided for the mainstreaming of people’s solutions. Section 6 examines the assumptions of the People’s Plans through the review of main phases of the housing development process, the role different stakeholders take in it and the ways formal and informal approaches interact with each other. In the final part of the article, the ability to execute the principles of People’s Plans in practice is illustrated through two case studies demonstrating the implementation of people-led multi-storey housing in Metro Manila, Philippines. This is followed by a debate on the relevance of the approach in crossing the formal-informal binary and the challenges it encounters at project level.

The analysis is conducted in the context of the Oplan LIKAS programme which was realised in the Philippines between 2011 and 2016 with the aim of resettling around 120,000 informal settler families from flood-prone danger zones in Metro Manila. Due to the big impact of the local urban poor sector and civil society on the design of the programme, one of the multi-storey housing modalities integrated the approach of co-production through People’s Plans created by the community organisations involved. The debate in this article is based on fieldwork data collected between November 2017 and March 2018 through 37 interviews with civil society and public sector actors engaged in the development and implementation of the Oplan LIKAS housing modalities as well as the analysis of secondary data sourced from key shelter agencies, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and civil society. This part of the research contributes to the discussion of the
governance context and the assumptions of the People’s Plans as a hybrid formal-informal housing process. The analysis of two case studies testing these assumptions is based on 8 interviews (3 in a group setting) with community leaders, involved NGO intermediaries, public sector agencies in charge of the housing modalities under discussion as well as transect walks on the sites and an analysis of secondary data related to the relevant housing. Although the case studies are not representative of all multi-storey projects realised within Oplan LIKAS, they allow for a demonstration of the ways in which people’s approaches were infused into the formal process, and help identify the challenges and successes encountered in the process.

**Low-income housing in Asian and South-East Asian contexts: ‘adapting informality’**

Along with the rapid population growth in Asian cities, the issue of a housing backlog has been experienced by the majority of states on the continent, with 61% of its population living in informal settlements and slum-like conditions (Bredenoord et. al, 2014). With limited resources and encouraged by major international agencies such as the World Bank and the UN (Arku, 2006), many low-income housing solutions from the 1970s in South and South-East Asia were framed in line with the enabling approach (Giles, 2003) aiming at the development of housing markets. In parallel, aided self-help strategies, which concentrated on the bottom up activities in housing development, gained wide recognition. This orientation stemmed from the revolutionary works of Turner and Fitcher (1972), who recognised that people are a driving force in the creation of contemporary cities and that their approaches may serve as a backbone for housing programmes. In the context of informal settlements, this meant involving communities and the private sector in the process of developing housing and promoting solutions such as aided self-help, slum upgrading or incremental development. In other words in those cases governments tactically accepted elements of informal development, while imposing their hierarchies and rules of implementation (Pieterse, 2013). Among the most successful programmes were the Million Houses Program in Sri Lanka (1983-1994) (Joshi & Khan, 2010), the Kampung Improvement Programme in Indonesia (1969-1993) (Salas, 1992). During the 1970s and 1980s, these approaches spread through the continent and, when coupled with stable economic growth, supported many informal dwellers (Yap, 2016), either with decent housing or access to services.

Turner’s holistic approach, however, did not translate into a general recognition of informal urbanisation as a natural component of contemporary cities. A large number of slum
upgrading projects were motivated by a neo-liberal paradigm that shifted responsibility for development from the state to the people (Burgess, 1978). Much of the developmental and technical support delivered by international agencies was, in fact, tied to compulsory reforms, which incentivised states to retreat from service delivery (Pieterse, 2013). Similarly, co-option of the inclusive mechanism plagued many projects (Lemanski, 2017) which were sometimes used as tokens to replace wider pro-poor reforms (Karaos, 2006). Consequently, while many state-initiated slum upgrading projects recognised a formal-informal sector hybridity in terms of spatial dimensions, in some cases they also did the opposite in terms of applied implementation logic and organisational choices. This is debatably the case in the application of De Soto inspired tenure solution, which pushes for individual ownership as a superior model for informal settlements and has been eagerly adopted across different contexts as a policy of choice, ignoring a range of different tenure models practised by poor communities and often better suited to their needs (Payne et. al, 2009). Similarly, some upgrading projects delivering formal housing have enhanced the quality of life of the beneficiaries but at the same time have also led to the dismantling of the previously strong informal organisation of the community and to the gradual erosion of social cohesion (Brown-Luthango, 2016).

**Multi-storey housing in the region: delivering ‘formal’ city**

Over time, the use of in-situ participatory upgrading approaches declined in many contexts, particularly in central locations of big metropolises. This was due to rising land values and increasing pressure from the growing middle class (Yap, 2016), as well as to ideological currents pushing the vision of a ‘global metropolis’ (Garrido, 2013) free of spatial structures resembling informal settlements (including those already upgraded).

Consequently, in recent years some states focused more resources and attention on massive top-down relocation schemes like Housing for All by 2022 in India, which facilitated development of apartment blocks located on urban peripheries (Huchzermayer and Misselwitz, 2016). In South-East Asian countries similar approach typically occurred concurrently with the self-help approaches of the 1980s. Examples of top-down mass housing can be found in Singapore and Malaysia (Agus, 2002) and such programmes have also been developed in Thailand (Baan Ua-Arthorn programme) (Yap and Wandeler, 2010) and in Indonesia (‘Rumah susun’ multi-storey housing) (Warouw et al., 2010). Although the top-down approach has been considered successful in states with ample resources such as
Singapore, in many other contexts multi-storey housing has experienced a variety of problems.

While many of these problems arose from practical issues such as land policies and technical errors, I argue here that many were the consequence of the top-down manner in which most multi-storey housing is developed. They stem from the insistence that this kind of spatial form must fit in with the ‘formal city’ vision, in spite of the fact that an adaptation of people’s solutions could be a remedy for some of the issues. The clash between formal and informal resonates strongly when juxtaposing the morphology of top-down multi-storey housing with the spatial knowledge of informal settlers relocated to those contexts. Disorderly informal settlements were to be replaced with standardised structures, even if these structures jeopardised the livelihoods of the beneficiaries (Hasan et al., 2010). The peripheral locations, dictated by low land prices and municipal land use planning logic, led to the loss of informal sources of income for the settlers and, in effect, resulted in working members of some families abandoning the properties. Finally, the high cost of the structures, including additional expenses created by the appointment of external maintenance and management corporations, made the low-cost condominiums unaffordable and an easy target for speculation by higher income groups (as has been documented in the case of the Baan Ua-Arthorn programme). Likewise, multi-storey housing can be motivated by political gain and tainted by too-close relations between the real estate sector and the decision makers (Yap and Wandeler, 2010).

In spite of the strong formal machinery and imaginaries of an orderly city, these types of structures can, paradoxically and against the intentions of the housing delivery system, become hybrids of what is perceived as formal and informal. In such cases the occupants appropriate spaces according to their needs, often at the cost of re-stigmatising their homes as vertical slums, with the risk of further relocation (figure 1). The following parts of this article discuss the potential for including the people’s approaches at an earlier stage in the housing development process.
Co-production: adapting to informality

Since the 1970s co-production has been discussed as a promising approach to optimising the delivery of goods or services through inputs provided by a variety of stakeholders (Ostrom, 1996). Typically, these included representatives of the public sector on the one hand and citizens or representatives of civil society on the other. Overall, the benefits of the approach were discussed in terms of decreased costs for the public sector and better outputs for the people (Albrechts, 2012). In the context of the global South, an important aspect of the empowerment of marginalised groups was also raised: groups such as the associations of urban poor or people’s organisations utilised this approach in order to be recognised as valid partners for the public sector, capable of providing real input into service delivery activities. Ultimately, this meant a ‘process that opens space for poor communities to work with their local governments and other public and private stakeholders to deliver various development goods’ (Boonyabancha and Kerr, 2018: 444). More broadly, co-production was seen in the South as reflecting urban poor approaches, particularly when initiated by the urban poor groups themselves (Watson, 2014).

On the ground, the practice of co-production differed depending on the context in which it emerged, the political environment and the level of mobilisation of the civil society (Mitlin, 2018). Bovaird (2007) divided citizens’ groups into three categories: those involved solely in the planning of a specific service, those involved solely in its delivery, and those involved in both. Within the European context, the first of these was tested in the case of
cooperative housing, with a group of citizens playing a major role in the planning of multi-storey housing. In the Southern context, the co-production of housing and self-help approaches were most commonly applied through the engagement of the people in the construction process. Sweat equity solutions were often utilised by the public sector to facilitate housing delivery at a low cost, while providing employment opportunities for community members. This practice was common on incremental projects (Greene and Rojas, 2008), with co-productive solutions being applied typically to in situ upgrading and the development of low-rise settlements. Some recognition of the co-productive process within multi-storey housing is visible in Latin America, for instance in the case of cooperative housing solutions in Uruguay. This includes the FUCVAM federation representing a social movement which emerged within the context of self-help construction and, with time, moved to the development of multi-storey housing. Through close cooperation with professionals and the public sector as well as an institutionalised housing development process, it achieved significant low-income housing delivery, summing up to approximately 30,000 households (Barenstein and Pfister, 2019).

In the dominant model of in-situ upgrading of informal settlements, the community groups could provide input into the design of the neighbourhood and negotiate particularities of a project, but control over the development process was achieved mainly thanks to their direct involvement in the construction of the housing or the infrastructure. The involvement of both the urban poor sector and the public sector allowed aided self-help to be seen as an adaptive format enabling planning with informality. In some interpretations, this translates to the creation of ‘positive hybridity’, where the informal sector develops practices that correlate with formal planning (Song, 2016). However, rather than implying an adaptation to the formats of government, those practices are fluid and include both compliance and resistance (Roy, 2009). Co-production, in contrast to participatory planning, challenges the formal logic of the process by working outside existing regulatory frameworks and hierarchies, as well as by involving the urban poor in both planning and construction. However, similarly to participatory planning approaches, the application of co-production may run risks in terms of exploitation of community relationships and networks (Beall, 2001). For instance, the public sector may be solely interested to use those relationships to benefit from community effectiveness in service delivery (Mitlin and Bartlett, 2018). Avoiding these kinds of risks depends, to a large degree, on the ability of community groups to maintain a degree of independence from their counterparts in public sector (Galuszka, 2019a). This is typically facilitated by social movement initiated co-production. Its elements,
such as incorporation of conflict-based strategies rather than collaboration only or principles of collective action, are ensuring a more equal power balance between communities and public sector (Watson, 2014; Bradlow, 2015). Overall, co-production, rather than only supporting policies which utilise informal solutions within housing formalisation, is also directed at creating laws which recognise people's approaches, hence truly adapting regulatory frameworks to aspects of informal urbanisation (Galuszka 2019a) (as debated, for example, in the context of the Baan Mankong programme) (Boonyabancha & Kerr, 2018). However a strong focus on the mainstreaming of existing on-the-ground solutions through a showing by doing strategy and slow bottom-up work has primarily meant operating within spatial forms widely associated with the imaginaries of informal cities. As a result, opportunities to apply a true co-productive process within the multi-storey housing context have been scarce, this being judged an inappropriate built form for the needs of informal settlers by the urban poor themselves (Karaos, 2006). Therefore, what is discussed in the literature as social-movement initiated co-production (Watson, 2014) rarely incorporates spatial forms associated with the formal city. Efforts to transcend this approaches have been made in Metro Manila over the past 10 years.

**Housing in Metro Manila**

Contemporary Metro Manila is one of the world’s largest metropolises, with approximately 13 million people of whom between 1.3 and 3 million are estimated to live in informal settlements (World Bank, 2016; 2017). The People’s Plan approach stems from several decades of efforts of the urban poor and civil society to leverage people’s solutions into the official planning system. While initially the expansion of informal settlements had unorganised characteristics, with time strong social movements emerged in Metro Manila. Typically, those groups operated within informal settlements but the growing pressure on land from private sector (Garrido, 2013, Kleibert, 2018) pushed many of the existing coalitions to recognise that the engagement into the development of mid-rise buildings was the only viable option for avoiding relocation to the urban periphery. This approach became particularly relevant also wherever in-situ upgrading of settlements was not possible, as in the two discussed case studies of the APAOAM-F and ALPAS. In those contexts Local

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1 The term co-production is used relatively rarely in the Philippines, even within the programmes representing features of the approach. Those are more commonly labelled as bottom-up process or a form of participatory governance.
Government Units were obliged by the Supreme Court mandamus from 2008 to evacuate the aforementioned communities from waterways in which they resided because of flooding and environmental hazards.

In fact, the issue of relocation was an ever-lasting problem in Metro Manila, which fuelled the emergence of organised urban poor groups from the middle of 20th century onwards. Initially, in the early post-colonial period, the growing population of the metropolis was accommodated through the development of new satellite settlements and mass-produced bungalows (Morley, 2018). However, with the rise to power of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965, informal settlers were increasingly pushed out of their homes (Shatkin, 2002).

The 1970s were the start of a centralised public housing policy period (Ballesteros, 2002). In 1975 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was established to ‘provide and maintain adequate housing for the greatest possible number of people’ (Presidential Decree, 1975: 2). The agency became, and still is today, the main institution in the country responsible for facilitating the resettlement of informal settlers. Its main task and practice was to construct vast, sprawling low-rise resettlement sites on the outskirts of the metropolis. During the same period the first low-income multi-storey housing project was tested via an Imelda Marcos-‘led’ initiative, the BLISS programme, though a mere 2500 units were actually produced. Due to alleged corruption and the use of expensive design solutions and materials, the project turned out to be unaffordable (Shatkin, 2004). Next to those top-down solutions some alternative shelter provision approaches were tested, including site and service projects, core housing and slum improvement (Ballesteros, 2002). A landmark alternative approach was tested with the World Bank-supported Tondo Foreshore Urban Development Programme. Although the programme promoted self-help solutions, its implementation happened in a repressive environment which seriously limited the extent of the urban poor’s participation (Storey, 1998). A broader change in urban development legislation happened after the People’s Power Revolution in 1986. Enabling laws like the Local Government Code of 1991 and the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) marked the beginning of the devolution/privatisation period in the local housing market (Ballesteros, 2002). This legislation opened the way to wider involvement of community-based organisations and NGOs in developmental projects as well as, at least in theory, guaranteed protection from forced evictions.

However, in spite of supportive legislation, a flourishing civil society and the formation of urban poor groups (Yu & Karaos, 2004; Karaos & Porio, 2015), the low-income housing provision system did not change in an substantial way. Rather than enabling the
inclusion of informality in the structures of the city the public housing programmes facilitated its eradication, with massive relocation schemes dominating over progressive in-situ upgrading approaches like the Community Mortgage Program (Galuszka, 2014). This paradox was linked to the positioning of the urban poor and civil society actors as leaders of the upgrading process while subjecting them to the patronage of powerful figures and intra-bureaucratic power struggles (Porio, 2012; Shatkin, 2016; Hutchison 2007). Although some groups were successful in reaching their locally-based goals like getting access to public land, the wider movement advocating for broader changes in land policies was systematically dissolved by powerful actors in the country (Karaos, 2006). Prior to Oplan LIKAS, vertical densification through construction of multi-storey housing was rarely seen as part of the solution for the urban poor, and even more rarely was put into practice with any real input from the urban poor sector. Some examples of this type of housing was developed on the basis of a variety of usufruct arrangements and include projects driven by the local government units and NHA or charitable organisations like Habitat for Humanity or Gawad Kalinga (Karaos et. al, 2011; Galuszka, 2014).

**Governance openings for pro-poor solutions: 50 billion fund and Oplan LIKAS formation**

The shift towards a multi-storey building strategy was a result of the clamouring of a big segment of the urban poor movement and the consensus that it was essential for the informal settlers to avoid off-city relocations. Even though the urban poor traditionally contested mid- and high-rise developments (see Karaos, 2006), the scarcity of land in the metropolis led to a larger acceptance of this type of housing. A key driver in leveraging the approach was the organisation of urban poor groups into the Urban Poor Alliance in 2005, which eventually led to the establishment of the 10 Points Covenant between the civil society and presidential candidate Benigno Aquino III (Porio and Karaos, 2015). The document acknowledged the main demands of the urban poor sector on a policy level and supported the development of the 50 billion pesos fund (ca. US$1.15 billion) and the Oplan LIKAS programme (2010-2016). The programme envisaged the relocation of around 120,000 informal settler families (ISFs) from danger zones in Metro Manila into affordable housing. Initial work on the programme positioned the civil society and urban poor actors as its main co-producers, thus enabling them to have a real impact on governance matters. This was reinforced by the employment of civil society representatives in two out of three main public sector agencies
dealing with the Oplan LIKAS. Although heavily contested within the sphere of formal governance (Galuszka, 2019b) and eventually utilised by power holders to accelerate confrontation-free relocation of informal settlers from danger zones (Alvarez, 2019), the new context provided some openings for the adaptation of housing approaches to the agenda of the urban poor. These openings were realised through the establishment of multi-storey housing modalities within local shelter agencies, with two programmes being truly informed by urban-poor preferred solutions (table 1). This involved the incorporation of two main advocacy points of the urban poor sector; the People’s Plan and in-city multi-storey housing. In principle vertical development meant that more informal settlers could be accommodated in the vicinity of their original settlements and avoid city-edge relocation. At the same time, there was more space for the development of public facilities and amenities (Turok, 2016). The People’s Plans retained control by communities over the key points of housing estate development. Ultimately, the whole process meant that different aspects of estate development would be shared between a community association (in the form of a registered homeowners association or cooperative), a shelter/government agency or LGU providing financial and organisational support, and civil society mobilisers supporting the organisation of the community. It also included a private developer who was mainly responsible for construction.

Table 1. Summary of agencies and projects involved in the development of multi-storey housing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Agency’s profile</th>
<th>Main Multi-storey housing modality</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Land modality</th>
<th>Delivered units (SHFC/DILG - by the end of 2017, NHA - by the end of 2016)</th>
<th>Stor y(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Housing Authority</td>
<td>Largely top-down approach and delivery of far-off-city resettlement sites; contested by civil society organisations.</td>
<td>In-city resettlement housing programme; -Design and Buildability; -Community Initiative Approach (CIA).</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Uninfract, Land provided by NHA or LGU, CIA envisaged on private land.</td>
<td>36 projects: -6444 completed units; -1676 under construction; -3228 planned</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Finance Housing Corporation</td>
<td>Experienced in the tenure-oriented Community Mortgage Programme. Linked to the civil society during Oplan LIKAS implementation process and supportive towards its approach.</td>
<td>High Density Housing Programme (HDHP) -HDHP based on People’s Plans -HDHP refinancing scheme.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Uninfract; private land identified by the community.</td>
<td>27 projects: -4553 completed; -9304 under construction; -5750 planned</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Interior and Local Government (delivered via SHFC or LGIs)</td>
<td>Linked to civil society during Oplan LIKAS implementation and supportive towards its approach; Delivering money for in-city housing via the Social Finance Housing Corporation of LGIs.</td>
<td>Micro-Medium-Rise Buildings (MRRB)</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Uninfract; private land identified by the community.</td>
<td>4 projects: -634 completed; -34 under construction; -1700 planned</td>
<td>1-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Co-production in context – adapting to an ‘informal’ organisational model within a ‘formal’ built form

While the shift towards multi-storey housing was motivated by the desire to avoid off-city relocation, the People’s Plan is supposed to enable the inclusion of people’s solutions in the formal housing development process. Its processes stem from broader governance shift and assumed that the communities can take a central role in housing planning, organising, development and maintenance. More precisely, the process includes the direct role of communities in:

- community organisation and profiling,
- search and acquisition of land,
- financial planning,
- input into preparation of site development plan and housing design solutions,
- management planning,
- preparation of a community development plan, including property management and a livelihood plan (Patiño, 2016; Asia Foundation, unknown).

Due to their focus on multi-storey housing and in-city relocations, the People’s Plan is an instrument for empowering people to take on a lead in a process which is conventionally seen as a field of expertise of professionals and typically facilitated in top-down manner by public sector. Although the public sector perceived this solution mainly as an innovative housing finance scheme or as a bottom-up housing process, the approach emerges as a form of institutionalised co-production. This is encapsulated in the contribution that both sectors do in all of the phases of the process (although this contribution may be varying based on different skills and capacities of the involved groups). In contrast to well-known incremental relocation projects like Khuda Ki Basti (Hasan, 1990) the process meant infusing formal housing development processes with informal solutions at the planning and organisational stages rather than at the time of construction. It also enabled communities rather than the public sector to assume the role of initiators of specific projects. In this context the application of a co-productive approach responded both to the practical need to address the shortcomings of the state with regard to the delivery of its statutory functions (Josie and Moore, 2004) and to the people's demands for the power to shape the housing delivery process (Mitlin, 2008). Simultaneously, the approach opens up opportunities of integration of formal and informal solutions in one scheme (Shand, 2018) and, when successful, supporting
emergence of positive hybridity between the two sectors (Song, 2016).

Community organisation and profiling are the first elements of People’s Plans. In essence the role of resettling authority is taken over by the communities themselves, usually with the help of an associated NGO. The process involves defining the people who are to take part in relocation, deciding on the process and, typically, mobilising community resources through saving schemes or other mechanisms (Ballesteros et.al, 2017). On formal ground it requires the group to register as a Homeowners Association or a housing cooperative.

Similar to the process of enumeration, which is incorporated in many co-productive engagements, the profiling of potential beneficiaries was a first step towards knowledge creation which translates to more equal power relations between community groups and the state (Patel et. al, 2012). According to one civil society activist, the process can have profound implications and strengthen the positioning of concerned groups within the local governance spectrum:

‘In their own relocation sites they ((public sector)) can control people, who will be HOA (homeowners associations) officer, who should be evicted (…). If people win their People’s Plan because some of the opposition from the political bloc will approach ((them)) (…) so it can be, for example, 900 families times 3 voters, gives 2700 (…) they can win Barangay2 captain who can be influential to some Councillor’ (civil society/ public sector, 03.02.2018)3.

The organisation and selection of beneficiaries therefore becomes more a matter of internal community dynamics and helps to build capital for the formation of ad hoc political coalitions involved in negotiations with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. This approach requires ample time for organisational activities and runs the risk of non-transparent and exclusive internal power dynamics (Rigon, 2017) but aims to steer collective action and prevent co-option.

The second component of the process is the search for and acquisition of land, which addresses the challenge of accessing land in Metro Manila. Previous programmes like Community Mortgage Program recognised the centrality of the issue and provided opportunities for communities to buy the land they were informally occupying. However bearing in mind the numbers of informal settlers and growing land prices dictated by the visions of a formal city encapsulated within the phenomena of enclave urbanism (Kleibert, 2018) a new approach was required within the relocation context. The application of a community-based land search system is linked to the passivity of the Local Government

2 The smallest administrative unit in the Philippines.
3 The interviews are referred to based on the sector represented by the interviewee.
Units in their formulation of Comprehensive Land Use Plans which were supposed to delimit areas intended for the development of social housing. Considering that in 2017 only 5 out of 16 cities and one municipality in Metro Manila had their plans updated (World Bank, 2017) the independent search was envisioned as a remedy for the land access issue. The approach involves a physical search for land (in most cases private land) which means: ‘we (the community) go around, we go around, then we see a vacant land, then we go to the local government and ask the city mapping, we see owner (of) that parcel’ (community-based organisation, 10-03-2018). This is followed by negotiations with the owner, and in the event of a successful resolution, the preparation of a contract of sale all of which resonate true mix of formal and informal process.

The next part of the process involves the creation of a financial plan, preparation of a site development plan, and architectural and engineering design. These elements, in particular the financial plan, depend on the programme modality to which the community groups will apply (see table 1). On the one hand the approach incorporates solutions often practised within the informal sector, such as saving schemes or microfinance mechanism (McFarlane, 2012b). On the other hand it requires adaptation to the cumbersome (Ballesteros et al. 2017) formal process. The degree of support given depends largely on the positioning of the agency administering the loan vis-à-vis the urban poor communities. The communities are put in charge of managing the main components of the process, including the selection of a developer, the debate on the site development plan, its design and the running of workshops to consider the needs of the community.

The project management plan ‘details the daily, weekly, and monthly targets of the construction of the new resettlements site’ (the Asia Foundation, unknown: 8). This means taking on a supervisory role: carrying out checks on the quality of the delivered site and on the progress of the works. Importantly, as in incremental upgrading schemes the construction process is intended to create employment opportunities (Greene and Rojas, 2008) for the community, through the employment by the developer in charge of the construction works.

Lastly, the communities are supposed to create a community development plan which includes basic services/livelihood plans and an estate management plan. The combination of design input and a livelihood plan is supposed to enable the creation of spaces for livelihood creation within the buildings and the site, responding to criticisms of multi-storey estates as ill-adapted to the needs of informal economies (Hasan, et al. 2010). The crucial aspect of estate management is supposed to be designed by the community after a thorough capacitation process (The Asia Foundation, unknown). The assumption is that the people can
manage and maintain the estate by themselves instead of paying an external management company. This is positioned as one of the critical aspects of the sustainability of the approach considering that the maintenance issues experienced in low-income multi-storey housing around the world are one of their main drawbacks.

The People’s Planning: a closer look

The two case studies presented test the approach through the review of the role of the concerned communities in the housing development process as well as the analysis of the process in terms of integration of solutions that stem from formal and informal sectors. This review is conducted in relation to all of the key components envisaged as a part of the People’s Plan and described in the proceeding section. The selection of case studies is based on the recommendations of civil society and public sector actors involved in the implementation of the Oplan LIKAS programme, against criteria including: the stage of the project, its institutional setting and perceived integration of the People’s Plan approach. As such, two projects under different institutional arrangements are reviewed, one involving the National Housing Authority, the second the Social Finance Housing Corporation.

Manggahan floodway low-rise buildings: a co-productive process in a conflict setting

The Manggahan Floodway was constructed in 1986 with the intention of easing flooding in Metro Manila. Since completion its banks have been gradually utilised by people to build
informal settlements. The land around the floodway was eventually proclaimed in 1995 and 2006, which meant its ownership was delivered to the National Housing Authority with the intention to use it as a housing site for informal settlers. However, due to the writ of mandamus issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which ordered local government units to clean three-metre-wide areas along the main waterways in Metro Manila, the settlers were again under threat of eviction. The situation was aggravated in 2009 when typhoon Ondoy devastated the metropolis. Much of the land along the Manggahan Floodway was flooded and the informal settlers living in the area were blamed for the destruction that occurred in other parts of the metropolis because of blockage of the floodway by their shacks.

In response to the crisis the APOAMF federation (Alliance of People’s Organisations Along Manggahan Floodway), integrating 11 local organisations and numbering 2867 registered members, was established in 2010 with the help of a local NGO, the Community Organisers Multiversity. The organisation enabled local leaders to resist relocation and push for their own housing project. In spite of efforts to develop an in-situ upgrading scheme, parts of the settlements were evacuated in 2011. At the same time the Oplan LIKAS programme was being established. According to the programme’s initial discussions, a large amount of money was to be devoted to in-city housing developed according to the People’s Plans. Following the framework of the scheme, the community positioned itself to receive the funding and initiated a land search which led to the identification of a nearby two-hectare lot, utilised as a motor pool (figure 4). This lot had previously been part of a proclamation site, owned by the public sector and administered by the National Housing Authority. The APOAMF embarked on this opportunity while facing the initial resistance of the public sector, which wanted to devote the site to other purposes. Between 2012 and 2014 (coinciding with the Philippine General Election in 2013) the process involved the informal lobbying of the local politicians and public sector representatives by APOAMF (considered by community leaders as crucial in moving the project forward) as well as the selection of beneficiaries, preparation of competing designs and work on occupancy regulations (table 2).
During the process the project was scaled down, resulting in the resettlement of some of the APOAMF members in off-city sites. In addition, the slow construction process meant that, in 2017, some community members who had been forced to vacate their informal settlements had to move into buildings without electricity or water. At the same time the APOAMF was faced with increasing risks of squatting in the vacant buildings by the Kadamay group, which used occupation tactics rather than cooperation with the government. By 2018 only six buildings were completed. Of seven uncompleted buildings, five were at an advanced stage.
but they were suspended due to construction issues with the sub-contractor imposed by the public sector and responsible for the third phase of the project. The final units delivered were up to 24m² in size with individual bathrooms. Overall, from a perspective of civil society groups supporting the process, the project was considered a successful application of the People’s Plan utilised as a negotiation tool for the construction of housing which would otherwise have been contested by the public sector and could not have happened at the site selected by the community. In many other locations the process of in-city relocation was hampered by the pressure of public sector and ‘the people who are along the estero⁴ opted to go to off-site relocation site because (...) they were pressured. Because People’s Planning (...) works for those who can have really the patience, (...) in Pasig, APOAM, Alliance of People’s Organisations in Pasig it is something like that’ (civil society, 08-12-2017). While a part of the public sector shared this opinion, the National Housing Authority disagreed that the project was driven by the People’s Plan.

Table 2. Elements of the co-productive process in projects steered by the APOAMF and the ALPAS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Community and organisation profile</th>
<th>Land acquisition and development plan</th>
<th>Selection of the developer</th>
<th>Site development plan and architectural design</th>
<th>Project management plan / participation in the construction</th>
<th>Community development plan (basic services / livelihood plan &amp; estate management plan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manggahan Roadway [APOAMF] under the NHA in-city resettlement programme</td>
<td>Facilitated by the APOAMF. The group was in charge of selecting beneficiaries of the programme. The NHA approved the provision of land.</td>
<td>Land identification done by the community organisation (CO). Initial resistance of NHA and the necessity of lobbying politicians by the CO to secure land access. The initial offer of the NHA to resettle the whole community was refused.</td>
<td>Lack of real influence of NHA on the process of selection. At a later stage, it is an observer. Three sub-contrators employed in the process. One failed to deliver construction, which was suspended due to conflict with the workforce.</td>
<td>CO pushing the construction of 49 buildings accommodating all of the APOAMF members. Based on building law and negotiations with the NHA plans from both sides were merged. The number decreased to 25 buildings and 667 units. Part of the community opted for off-site at Tandang due to lower cost. CO influenced the final design of buildings (lower location, hallway sites etc.).</td>
<td>Lack of influence on management of the construction process. Due to low remuneration only 2% of the community was employed in the workforce.</td>
<td>Preparation of management guidelines in cooperation with NHA and the CO. Four committees were established: community development, livelihood, maintenance and management. After construction issues it turned into a conflict filled relationship. In some of the buildings people are internally in charge of estate management after declining to sign contracts stipulating employment of an external condominium corporation. In other building the NHA takes responsibility according to their preferred regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALPAS Phase 1 under the SHFC High Density Housing programme</td>
<td>Community organisation: Kilas MoroBaba, representatives of different barangays in Cainta brought together in order to form several homeowners associations.</td>
<td>Land research done by the CO. Identification of the land and successful negotiation with the private owner. Near-city relocation.</td>
<td>CO approved a developer suggested by the SHFC/mobiliser.</td>
<td>Original design came from the developer. After beginning construction of the first buildings the CO is influencing the design through enlarging the unit size from 21 m² to 25 m²+ bath-suite flat (overall 35 m² floor area) and the introduction of additional windows.</td>
<td>Systematic monitoring of the construction process by the CO, requesting amendments and use of correct materials. Around 50 members of CO employed in the construction process. Number reduced to ca. 10 due to low wages.</td>
<td>In the process of development by community members and Kilas Mababa. Design seven committees including maintenance, ecology etc. - Housing planned commercial rental spaces, ceiling fertilizer from recycled trash by unprivileged members of the community.</td>
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⁴ A form of canal used as a part of drainage system in densely populated areas
ALPAS Phase 1, High Density Housing: People’s Plan driven by the urban poor sector

The ALPAS project began in 2012 when groups of informal settlers from different barangays in Caloocan and Metro Manila were approached by People’s Organisation: the Kilos Maralita (KM). The KM helped to organise the leadership of the communities involved. From the start the intention was to embark on a project using the People’s Plans. The process commenced with a land search which resulted in the identification of a private parcel directly outside Metro Manila, in the city of San Jose Del Monte. The ‘near city’ location was acceptable to the network of communities due to its proximity to their original informal settlements in Caloocan. Negotiations led to the signing of an ‘intent to sell’ letter with the owner of the land. In the meantime the informal settlers had to organise homeowners associations (HOA) to fit within the loan regulations and source support through the High Density Housing programme. The project benchmark was set at 546 units. Approximately 50 Informal Settler Families refused to join the process. According to the HOA’s leadership this was linked to a lack of faith in the success of the project. After obtaining the loan, the HOA selected a developer suggested by the finance agency administering the loan and approved the neighbourhood and housing design. Only after construction of the first buildings had begun did the HOA leadership demand changes in the size of flats in the remaining buildings.

Figure 6. Project site in February 2015. Source: Google Earth

Figure 7. Project site in November 2018, Source: Google Earth
The HOAs engaged in rigorous monitoring of the building progress and intervened with the developer on several occasions. Some of its members were employed as construction workers, although the majority resigned because of low wages. By February 2018 the families were ready to sign certificates of occupancy, pending approval of the local Fire Department concerning safety regulations, which followed a set of other administrative regulations the groups had to comply with. Although no water or electricity connections were secured at this time a small number of families moved on to the site, fearing that the buildings might be occupied by external groups. The HOA formed seven committees to manage the buildings. Overall, the envisaged solutions for the estate included livelihood creation and economic management such as turning the community's waste into fertiliser and the installation of solar panels to provide 40% of the estate's electricity requirement. Additionally, some spaces were reserved as rental spaces for economic activities such as shops or stalls and linked to the network of commercial spaces to be managed by Kilos Maralita, through a system encompassing housing estates in Metro Manila whose construction they supported.

*Commonalities and differences*

The case studies illustrate that People’s Plans helped to facilitate communities’ engagement in the development of multi-storey housing and its specific components benefited from the solutions originating from the informal sector. However, the extent to which this was
achieved varied depending of the type of undertaken activity. The strongest input on communities’ side happened within community organisation, profiling and search for the land. In both cases community leaders created a list of people capable to engage in the process and found the land fitting to their needs. However, in the case of APOAMF, the informal negotiations and the securing of support from politicians were crucial for the realisation of the project due to the central location of the selected plot. This difference points to the fact that in locations where land prices are high the key power holders may be prone to opposing community-driven multi-storey housing due to the potential financial return from the land in question. For communities this will mean that institutionalised mechanisms of land access will not suffice to purchase their desired lot. Rather, the process may require engagement in off-the-scene lobbying or resorting to protest or contestation. Similarly, in the cases reviewed, as well as in a couple of other projects, attempts by communities to purchase land from the public sector proved to be harder than negotiating with individual owners. However, such negotiations are also unlikely to be successful in locations where land values grow rapidly.

The level of input into the management of site construction, financial process and development of community-led property management system as well as livelihood plan was relatively high but varied in both cases. The public sector-community cooperation went relatively smoothly in the ALPAS project, where the leadership was in charge of the internal management of fees collection for the loan repayment, supervision over the construction process and development of maintenance and livelihood system. In the APAOMF project the community leadership had limited impact on the supervision over the works and struggled to establish property maintenance system for the whole site. Due to a conflictual relationship with public sector, there are currently two parallel property management systems running in specific buildings on the site, one led by the community and the other by the National Housing Authority.

In both cases input into the design of site and housing was possible. On one hand, some adaptations happened in both projects during design and construction phase. Additionally, individual adaptations were possible, for instance in the context of the ALPAS project where mezzanine areas could be added directly by inhabitants in each of the flats. Overall, the community leadership reported satisfaction of the members of their groups concerning the quality of the housing, particularly in terms of their resilience to natural disaster risks. On the other hand, strict building codes limited the adaptability of the design of sites and buildings. For instance, the whole APOAMF project was scaled down due to limits
to the number of houses that could be built on the site. This led many families, particularly those with lower incomes, to move to a distant relocation site.

The last component of the process, the engagement of people directly in the construction, illustrates the difficulty of breaking the formal and informal binary within multi-storey housing form as most the expertise remains with the developer who needs to maximise timely outputs and minimise the costs of the work. Even from the perspective of civil society, ‘to ensure quality homes, the organisation or the person who really has the expertise on construction should be given the role of (...) managing the construction’ (civil society, 24-11-2017). At the same time and similarly to the incremental housing projects, the solution was supposed to result in the engagement of community members into the construction of buildings, since ‘the workers are still from the community’ (civil society, 24-11-2017). However, this assumption was not truly realised in either of the two projects because remuneration and working conditions were unattractive for the community members. Those who were employed quickly resigned, leaving the rest of the works to be continued by external contracted workers.

What the cases illustrate is that crossing the formal-informal binary is facilitated by the co-productive process even in the case of multi-storey housing, which is typically associated with a rigid, top-down process and mass housing delivery systems. Three key factors were crucial for the realisation of the discussed projects. Firstly, the land access question, which differed in both cases, illustrated how the issue of location may affect the housing process. Secondly, the approach of the public sector towards the People’s Plan mattered greatly. Even in a context in which the public sector was contesting the elements of the approach, co-production helped facilitate the process and steer negotiations between the different groups. However, an unfavourable response from the public sector also results in massive delays, forces communities to focus on lobbying politicians and may limit the extent to which the people’s preferences are integrated. Thirdly, the mobilisation of the leadership of community groups involved, the forming of connections with external community networks or dedicated mobilisers, can play a crucial role in the housing process. In the absence of this, many communities (or parts of communities) under pressure of relocation and with an offer of a ready-made housing product in a distant relocation site, will agree to be resettled instead of engaging in a long and complex co-productive mechanism (Galuszka, 2019b).
Discussion and conclusions

The People’s Plan approach was developed in Metro Manila and applied within the Oplan LIKAS programme as an unconventional solution, which merged experiences from in-situ upgrading schemes within a built form conventionally fitting the imaginaries of a formal city. It achieved this by employing a co-productive process in a resettlement setting.

Overall, while the approach offers an opportunity for communities to access housing in desired locations, provide input on design and control various aspects of the delivery process, it is not free from vulnerabilities. The acceptance for incorporating informal processes is guaranteed mainly thanks to massive lobbying of civil society and is mostly visible within the project phases which are considered by public sector as not requiring high professional skills (like community profiling or land research). Simultaneously, the communities which are willing to engage into the process still need to comply with a tedious administrative process operating with a complex legal and technocratic language. Additionally, apart from purely practical issues such as the affordability of in-city housing for part of informal dwellers (COA, 2017), the complexity of the process (Ballesteros, 2017) or opportunistic corruption inflicted by the public sector, the approach is also challenged on a governance and organisational level. This contestation by the public sector remains crucial for understanding the process involved in creating a formal–informal binary in contemporary cities. Even in an initially favourable context, such as Oplan LIKAS, where civil society had the tools to influence the way the programme was set up, some involved shelter agencies and local government units contested the approach. On a broader scale, opposition to the people’s solutions is illustrated by the fact that majority of the programme’s budget was spent on conventional low-rise, off-city resettlement sites delivered by big developers, which in the end meant skewing the principles of people’s instigated governance shift (Galuszka, 2019b). Similar contestation also occurred at project level and within the implementation of People’s Plans. For example, the community profiling was criticised by the NHA as being non-transparent: ‘we are much better than SHFC (Social Housing Finance Corporation) in terms of output, in terms of the qualification of the beneficiaries, we heard that even non-qualified beneficiaries are given the allocation. That’s our allegation but in the case of NHA we ensure that only qualified families who were not given housing assistance before are provided with housing assistance’ (public sector, 01.02.2019). This assumption, which may be accurate in specific contexts, reveals the public sector's inherent belief that messiness within the informal process is bound to create a malfunctioning system. However, it fails to acknowledge that
corruption, lack of transparency and arbitrariness is also a part of more rigid, technocratic approaches. In a similar fashion the community-based land searches were viewed unfavourably by the public sector (as in APOAMF case) and cases were reported of land identified by communities being hastily purchased by Local Government Units, in effect exploiting the search work done by the urban poor for their own purposes and programmes. Conversely, civil society members share distrust in technocratic solutions, while bottom-up approaches may themselves incorporate non-transparent mechanisms dependant on community leaders or consultants involved in the process.

Additionally the process opens an extremely relevant pathway for direct cooperation between civil society and the private sector – a pathway that potentially challenges one of the strongest assumptions of the ‘formal city’, namely that it is the public sector in cooperation with private sector that draws up contracts and decides who will earn money. The multi-storey housing approach shows that there is scope for socially-oriented developers⁵ and the informal sector to work together, thus enabling the urban poor to impact the process which is typically owned by professionals and the public sector. This challenges not only the city imaginaries but also the conventional pathway of employing large-scale contractors who, within the currently dominant, neo-liberal paradigm of a city, deliver peripheral, mass-social housing.

This resistance by the public sector is not surprising, neither as regards their beliefs (as in the community profiling aspect) nor as regards their interests and exercise of power (as in the land search and contracting question). The case studies illustrate the complexities of these relations. The ALPAS project was realised in a context where competition for land was not extremely high. The process was relatively smooth and resulted in the creation of an extensive housing site, with adapted design, possibility of adding loft area in flats and emerging communal facilities. For the APOAMF the co-productive process was in fact a strong negotiation tool in a relationship with a public sector characterised by an ambiguous conflict-cooperation dynamic, where each of the sites struggled over the control of the process. The project suffered multiple complications yet is still considered an example of the success of the urban poor in making their People's Plan, a point of view not shared by the public sector. In this context, and in a broader scale, this example illustrates the paradoxical positioning of the People’s Plan. On one hand, the approach was criticised by Local

⁵ Beyond the presented studies this was also documented within AMVACA project in Valenzuela City or the Ernestville HOA in Quezon City - see Ballesteros et al. 2017.
Government Units as too slow, and conflicting with their mandate to vacate waterways in Metro Manila as rapidly as possible. On the other hand, it facilitated some conflict-free resettlement to off-city sites (Alvarez, 2019) by giving ‘an option’ for the members of the community to stay nearby their original settlement. As much as part of the local community used this opportunity, the public sector downscaled the original size of the project by resorting to existing building codes and ‘formal’ logic of development, a mechanism which resonates with the notion of conflicting rationalities in urban development (Watson, 2003). Efforts to overcome the divide are necessary for any people’s solutions to be mainstreamed. Co-production remains an important tool for the urban poor sector to navigate this kind of unfavourable governance context, but the reflection on its impact on a broader governance structures remains crucial.

One such outcome can be documented in terms of the People’s Plan approach. Despite being plagued by practical issues, the people’s process for the development of multi-storey housing in Metro Manila shows that the informal sector is capable of completing a project outside a ‘slums’ or shacks context. This is extremely important. The ability of community groups to navigate such a complex and unexpected context as multi-storey housing development pushes the boundaries of what can be done ‘for them’ but ‘without them’. When public officials, as well as housing markets, increasingly turn their attention to low-income multi-storey housing delivery systems, experiences such as those of the People’s Plan can be used to counterbalance the replication of top-down housing models and open up a discussion about incrementality, adaptable design, and mixed-use spaces in multi-storey housing. Perhaps the aspect of challenging the informal-formal dichotomy can in this context be discussed as part of a broader transformation process towards more equitable and just cities. While there are obvious limits to what the discussed co-productive process can do, such as unblocking sufficient amount of land in the most valuable areas of metropolises, it holds the potential for changing the rules of the game in the conventionally ‘formal’ housing development process.

When juxtaposed with the dominant understanding of housing co-production in the South (involving such mantras as enumeration, showing by doing, incremental upgrading) this remains a crucial piece of data both for the urban poor and for the civil society sector. Challenges to what formal and informal actually mean can happen within the most unexpected of contexts and can upset even powerful imaginaries of urban morphology.
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The dissertation explores how the process of co-production of housing between civil society/urban poor groups and the public sector affects urban governance on a broad metropolitan scale. At the same time, it investigates what promotes and limits the outreach of co-productive approaches mainly in the context of exclusionary governance setting that often characterises the rapidly-growing metropolises of Asia and Africa (Shatkin, 2017; Goodfellow, 2017).

The intention was to fill the existing research gap that derives from the Euro-American focus of the majority of studies on co-production and from a prevailing concentration on small or mezzo-scale governance transformations in the context of the South. Additionally the ambition of the dissertation was to understand how a civil-society or urban-poor-driven co-productive approach stimulates the process of governance change, and what successes, challenges and limitations it can expect to encounter along the way. While taking existing definitions of co-production as a starting point, it aimed to enrich the current theoretical debate beyond the rigid ideal models or frameworks. Consequently, the first part of the dissertation deals with those various theoretical considerations by discussing the appropriateness of some of the main assumptions surrounding co-production discussed in the literature. At the same time, it reflects on what makes the difference between co-produced governance and participatory governance. It juxtaposes three main contradictions in the current debate in order to come up with an analytical framework to help investigate governance change in the context of the exclusionary governance setting. These three contradictions and areas for analysis of governance are covered in the following questions.

- What is the role of institutionalisation vs. flexibility in a specific governance setting?
- How can consensus vs. conflict be utilised in the shaping of governance models?
What kind of control can the urban poor and the civil society sector have over the process of development and the redistribution of resources (referred to here as process vs. outputs)?

This analytical model is referred to throughout the remaining chapters of the dissertation. The third and fourth chapters look in detail at the specific context of Metro Manila, where one of the main fractions of civil society and urban poor groups succeeded in engaging in a substantive manner with governance but also faced difficulties and failures along the way. This is discussed in the context of the development and implementation of the Oplan LIKAS resettlement and housing programme in Metro Manila which aimed at accommodating around 120,000 informal settler families. Chapter three focuses on the broader governance transformation process rather than on any specific project. Chapter four examines in detail the formats of the programme for the co-productive delivery of multi-storey-housing for and by the resettled communities. In addition, it reviews the implementation process and new governance structures within two multi-storey projects, one realised as an in-city relocation in Pasig, the other as a near-city relocation in San Jose Del Monte for the communities from Caloocan city.

The findings of the dissertation can be organised around four core areas: as a contribution to co-production and governance theory, and by methodological considerations, practical implications, and policy recommendations. The dissertation concludes with some recommendations for further studies.

5.1 Contribution to theory – co-production of governance

While the bulk of recent studies position co-production as one of the most promising approaches towards services delivery and the inclusion of citizens in decision making in policy and governance matters, this dissertation exposes its slightly more ambiguous potential. This ambiguity is particularly visible when the engagement reaches higher levels of governance and policy making. On the one hand, the study supports the view that co-production is a very promising approach to service delivery and an effective way of including civil society and the urban poor in governance at project level or on a micro/mezzo scale. On the other hand, it reflects on the challenges the approach faces
when truly scaling up. Additionally, the dissertation questions whether the current understanding of co-production (even that seen from a Southern perspective and steered by grassroots), encapsulates all of the activities and solutions which instigate changes to rigid governance structures. It questions whether such mantras of co-production as networking, engaging in collective action, enumerations and ‘showing by doing’ strategy, and working outside of existing norms and regulations (Watson, 2014) will always suffice to shift governance modes. In the light of documented experiences in Metro Manila, these features are seen as truly important for the creation of strong urban poor movements and the study confirms that the classically understood concept of social-movement-initiated co-production plays an extremely important internal role in the civil society and urban poor movement and also to some degree in their external functioning. The latter refers to their ability to position themselves as a prominent movement in order to be noticed by the power holders as a numerous and unified entity. Such a positioning also enables them to establish relations with the public sector, sometimes leading to their role in framing governance and policy matters on a district or city scale. This kind of ‘optimistic’ scenario is particularly possible when the authorities are open to cooperation, either because of their values, out of pragmatism or in order to promote some programme. However, I argue that this type of a smooth cooperation is typically possible in contexts where external conditions are favourable. For instance, where competition for land is not yet so high, where no major infrastructural projects are taking place, or where authorities are not under pressure from central government to commit to other landmark projects. This was discussed in the case of Montinlupa city (Chapter 3), where the Homeless People’s Federation Philippines and local groups work closely with the local government. Even in this context, however, the good relationship between local NGOs and the authorities, was set back during periods when an unfavourable administration took over the local government. Similarly, in Chapter 4, the ALPAS project case illustrates the relatively smooth process of housing development outside of Metro Manila which contrasts with the experiences of the APOAM-F group, which tried to acquire land in the centre of Pasig city. These types of land-related issues were mentioned by several interviewees as being truly influential in the success of co-productive solutions in a variety of contexts.

Such difficulties are even more prominent in highly-urbanised metropolitan contexts characterised by a large proportion of informal dwellers, high socio-economic
inequality and fierce competition for land. In line with the dissertation’s findings in these cases, the ‘characteristic’ features of co-production need to be reinforced with complementary approaches. This brings us to the difference between co-production and collaborative planning (Watson, 2014) and the way in which conflict and cooperation are treated. This study reinforces the view that conflict is an important element in co-production (Watson, 2014; Bradlow, 2015), particularly when scaling up to new governance constellations. In fact, I would argue that it is a crucial starting point for many of the more substantive engagements with the authorities. The ability to protest, resist relocation, and attract media attention and the support of opinion makers may be as crucial as an ability to network and incentivise local governments through a showing by doing strategy. Although none of the bottom-up groups discussed in the thesis resorted to the truly violent measures characteristic of some radical movements, many of them experienced some sort of confrontation with the authorities. Overall, the ability to establish long-term cooperation with different actors in the public sector was a result of co-production understood as a service delivery arrangement, but with a conflict component. These activities were non-exclusive. For instance, many rallies that took place advocated in favour of co-production and supported its institutionalisation.

What is conventionally not seen as an element in the co-productive process but which came out of the study was the importance of political engagement of the urban poor movement. While landmark local (Appadurai, 2001) and international coalitions like the SDI claim to be apolitical (Huchzermayer, forthcoming), some groups in the Philippines utilised their ability to be seen as a major voting force during an election period to negotiate with politicians and initially position themselves as a key power in shaping a major resettlement and housing programme (the Oplan LIKAS). This was possible because, as conventionally understood within the co-productive approach, the ‘depth of activism is likely to provoke a positive response from the politicians (…), in part because such groups are not politically aligned and therefore have votes that can be secured’ (Miltin, 2008: 354). However, when moving up governance structures, these votes will likely be secured by some political bloc, so that the civil society groups stop being ‘not politically aligned’. The co-production of governance may require this kind of opportunistic strategising, and building ad-hoc coalitions, but if a movement is to remain fully independent it should avoid dependency on any political bloc. As with project-level co-production, which is characterised by high fluidity, this would mean
switching political alliances according to need. In this context civil society becomes a power which can shape political relations rather than being shaped by them. In the Philippines, political affiliation with the ‘liberal party’ was intended as a mechanism for the promotion of a co-productive approach of the People’s Plan and in-city relocation. What is important is that this engagement went beyond small-scale, clientelistic and non-transparent relationships with power figures and resulted in a real redistribution of money for housing for different communities, including those unaffiliated with the urban poor bloc in charge of the process. Additionally it meant the employment of civil society actors in the implementation structures of the programme as well as in shaping policy discussion in line with their agenda. Only later in the process were these achievements radically opposed by parts of the public sector, showing that an ability to shape politics had not been fully achieved by the urban poor movement.

The theoretical debate in this dissertation broadly reinforces the view that classically viewed co-production as a service delivery arrangement differs from co-production of governance. While the latter may include all of the strategies characteristic of the former, it also adds to it from different approaches. Above all it includes the necessity and ability to navigate the political environment and can help community groups break through to position themselves as implementers only or as ‘participants’ in decision making on a small scale or at project level. It is defined as an ‘open-ended process that enables the urban poor to continuously affect, review and update policies within or outside of formally recognised bodies. Ideally, their impact should mirror their own protocols and safeguard principles of flexibility and collective action’ (Galuszka, 2019a: 151).

This understanding of the governance change process to a certain degree questions the utility of building theoretical ideal models proposing a single solution for urban poor engagement with governance. Co-production of governance can succeed when it embraces the application of new solutions and new modes of action that reflect the context from which it emerges. Consequently what the co-productive element really means in a governance context is that the actual, on the ground solutions promoted by civil society or the urban poor become equally as important as those promoted by the public sector and that the urban poor exert a real impact on the political and policy situation within their context. This relates to notions of knowledge creation and the ability to gain power and steer change from the bottom up rather than being included in
readymade frameworks. At the same time they create openings for direct cooperation with the private sector, a potential basis for the development of alternative relationships within co-production that go beyond public sector control of the process. Classically understood co-production of services would be one of the most effective channels for reaching a good starting position in such a governance transformation process. It may well, however, start with different approaches, including contentious tactics or the lobbying of politicians. Conversely, some co-productive projects, when missing critical mass and, I would argue here, missing multidimensional approaches towards transformation, may well die out when a housing project is completed. In this way projects are labelled a ‘success’ even without having made any serious impact on governance or policy making (as often happened with self-help approaches). In such cases it is legitimate to say that the project was co-productive but the process cannot be related to co-production of governance even if it ticks several boxes, such as showing by doing, networking and own knowledge creation. Such projects may be labelled as ‘innovation’ but in reality are only innovative when compared to dominant modes of housing delivery, while not being truly effective in challenging those modes on a broader scale.

Even when co-production of governance is achieved there is no guarantee that the pro-poor solution generated will not be contested at a later date. In such cases, whether institutionalisation is involved or not, the approach may encounter strong opposition from power holders. The experiences of Metro Manila shed light on what the issues might be. Both Chapter 3 (governance at metropolis scale) and Chapter 4 (governance at programme and specific projects level), illustrate that when the public sector, or part of it, is not in favour of co-productive or people-steered approaches it has a capacity to undermine those approaches. Paradoxically, and in line with contradiction two set out in Chapter 2, it may use institutionalised frameworks to hamper civil society engagement in implementation, even when those frameworks were co-conceptualised with the same civil society groups. This happens through informal channels at high- and mid-bureaucratic level through lobbying, negotiations and non-transparent decision-making. In other words, the ‘formal’ sector mobilises in a wholly informal manner some ‘formal’ frameworks such as budgets, technical specifications etc. to push for their own solutions. This can be motivated by such factors as:
- Interests - for instance linked to a preference to use specific land for predefined purposes, or to sell the land for a higher fee to the private sector.
- Beliefs - a conviction that conventional service delivery modes are simply better that co-production or that a metropolitan centre is not a suitable place for ‘informal’ or low-income housing.
- Routine & path dependency - a preference for doing things the way they have always been done, or a lack of tools or know-how to do something else.
- Practical priorities - like long-term planning which may, for instance, prioritise future plans for large transport infrastructure rather than low-income housing.

In order to navigate these complex scenarios, the urban poor and civil society may need to learn to deal both with formal regulations which function as restrictive measures as well as with informalities at the upper levels of bureaucracy and in the political world. In the context of a non-political perception of co-productive engagements, this aspect of governance creation emerges both as a risk and an opportunity for community groups. Exposure to high-level politics may come with a price but it also offers the possibility of rewards when civil society learns to navigate this sector. Engagement with governance emerges as a must. Even at project level, informal lobbying with politicians may be essential to move a project forward, as illustrated by the APOAM-F experience in Pasig.

In theoretical terms my findings confirm those of other studies (McFarlane, 2012a; Acuto, Dinari & Marx, 2019), observing that the artificial dichotomy between formal and informal has no validity as both are present within the ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ sectors. Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 4, the People’s Plan approach, with its roots in the ‘informal’ sector and using its organisational approaches, may successfully be applied in the context of multi-storey housing, which conventionally is associated with imaginaries of a ‘formal’ city. Co-production can facilitate such a process and, importantly, it does not need to be limited to incremental upgrading schemes. Even though the involvement of communities in the actual construction process of multi-storey housing may in some ways be limited (unless they are employed by the developers as was conceptualised in the cases reviewed), under favourable conditions the process can be steered by the urban poor, translating into involvement in land research, planning, quality control and maintenance of the housing.
The research also suggests that institutionalisation (Joshie and Moore, 2004) is not always a guarantee of the creation of transparent and sustainable systems. In fact, flexibility with rules and regulations may be a stronger characteristic of co-productive approaches in the South than the setting of fixed institutional and programmatic guidelines, especially if these complicate the process by multiplying legal requirements and standards (as in the case of BP220 building law in the Philippines) (Galuszka, 2014). In a broader context this resonates with the view that governance reform is characterised by messiness, non-linear form and a distinctly conflictual process rather than the ‘technocratic view that sees state reform as a technical proposition that can be handled through appropriate institutional redesign’ (Heller, 2001: 157)

The final important theoretical consideration is linked to the aspect of community engagement and empowerment. Co-production may be empowering and based on collective action but it does not necessarily create the long-term mobilisation that would make grassroots movements sustainable. For instance, as discussed in relation to access to resources, many communities opted within the Oplan LIKAS process for a ready-made housing product rather than engaging in project-level co-production. As discussed in Chapter 4, the co-production process sometimes turned exclusive, shutting out those who could not afford to engage either financially or timewise. Major dependency on community leaders and external mobilisers (NGOs) suggests that the process, although generally empowering and democratic, may give rise to the same problems as any other upgrading scheme and that there will be winners and losers also at community level. Truly rooted co-produced governance would mean that these project-level issues could be addressed in a more effective way or rectified during later stages of the programme. For instance, instead of setting laws which push for rushed relocation, as in the case of the Oplan LIKAS, sufficient time should be allocated to achieve a deep capacitation of a majority of the members of the community to be relocated to in-city locations.

5.2 Methodological considerations

The proposed analytical framework arises from discussion of the contradictions in the current debate on co-production. In line with the analysis presented in Chapter 2, the different perceptions of what co-production means are linked to the intellectual
tration and context in which it is discussed. Although not uniform in their definitions, most studies rooted in European and North American planning tradition typically support the description of co-production as a cooperative process, benefiting from institutionalisation and often dependant on the public sector’s goodwill and engagement. Studies representing the view from the South place more emphasis on the collective action aspect of co-production, position civil society and grassroots organisations as drivers of the process and emphasise that it is an approach which helps them leverage their own planning approaches which are often contradictory to official planning systems. For these reasons evaluations of ‘European’ schemes lean towards rational and regulatory mechanisms and their efficiency, often ignoring the fact that hidden interests structure the outputs of specific solutions as much as fixed implementation mechanisms. This element, although not discussed directly in the core of the dissertation, is elaborated in Appendix 1 (Galuszka, 2017), which juxtaposes different factors impacting the replication of co-productive solutions vis-à-vis standard mass housing in the Philippines and South Africa. While many important analytical frameworks already in place (Healey 1997; Fung, 2006) help in reviewing governance change processes, the thesis argues that certain complexities of the process hidden within official reviews and policies and documentation require renewed modes of analysis. The proposed framework uses the three co-production contradictions under discussion (Chapter 2) as a device for tracing the hidden dynamics in governance transformation. While alternative approaches are possible, the selection of these three contradictions as a point of reference is rooted in a thorough discussion of what shapes co-production and our understanding of it in the context of the South. Thus, the framework allows for reflection on the issues of hidden agendas, power and relationships vis-à-vis more ‘objective’ indicators of the success or failure of this specific approach. The approach is tested in detail in Chapter 3, which illustrates the ambiguities of institutionalised mechanisms and the relevance of reflecting on them from the perspective of those who have directly shaped them. The article reflects on how the institutionalised logic of programme implementation (with its timeframes and budgetary considerations) may be using legal language to support the approaches which the power holders informally lobby. Similarly, issues around the use of conflict and informal lobbying emerge as crucial in the contexts of Chapters 3 and 4, where the ability to make informal alliances is revealed as key in shaping which projects are
carried out for both the urban poor communities and the public sector. The final contradiction (process vs. outputs or, in other words, control over development process vs. redistribution of resources) remains crucial not only because it helps to identify whether an approach made by the urban poor was successful or not but also because it enables reflection on the internal dynamics of bottom-up movements where issues of conflict and power are as much present as at formal governance level. An understanding of the internal dynamics of specific movements allows for reflection on how the public sector tries to interact with civil society and why it selects specific approaches. This relates to the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 which illustrates that urban poor movements are not uniform. In fact, some ‘competing’ civil society blocs may share lots of similarities when one looks at their general approaches or the support they deliver to each other. However, when analysing the internal structure of each of those blocs it may turn out that weakly capacitated communities are not integrating uniformly all of the official approaches promoted by the block’s leadership. This may enable some public sector actors to find cracks in the internal structure of movements and effectively lobby for their preferred solutions.

The proposed analytical framework was essential for the aforementioned inquiry and turned out to be appropriate for the analysis of governance transformation in the exclusionary context, often evident in the South. As such it contributes to the growing literature taking the Southern perspective in planning (Yiftachel, 2006; Watson, 2009). At the same time, assumptions regarding co-production in the Northern context are also challenged. While the dissertation does not empirically touch upon any case studies from a Northern context, the analytical approach was created with potential value for ‘reversed flows’ in theory creation (Yiftachel, 2006) and for its applicability to European, North American or Australian contexts. This is particularly relevant bearing in mind increasing inequalities and the growing evidence that legal machinery and regulatory frameworks are not always used in a transparent manner (Kusiak, 2019), as many evaluations and studies take for granted.

### 5.3 Practical recommendations and policy implications

Although co-production is in fact highly fluid and context dependant, the experiences of mainstreaming co-production in Metro Manila can shed light on some
more universal trends to be encountered in complex governance systems and unequal societies (while not directly included in the dissertation, Appendix 1 reflects on such a context and compares difficulties integrating co-production as a main housing solution in South Africa and Philippines.) Overall the dissertation suggests that, from the perspective of the public sector, far-reaching experimentation in local governance modalities may be required if ‘innovative’ solutions are to be successfully scaled up. For instance, civil society may be able to effectively engage with urban poor communities and come up with alternative housing solutions. However, rather than providing guidelines for such a process the public sector could support the creation of spaces in which the approaches could be created. This might require the loosening of official regulations (with building codes adapted for condominium buildings being especially problematic) and the provision of sufficient time to implement and develop new solutions that disentangle financial support from classical reporting frameworks linked to unrealistic yearly budgets and similar regulatory guidelines. These kinds of solutions require true openness on the part of the public sector, but some international examples, such as the use of direct money transfers or flexible finance within the Community Organisations Development Institute in Thailand (Boonyabancha and Kerr, 2018) show that they are feasible. The institutionalisation of these kinds of experimental approaches could provide more support for communities than designing programmes in line with existing legal machinery which may be biased towards more conventional housing modalities.

The dissertation also documents the communities’ capacities to work outside the context of incremental upgrading of low-rise settlements (Chapter 4). Although such an incremental context may be the most obvious and natural modality for low income housing provision the necessity to relocate due to infrastructural programmes and environmental hazards justifies thinking about mid-rise developments. Co-production of multi-storey housing within Oplan LIKAS experienced multiple difficulties, some of which were linked to the practicalities of the process (mainly affordability and timeframes) as well as to some resistance on the part of public sector agencies, but this unconventional solution proved to be feasible and manageable by the communities when supported by dedicated organisers. In addition, the co-productive approach allows for direct interaction between communities and the private sector and means that the delivery of housing need not depend on large contracts with state-selected
developers (an approach which often leads to the construction of mass housing on the peripheries of cities). Similarly, considering the huge disaster risks in the context of the Philippines, the co-productive approach towards the development of multi-storey housing may be a better guarantee of integration of informal and formal norms than spontaneous developments driven by the private sector. Although this form of landlordism is not typical in Metro Manila, international examples such as in Nairobi (Huchzermayer, 2011) illustrate the risks of excluding communities from the housing development process. The co-production of multi-storey housing with community involvement might ensure more systematic quality control. Lastly, in the case of capacitated groups, community-based estate management might become a valid option, reducing the costs of external building management and maintenance. The potential of this kind of solution needs, however, to be systematically evaluated through a review of existing community management systems.

5.4 Recommendations for further research

In a broad sense the main contribution of the dissertation is the elaboration of a concept of ‘co-production of governance’ built on an analysis of co-production beyond project or neighbourhood level. A natural continuation of the study would be the application of the developed analytical model and the concept in a variety of different contexts. This could be especially relevant in Southern contexts where civil society and the urban poor aspire to transform exclusionary governance structures. However, the study also suggests that the model could be relevant in the contexts of high-income nations where the conflict-driven aspects of co-production are very often not taken into account and where institutionalisation is idealised and the informalities of power holders go unnoticed.

The dissertation also suggests that informalities practised in the public sector sphere are a key factor in shaping the way certain policies are formulated and carried out. Understanding these dynamics, while methodologically challenging, could result in the development of evaluation frameworks to tackle the issues of transparency and political interests in the urban development process. This kind of problematisation of governance transformation stands alongside an already impressive tally of studies concerned with the impacts of real estate markets and private and political interests on
how spatialities are shaped and cities governed. Where the gap lies is in the absence of adequate methodologies to trace these processes. Building and expanding on the analytical framework adapted in this dissertation could provide the opportunity to close that gap.

In addition, the research findings reveal the relation between mobilisers and community leaders and members to be a crucial factor in the success of co-productive arrangements. While this was conventionally labelled in the studies as the presence of social capital (Putnam, 2000), more detailed investigations of those relationships, including through the prism of power and exclusion, need to be undertaken (see Rigion, 2017, for instance).

Lastly, the dissertation (in particular Chapter 4) provides an insight into the role of co-production in linking formal and informal planning systems in multi-storey housing construction. There is an obvious necessity to follow up on these studies in terms of investigating such practicalities of the delivery system as affordability, maintenance (including the role of community associations), location and land use logic etc. This could include comparative and longitudinal analyses of quality of life in multi-storey housing developed as a co-productive process and similar housing delivered in a top-down manner in the context of Metro Manila and beyond.
### Appendix 1

**Index of interviews & site visits**

Index of interviews – M&E experts, online interviews.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Sector represented</th>
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<tr>
<td>3 June 2016</td>
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Index of interviews – public sector and civil society in Metro Manila

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**Informal interviews (non-recorded)**

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<td>02.02.2018</td>
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**Site visits / transect walks.**

- 18.01.2018 – Montinlupa City - enumeration office
- 02.02.2018 – San Juan del Monte - relocation site
- 03.02.2018 – Barangay Fairview / Quezon City - informal settlement / pre-relocation context
- 03.02.2018 – Barangay Fairview / Quezon City - relocation site
- 23.02.2018 – Pasig City - relocation site
- 05.03.2018 – San Juan City - relocation-site
- 10.03.2018 – Binondo / Manila- informal settlement / pre-relocation context
Evidence-based Planning and Housing Approaches Bias: Methodological Alternatives for Broadening Policy Options in Mass Housing Programs

Jakub Galuszka

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Evidence-based Planning and Housing Approaches Bias: Methodological Alternatives for Broadening Policy Options in Mass Housing Programs

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ABSTRACT

The paper analyses the role of evidence-based planning and evaluation regimes on setting and legitimizing housing policies. It explores the perceived roots of bias towards the standardized large-scale housing programs vs. co-productive and incremental housing solutions. The analysis is based on desk research and interviews with researchers and practitioners in the context of two mass housing programs and co-productive-oriented solutions in South Africa and the Philippines. Finally the paper explores in which way evaluation regimes can block or streamline innovations.

INTRODUCTION: HOUSING APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE-BASED PLANNING

The housing backlog has been long identified as one of the key development challenges in the Global South. Along with growing rates of urbanization from the middle of the twentieth century, many states have encountered the issue of how to provide adequate shelter to all while facing extreme financial pressure and a set of different priorities. Consequently, a variety of approaches have been experimented with, including the engagement of the State as a provider of housing, market-oriented approaches promoted by agencies like the World Bank, or building upon self-help strategies for the urban poor. Urban planning analysis found its roots in a landmark social survey, carried out by Charles Booth in 1887, in an effort to map the social problems of London, and has since evolved as a key element in the majority of development projects. Currently, baseline studies and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methodologies are applied at practically all levels of public interventions, whether facilitated by international agencies, NGOs, or national or local governments. Nevertheless, in a variety of local contexts, the process of housing policy change has stalled and the issue of homelessness is nowhere near being resolved. Contrary to the evidence base, many governments
rely on clearance or relocation as a “solution to the slum problem” or replicate standardized mass housing approaches. The latter is manifested by a renewed interest in heavily subsidized mass housing programs in several countries around the globe (Huchzermeyer and Misselwitz 2016). While they differ in their impacts, many have adverse effects on the local populations. Peripheral locations and the lack of services and livelihood opportunities in these neighborhoods are identified as some of their key problems (Buckley et al. 2015).

On the other hand, the failure to progress in addressing housing issues in specific local contexts is not equivalent to the general stagnation in the policy debate at the global scale. In fact, backed by research bodies, the global community has significantly progressed in understanding the housing process. This is driven by global development strategies, like the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2016 New Urban Agenda (NUA), which link the issues of urban development with the debates on environmental protection, disaster reduction, and, most importantly, inclusiveness (McGranahan et al. 2016). The latter is acknowledged by reference to the Right to the City concept in the draft NUA and the document’s focus on participatory development and the devolution of power and responsibilities in the planning and implementation process (United Nations 2016). Overall, a fairly cohesive vision emerges from these documents of inclusive cities with well connected, dense, socially diverse neighborhoods having low ecological footprint. The housing process is identified here as a catalyst for poverty reduction through the creation of productivity opportunities and providing a chance to lift households out of poverty (Turok 2016).

Yet again, if there is a sound global consensus on what kind of cities we want, as well as context-specific professional protocols and research data for promotion of innovative housing measures, why is it that, so often, housing delivered by states still takes the form of uniform, stand-alone programs? This paper analyzes the roots of this dichotomy and the perceived bias for standardized mass housing delivery programs in the context of the limitations of the current evaluation regimes and the utilization of gathered data. It poses a hypothesis that the current evidence base has a limited impact on informing policy change in comparison with other, often off-scene factors. Finally, it discusses the alternatives for making evidence-based planning a more appropriate tool for leveraging innovative solutions into mainstream programs.
METHODS AND THE TYPOLOGY OF THE ANALYZED PROGRAMS

The context of the paper and its hypothesis are based on auto-ethnographic reflections on professional experiences and their analysis, using gathered eld notes, recordings and materials. Although it goes beyond a specific project or program, it was made possible as a result of personal involvement in two monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities: (1) a research period with the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) in Metro Manila in 2012, which included participation in the Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs of the National Housing Authority and independent research on community-based approaches to settlement upgrading; and (2) experiences in Cape Town in 2013–2015, linking to systematic M&E of the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading program (Cassidy et al. 2015). The core of the study involves desk research concerning the evolution of housing policies in the Philippines and South Africa, as well as a set of expert interviews with researchers and practitioners from both countries. The interviews are used to verify the initial hypothesis and conclusions from the desk research and to seek an insight into the interviewees’ personal experiences with evaluating, planning and implementing the programs with relevance to housing. The interviewees were selected based on their professional expertise and were approached thanks to personal networks via the use of the snowball method.

Bearing in mind that there are a multitude of different programs in both countries, the analysis of evaluation regimes and policy framing factors was conducted in the context of the most well-known and largest scale approaches that represent: (1) the standardized mass housing approach in both countries (i.e., in South Africa—Reconstruction and Development Programme [RDP] housing; in the Philippines—the developer-led Resettlement Program); and (2) approaches commonly labelled in the literature as “innovative” or “co-productive” (in South Africa, the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Program; in the Philippines, Community Mortgage Program (CMP) and the incremental modality of the Resettlement Program). This typology aims at a selection of approaches that are located on different ends of the housing delivery spectrum: from centralized ones, entailing the provision of a ready/nearly-ready product, to decentralized ones, which involve the notion of incremental upgrading of settlements.
where a housing unit comes at later stages of the process. The analysis also looks out for co-productive elements in the programs’ set-up. This entails “the joint production of services be- tween citizens and state with any one or more elements of the production process being shared” (Mitlin 2008, 340). The typology allows the inclusion of approaches that are not merely about the delivery of a shelter, but also resonate with the SDGs and NUA notions of inclusivity through the creation of livelihood opportunities and incremental in-situ upgrading. They also relate to empowerment and the creation of innovative solutions, which are considered to be characteristic of co-productive solutions, especially if steered by a civil society (Watson 2014).

EVOLUTION OF HOUSING POLICIES AND EVIDENCE-BASED PLANNING: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PHILIPPINES OVERVIEW

Although both countries represent very different contexts, they also share several intriguing similarities in terms of their housing markets and policy transformation contexts. In both countries, the housing shortages and inequalities are huge. Both have very active civil societies, which form strong networks with relevant local and global outreaches; however, each country radically differs in terms of the resources it has spent on housing during the last twenty years. South Africa is considered to have allocated billions of Rand while, in contrast, annual public spending on housing in the Philippines in the years 2001–2007 was on average less than 0.1% of national GDP, which is considered to be one of the smallest in Asia (Ballesteros 2009, 5). On a governance level, both countries experienced critical shifts in the 1980s and 1990s, when the local political regimes changed. This resulted in the creation of new legislation and decentralization reforms in the 1990s. The key policies were developed on similar foundations but were de ned by di erent means for achieving their goals. The following section traces the transformation and impacts of these policies.

South Africa

During the last twenty years, South Africa has experienced an evident shift in its housing policies. The initial focus on the standardized mass housing approach, which was mobilized by the National Housing Subsidy Scheme (and Reconstruction and Development Programme [RDP]), has been gradually shifted into in-situ upgrading and subsidy programs targeting the development of mixed neighborhoods. However, the
legacy of the initial approach is still considered to affect the spatial structure of the South African cities, as well as the interpretation of more progressive policies by the main housing actors in the country. In order to understand the implication of the process, one needs to look back at 1992 when initial discussions about the post-apartheid housing market had taken place within the National Housing Forum. The focus on more incremental and people-driven solutions was already on the table, yet the political context and lobbying of the private sector favored the approach that was able to deliver the maximum number of housing units in the shortest time possible (Huchzermeyer 2003). Consequently, a project-linked once-off housing subsidy was framed as a dominant program in the 1994 White Paper on housing, which resulted in the creation of isolated townships built almost exclusively by developers. An examination of the evaluation regimes showed a pattern of quantitative and target-oriented measures (see Figure 1).

Thus, while in discursive terms the main policy reviews (like the 10 Year Review) acknowledged the issues related to the approach, its indictors were focused on delivery targets (Charlton and Kihato 2006). In fact, looking only at the program’s objectives and delivery figures, its initial phase almost reached the impressive target of one million housing units delivered in five years. However, parallel to the dominant narrative of success, the faults of the approach have slowly become obvious, with rising unemployment in the peripheral townships and escalating crime rates. The malfunctions of the developer-driven RDP housing approach resulted in questioning the approach and a policy change, which placed the developer responsibilities on the public sector between 2001 and 2004. These, however, have not significantly changed the main problem with the projects, which continued to be criticized for peripheral locations and were argued to reinforce apartheid-like spatial segregation lines (Gordon et al. 2011, 25).
A visible shift in this approach came with the 2004 Breaking New Ground (BNG) policy, which supported the concept of poverty reduction through the in-situ upgrading of informal settlements. It was later embedded in Chapter 13 of the National Housing Code, which defined the principles for the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP) (in 2009 included in a redefined umbrella program: the National Upgrading Support Programme [NUSP]). The process of development of the BNG policy was preceded by an extensive research component within the Department of Housing, although, according to Charlton and Kihato (2006, 261) it was not well taken into account in the final documentation. A lack of full understanding of innovative approaches may have resulted in the common interpretation of the ambition of “eradication of informal settlements” in a very direct manner eventually leading to increased incidents of forced relocations. This is also attributed to lack of capacity among responsible parties (Tissington 2011, 72, 77) and the reluctance of officials, who did not favor the approach. The new approach was reviewed during the NUSP preparatory phase from 2006 onwards when the Cities Alliance (n.d.) conducted an assessment of sixteen pilot projects. However, as indicated in the report, only two of the settlements were truly upgraded in-situ. The rest incorporated greenfield developments or mixed
sites, which included the controversial N2 project in Cape Town, characterized by a top-down approach and involving relocations that led to cases in the Constitutional Court (Fieuw 2015). Additionally, the assessment was done shortly after the start of the projects. According to Huchzermeyer (2010, 139), none of the upgrading efforts in big cities in the country was finalized by 2008.

The next step in the policy transformation was the adaptation of the Enhanced People’s Housing Process in 2008 (replacing the older People’s Housing Process from 1998) and, most importantly, the 2009 revised Housing Code, which introduced a new individualized subsidy scheme that, de facto, replaced the RDP approach. Furthermore the modality of integrated and mixed Integrated Residential Development Programme (IRDP) projects in well-located areas equipped with most essential urban amenities was proposed. Again, the municipalities were supposed to act as developers to undertake all the project activities with the involvement of appointed professionals, who would deal with the design of settlements and houses, including the installation of services, and so on. However, most of the municipalities and provinces adopted the Turn Key Contracting Strategy, which again shifted the development responsibilities to a private sector contractor, including the administration of beneficiaries (Tissington 2011, 82).

The most profound manifestation of the policy shift favouring in-situ upgrading was the announcement of the National Outcomes Approach with Outcome 8 stipulating the target of 400,000 improved households in informal housing between May 2010 and April 2014. The actual delivery of the targets and its evaluation is discussed in the following sections and illustrated in Figure 1. The implementation issues as well as the drying up of subsidy money led to yet another mobilization of transformative forces promoting the in-situ upgrading approach. Another “White Paper” is currently in the discussion and consultation phase.

**The Philippines**

The housing policy transformation process in the Philippines followed a radically different pattern. Soon after the fall of the Marcos regime, the state-led housing approach started to reverse. The changes were initiated with the Philippines
constitution from 1987 and a shift began positioning the state as the “enabler” of housing rather than its “provider.” The new focus was on decentralization, reinforcing participatory development and involvement of the private market, all of which were strongly reflected in the Urban and Housing Development Act (1992). Additionally, a number of mortgage institutions were established to assist the poor to access financing opportunities. In 1994, the National Shelter Program was defined and it included several programs designed for the delivery of socialized housing in the country. The most important ones were the Resettlement Programme, the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) and the land proclamations system, the latter two of which were strongly inspired by self-help solutions, co-production and the notion of incremental development. However, unlike in South Africa, these innovative programs were not entirely new as land proclamations had happened in previous decades and the CMP had been launched in 1988. Additionally, during the 1970s, Metro Manila experienced a massive slum upgrading effort within the World Bank’s Tondo Urban Development Project. Although the results did not prove to be sustainable, the legacy of the experience might in some way have affected the thinking on the new urban polices in the Philippines.

Both the CMP and the land proclamations had been focused on the provision of secure tenure with the intention to support the upgrading of concerned areas and the eventual formalization of housing. Although the CMP is acclaimed as an innovative approach, based on comprehensive review of the case studies (Karaos et al. 2011), much of the program’s attention was devoted to mortgage recovery rather than poverty reduction (Porio and Crisol 2004). Analogously, the CMP evaluations have been focused on the former. Due to the high level of exibility, the outcomes of the CMP, as well as land proclamations, differ on a case-to-case basis and are linked to the capacities of the concerned communities, local government units and local political relations as well. In terms of land proclamation sites, some of them did not change over the decades, while others underwent gradual transformation with the provision of infrastructure, reblocking and the consolidation of housing (Galuszka 2014). Hence, quantitative indicators showing the number of “benefiting households” are not truly comprehensive. Overall, over the years, a number of issues have been identified. The CMP rarely moved out of the land acquisition phase (98% of all loans) and did not achieve scale up. A
major innovation was introduced in 2007 when the Localized Community Mortgage Program was initiated. Its intention was to strengthen the participation of the local government units (LGUs) in the financing and implementation of the process. However, up to 2015 only 9 LGUs participated with 28 overall projects (Ballesteros et al. 2015, 21, 56), which may suggest that LGUs were not that interested in taking on other fiscal and organizational responsibilities.

Next to these co-productive solutions, the Resettlement Program has been responsible for producing a large number of housing units, mainly in and around Metro Manila (see Figure 2). This program is identified to have three dominant modalities, which include developer-led, incremental and mixed approaches. The developer-led modality is dominant in the Greater Manila Area where, between 2003–2010, 70% of the 45 projects were delivered by developers (with only 6 incremental and 7 mixed sites) (Ballesteros and Egana 2012, 34). The key feature of the developer-led Resettlement Program was that it involved the developers’ implementation of the sites from selecting the locations, purchasing the land for site development and construction of row housing. The ready product was delivered to the National Housing Authority and then the people were relocated, arguably, in a humanitarian manner. The popularity of the modality was linked to the mandatory requirement for the private sector to set aside 20% of all proposed subdivision areas for socialized housing or to contribute an equivalent amount through set payments. However, this intentionally pro-poor policy turned out to have adverse effects on livelihoods, promoting urban sprawl and unemployment through the dominant delivery of housing on cheap land outside of the city (Lindeld and Naik Singru 2014; Galuszka 2013). Additionally, a number of issues in the implementation have been raised and were related to the inability and unwillingness of the local government divisions to secure good, in-city locations for site development (Ballesteros 2009). Overall, the developer-led modality of the Resettlement Program in the Philippines curiously reminds one of South Africa’s RDP housing: it results in similar issues in such a different context, including peripheral development, development of low-quality housing and reinforcing sociospatial polarization on a city scale.
On the other end of the spectrum of housing modalities is the incremental housing resettlement process, which, arguably, responds to the principle of housing being used as a tool to stimulate livelihood opportunities. It entails involving the communities in building their homes with delivered materials and in the majority of cases it is executed as an in-city relocation. The disparity between the developer-led and incremental modalities raises the question of why the former became the dominant option in Metro Manila. Although the rapidity and initially lower costs are the obvious arguments for policymakers, the success of the somehow related CMP process should act in favor of this incremental modality. The comprehensive evaluation of the NHA Resettlement Program was realized in 2012 and it recommended that the in-city incremental modality be the preferred option with better welfare effects, although it was characterized by initially higher costs and a complicated process (Ballesteros and Egana 2012).

Overall, the Philippines housing policy is a contradictory space: on the one hand it is prized for its innovativeness and very active urban poor sector; on the other, it
maintains an influential and rather top-down mass housing scheme (in spite of having an incremental policy option at hand) and there are often incidents of forced relocations. As seen by Gavin Shatkin, this dichotomy is linked to a broader response of government to two powerful transformative forces in the country: the civil society and the political and economic circles. Local “innovative policy and housing programs have been systematically undermined by many actors both in government agencies and the private sector who have employed legal obstacles, loopholes, and non-compliance” (Shatkin 2012, 21). This translates into limited space for policy change within the official governmental programs. According to Kristina Constantino-David, the former head of Housing and Urban Development, the policy shift from 1998 aimed at discarding the privileged position of developers in housing programs and a shift of the department’s budgets in favor of the urban poor (from 20% to 80% devoted to socialized housing) was confronted with “angry protests from the real estate sector” and a passiveness from top decisionmakers and aid agencies in interfering with various interest groups (Constantino-David 2004, 133).

The most recent innovation connects to the 2011–2016 50 billion Peso OpIn LIKAS (Informal Settler Families) Program. It is concentrating on in-city housing and is targeting people for resettlement from the disaster prone areas in Metro Manila (Karaos and Porio 2015). Its establishment is linked to advocacy of the urban poor network, UP-ALL, which was able to sign a ten-point covenant with the previous president, Noynoy Aquino, before his election. On the other hand, its final shape is affected by the recommendations from the World Bank. The new program resulted in the establishment of the High Density Housing program involving the construction of condominium or cooperative types of buildings being managed in a cooperative manner within the CMP or LGU financing scheme. Although offering an in-city resettlement option and addressing the issues of urban sprawl, its affordability for the poorest informal settlers is questionable (Ballesteros et al. 2015, 32). Similarly, even though the process has an extensive community involvement component, it seriously limits the engagement of communities in a construction phase as the developers or contractors realize the larger structures. As such, the innovation reverses the most co-productive-oriented aspect of the CMP. Last, in 2014 an extensive intragovernmental consultation process for a new National Informal Settlements Upgrading Strategy for the Philippines
was conducted and outlined an ambitious target of one million informal settler families benefiting from quality housing, services, livelihood and transportation by 2025 (Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council 2014, VII).

RESULTS

The review was followed by interviews with local experts who were asked to identify the most important framing factors for policy change in their countries, as well as giving their opinions about the roles of evidence-based planning. The shortcomings of current M&E frameworks were discussed and some desired changes were proposed. Although approaching the topic from very different angles, the experts shared a common view on several policy framing issues, with classical M&E not being considered as a main factor.

Main policy framing factors

Sociopolitical factors: who decides and why do they decide?

Political considerations have been identified by the majority of the interviewees as having a major impact on housing policy formulation. Three of the identified subfactors can be categorized as political gains, ideologies and off-scene factors that also relate to advocacy of the urban poor. All of these have a strong impact on the social concepts of human settlements. Post-1994 South Africa is a clear example of where the lack of housing was identified as one of the strongest manifestations of inequality and in justice. The focus on rapid provision, rather than enabling, was the most obvious political and ideological choice for the ANC party during its first term. The setting of overwhelming housing targets has, therefore, been a manifestation of a “service delivery” approach, which framed the discussions of political leaders who tend to be tempted “to give big solutions and make mega projects sound great” (interview 31) to the community, on the ground level where the “RDP has been promised by Ward Chancellors to communities in order to get the votes” (interview Calvo Boixet). The discourse around the RDP housing and the social concept of ideal housing outlasted the responsible housing policy.
The interviewees, who were involved in the promotion of upgrading and incremental approaches, have faced these difficulties directly: “during the community workshops in Khaya, Johannesburg, different housing options were supposed to be discussed but community members from the start did not want to consider any other option than the RDP type of housing” (interview Calvo Boixet); or “in one settlement people were ok with the idea of contributing their own resources to the construction but they strongly contested any changes in the traditional housing typology, for instance, two-story housing was declined” (interview Torresi). Similarly, the concept of a good neighborhood has been exclusionary for the informal settlers whose presence was considered detrimental to commercial developments or even to their neighbors with similar socio-economic status (interview Torresi; interview 4; see also Pieterse 2009). In this type of context it might be hard to push forward the concept of mixed neighborhoods and roll out in-situ upgrading.

Although the enabling approach promoted in the Philippines is radically different, the political gains and urban issues were also reflected in the presidential election process in 2010, when the urban poor sector was able to push forward its agenda.
Next to the level of political pragmatism, the interviewees underscored pure ideological reasons that seemed to be truly internalized by high-level bureaucracy. This is, paradoxically, reflected in contradictory policy orientations in both countries. For instance, in the case of Johannesburg, two lines of thinking about the city are present (interview 3): one, promoted by the provincial government, supports the development of a “smart province;” the other, positioned in the city administration, supports the concept of Johannesburg as a “world-class African city.” Most recently the latter was also confronted with the discourse on the sustainable development and in-situ upgrading, which is said to be represented in the new city’s Spatial Development Framework 2040 (UN-Habitat, 2016). In Manila the narrative of pro-poor development seems to have been present for decades yet, at the same time, huge real estate driven, business district projects, like the Bonifacio Global City, are heavily supported.

Off-scene factors can sometimes have an equally powerful impact as the ideological factors and the political gains aspect (as in the 1992–94 lobbying of the private market against the enabling approach as promoted by the civil society in South Africa); this suggests that already at the policy formulation stage there should be some form of external monitoring applied (interview Fokdal). Additionally, interviewees mentioned that the ongoing preference for standardized developer-led housing modalities, rather than facilitating in-situ upgrading, might have been linked to personal connections and individual benefits (interview Torresi; interview 8). Similarly, good personal relations between communities and governmental stakeholders can indeed increase the chance of specific area-based interventions being implemented.

Who implements? Mandates and capacities

The second group of factors affecting policy changes are the capacities and mandates of the implementing organizations. These can be linked to two subcategories: overlapping/conflicting mandates and lack of capacities. The first level—overlapping/conflicting mandates of implementing organizations—was reported to be an issue in both countries. Although the need for diversified housing products was underscored (interview McVitty), the issues of overlapping and unclear responsibilities were considered as problematic (Galuszka 2013). For instance, in South Africa the envisaged role of municipalities to administer national housing programs was stalled
because they were not able to complete necessary accreditation procedures. Currently, while new policy instruments—like the Integrated Urban Development Framework, Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (2013) or new “White Paper” draft—are starting to line up towards incremental in-situ upgrading methodology, there is still lack of operation clarity on the implementation process (interview Kumar).

Another of the key examples is the mixed priorities and mandates of different levels of government in both countries. Although provincial governments might be interested in high housing delivery numbers (which are politically motivated), the municipalities need to provide infrastructure and accommodate the land for these developments. In a long-term focus on quantity, other considerations come into play, such as maintenance and transportation costs in sprawling neighborhoods (interviews Gotsch; Kumar). The second sub-element is the lack of capacity, evident especially in the case of co-productive approaches, which require mid-level administration to use a new set of skills (interviews Kumar; Calvo Boixet).

In South Africa, the initial limited understanding of the in-situ upgrading process was evident and M&E procedures, rather than capturing the problems, were legitimizing misinterpretations of the approach. One of the main issues links to including greeneld developments in the quantitative target of 400,000 upgraded households, whenever parts of the beneficiaries who receive new housing originate from informal settlements (interview Fieuw). The presentation of the results turns out to be problematic and fudges what is really happening on the ground (interview 3). Moreover, officials are judged based on reaching their targets and not on the long-term welfare effects of applied policies, which does not incentivize them to initiate the learning process to accommodate the new policies. This might explain why the capacity building and evaluating component of NUSP laid out in the Annexure 1 for Outcome 8 of Delivery Agreements (South African Government n.d., 18–20) have not yet resulted in full comprehension of the upgrading process.

In the Philippines mid-level bureaucracy is also reported to lag behind in terms of implementation of innovative policies. This is visible within Comprehensive Land Use Plans, which should identify land for socialized housing within LGUs, but which often are prepared in a reactive manner just to satisfy government instead of providing real
solutions to the local problems (interview 9). Similarly an anecdotal feedback explaining the limited outreach of the incremental resettlement program in Metro Manila links it to the unwillingness of high-ranking officials, who considered the process to be “messy.” Overall, it seems natural that implementation typically lags behind several years after the policy change (interview Kumar). In co-productive interventions, the learning process can be considered to be even longer as it also needs to happen on the NGO and community side, which in the South African case often turns out to be problematic (interview Torresi). Although long periods of learning by doing seem to be a necessity, it also affects public perceptions of specific approaches. In such a context, the time-limited pilot projects are vulnerable to numerous mistakes and should be treated as a laboratory of change, rather than a true showcase of an approach.

Evidence-based planning: What are the issues?

In both countries the monitoring, evaluation and assessment of policies and housing programs is systematically conducted. Similarly, both have several institutions responsible for these studies and have access to internal governmental data. In South Africa, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation monitors the outcomes of policies, like National Outcomes Strategy, and works on the development of assessment tools, like Development Indicators or Citizen Based Monitoring. Analogous structures exist in provincial and city governments. In the Philippines, relevant governmental institutions conduct internal monitoring and their programs are the subject of evaluations conducted by the PIDS based at the National Economic and Development Authority. Many of those hold relevant findings, which in one way or another affect local policies. However, as discussed in the previous sections, the evidence base is often not considered by experts as a primary tool that can steer the transformation of policies, especially if these were to promote solutions with a high degree of exibility and co-production. In the second part of the interviews, several main issues with the existing M&E methodologies and the way in which they translate into policy innovations were analyzed. The listed issues can be categorized into two groups: the M&E burden and M&E set-up and objectives.

M&E burden

This category strongly links to the “mandates and capacities” group of policy-framing
factors. Similar to the complicated policies, the complicated M&E procedures are not always understood or considered as necessary (interview Torresi). First, this links to limited capacities. Second, while a project or program’s M&E should provide an internal learning opportunity, often it is seen as a judgment on the personal skills of the project staff (interview Gotsch). Third, the typical project cycle management set-up requires putting significant resources and time into M&E activities. For small organizations, it can become a burden, for instance, when different funding agencies use different types of indicators and templates (interviews Gotsch; Torresi). This is why simplicity is considered to be one of the most relevant characteristics of the M&E processes and indicators. On the other hand, some of the M&E procedures can unwittingly promote large-scale standardized housing where the evaluating body mainly interacts with unorganized individuals and where it is relatively easier to gather data. In the case of in-situ upgrading interventions, one typically needs to engage in a participatory evaluation scheme or the employment of local fieldworkers. In long lasting projects, this latter type of engagement can become a relevant source of income and hence be a very sought-after position, which can be the subject of internal tensions and power dynamics in a community.

**M&E set-up and objectives**

The interviewees mentioned the M&E set-up issues as another key factor that can be blamed for the reproduction of conservative policies. The main group of issues can be categorized as: timeframes of evaluations, standardization issues, outputs vs. outcomes orientation, and rationalization issues. First, the typical logic of M&E includes ongoing monitoring and ex-post evaluation shortly after the delivery of the project, which does not, necessarily, enable capturing the project outcomes (interviews Gotsch; Torresi; Lusterio). For instance, monitoring the housing quality in developer-led resettlement projects around Metro Manila tended to be done shortly after their construction phase; as a result, the resilience of houses or climatic response of structures were not included (interview Lusterio).

Second, different agencies responsible for specific programs use different types of baseline data and different indicators. This has been considered especially troubling in the case of informal settlements, which are not always well understood by formal
agencies. This is why one of the key strategies of urban poor movements is to engage in enumerations and profiling of settlements, which enables them to negotiate their needs with formal actors more easily (Patel et al. 2012). The necessity of getting comprehensive baseline data is gradually internalized by local governments. One of the examples of the formulation of uniform baseline data for upgrading informal settlements is happening currently in Western Cape, where the Community Organisation Resource Centre did the rapid assessment of about one hundred informal settlements for the province with the results informing the Informal Settlements Support Plan (interview Kumar).

Third, as illustrated by the example of large country-level programs, the policies are evaluated based on quantitative target delivery (see Figures 1 and 2). Although the interviewed experts did not disqualify quantitative targets, they underscored the necessity to shift the focus from output-based evaluations to outcome-based evaluations. As such, the obvious choice in long-term evaluations is to look at the livelihood impacts, employment, crime, and so on (interviews Calvo Boixet; Fieuw; Fokdal; Gotsch; Kumar; Lusterio; Tissington; Torresi) rather than concentrating solely on the number of installed taps or completed housing units. This would be very relevant for co-productive solutions, which potentially have stronger welfare impacts than standardized mass housing, but solid data for proving these points is often not available through standard M&E approaches. Last, the current M&E framework focuses on the rationalization of all of the project aspects. As such, it rarely counters for flexibility, unexpected process, outcomes and innovations (interview Gotsch), which can be the strongest advantages of this type of approach to enabling innovations in the community-government interface (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004). Consequently, a whole set of very relevant, but not quantifiable, benefits for the community are not captured by these evaluations.

CONCLUSIONS

When comparing the level of decrease in informal settlements in South Africa and the Philippines, the pure quantitative information suggests that the first country achieved enormous success while the second failed in terms of upgrading efforts. However, as discussed in the previous sections, this does not necessarily reflect long-term effects of
applied policies on people's lives and a city's development. Although it is common knowledge that target-oriented, quantitative evaluations rarely hold the whole truth about the urban realm, in a political environment everybody from the top decisionmakers to midlevel bureaucrats orient their activities and are held accountable through achieving these targets. Consequently, a truly comprehensive evidence base may not be well taken into account when new policy directions are explored. Based on the expert recommendations, this paradoxical situation needs to be challenged through greater systemic focus on outcome-based instead of the output-based evaluation measures, standardization of information about alternative approaches and, simply speaking, making the evaluation tools easier and less time consuming to use. Additionally, as the main policy-framing factors have been identified as sociopolitical factors, changing the mind-set and professional routine of the high and midlevel stakeholders requires more than just capacitation measures. New monitoring and evaluation approaches must be introduced and they should aim at tracking the policy formulation process with special focus on the economic and political benefits for the main stakeholders involved. Full transparency at early stages of the policy formulation process as well as potential and immediate political consequences of the choices should guarantee that the decisions are made with higher consideration for the real and long-term needs of the end users of a housing product.

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July 2016. Arlene Lusterio, Tao Pilipinas - Director, August 2016.

Kate Tissington, Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa - Senior Researcher/University of Witwatersrand, July 2016.

Barbara Torresi, Independent Consultant, July 2016.
Appendix 3
Statement of contribution

The contribution of the author to the three core chapters of this thesis (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) is indicated in the following:


Jakub Galuszka is the single author


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